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The dynamics of surprise and curiosity 
 
Not everything makes sense. Things change and people are often 
confronted with unexpected or novel situations that are not completely 
understood right away. These “not knowing” situations trigger specific 
affective states or emotions, such that people experience surprise when 
confronted with an unexpected event (Meyer, Reisenzein, & 
Schützwohl, 1997) and feel curious when they realize they have a gap in 
their information (Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia, 2005). Surprise and 
curiosity are thus related to people’s knowledge or understanding of 
their environment and for that reason they are also referred to as 
knowledge or epistemology-based states (Keltner & Shiota, 2003; Silvia, 
2008). 
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Surprise and curiosity are typically temporary. People are 
sensemakers and often resolve their lack of knowledge or 
understanding. As such, these knowledge states unfold from not 
knowing something to discovering what it is all about. Surprise and 
curiosity are thus dynamic states that change depending on where 
people are in their process of making sense. Based on this, I1 will argue 
and show that to understand surprise and curiosity it is key to take 
these dynamics of sense-making into account. Only then, it is possible 
to meaningfully distinguish the not knowing component from the 
subsequent (almost) knowing component. 
The starting point of the work described in this dissertation is that 
not knowing something feels very different from (almost) knowing 
something. Not knowing is likely to be experienced as unpleasant. An 
abundance of research in the domain of cognitive consistency (Aronson 
et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 2012), fluency (Topolinski, 2013; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), personal control (Kay, Whitson, 
Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009), and information search (Loewenstein, 
1994; Shani, Tykocinski, & Zeelenberg, 2008) all points to the notion 
that inconsistency, knowledge deprivation, lack of structure, or 
uncertainty is aversive because it threatens people’s need for a 
predictable and coherent world (see also Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015; 
Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). The not knowing component 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Science is a collaborative effort and even though this dissertation is single-authored, 
the work is done in close collaboration with others. Therefore, I refer to “we” after this 
prologue. 
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of surprise and curiosity is therefore likely to be experienced as 
negative. 
Contrary to this not knowing, (almost) knowing something can be 
very enjoyable. People are exploratory creatures who like to discover 
something new (Berlyne, 1971; Kashdan & Silvia, 2009; Silvia & 
Kashdan, 2009). Therefore, the anticipation of resolving one’s lack of 
knowledge is likely to be experienced as pleasant (Loewenstein, 1994) 
and once understood, a previously unknown outcome may be nice 
(Valenzuela, Strebel, & Mellers, 2010). So, opposite from the not 
knowing component, the (almost) knowing component of surprise and 
curiosity has the potential to be positive. 
In this dissertation, I aim to show that it is possible to integrate the 
not knowing versus (almost) knowing components of surprise and 
curiosity when taking the dynamics of sense-making into account. In 
Part 1, I focus on surprise and the temporal unfolding of responses to 
surprising outcomes. In Part 2, I focus on curiosity and the impact of 
feeling close to its resolution in terms of time and feeling able to deal 
with the unknown.  
 
Part 1: Surprise 
People anticipate and understand their environment using 
schematic representations and expectancies (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 
2015). Yet, no matter how cognitively prepared people are, they are 
frequently confronted with unexpected outcomes. When surprised, 
ongoing thoughts and activities are interrupted, and attention is directed 
to the surprising stimulus to make sense of it (Horstmann, 2015; Meyer 
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et al., 1997; Reisenzein, 2000b). Once the surprising stimulus is 
cognitively mastered (Attardo, 1997; Forabosco, 1992; Suls, 1972; 
Topolinski, 2013) surprise dissipates and other affective states follow 
depending on the valence of the surprising event (Ekman, 2003; 
Tomkins, 1984). In other words, people first respond to the 
unexpectedness of an event and only after people had time to make 
sense, they respond to the valence of the event. 
Following these temporal dynamics of sense-making, the first 
chapter of this dissertation is a review and integration of theories and 
empirical evidence on surprise. I distinguish surprise as initial 
interruption due to inconsistency or disfluency from subsequent states 
that follow after people cognitively master the surprising stimulus. I 
discuss methodological implications of this perspective and review 
cognitive and experiential consequences of surprise by arranging them 
onto the interruption-to-mastering timeline. 
In the second chapter, I use this temporal framework to 
empirically explore the possibility that surprise feels negative. That is, 
because the lack of understanding of unexpected outcomes is in 
conflict with people’s need for a predictable and coherent world, it is 
likely to feel negative (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015; Proulx et al., 2012). 
I investigate how linguistic features of surprise and its temporal 
dynamics may have contributed to previous confusion regarding its 
valence. Specifically, I use autobiographical recall of unexpected and 
surprising events and facial expressions of surprise to distinguish 
responses to the unexpectedness of an event from responses to the 
valence of the event.  
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In the third chapter, I more systematically investigate the unfolding 
of facial expressions after a surprising event. I reason that if surprise 
feels relatively negative, initial facial expressions to positive surprises 
should be more negative than later expressions. In addition, expressions 
to positive and negative surprises should be initially similar. Finally, I 
investigate the possibility that the surprised face involves frowning and 
test how different facial actions (e.g., frowns, brow raises, smiles) 
develop over time.  
Taken together, Part 1 of this dissertation aims to show that to 
understand surprise, it is key to take the temporal dynamics of sense-
making into account. The chapters provide a test of the logic that 
surprise is the initial interrupted state in which people do not (yet) 
understand what has happened, which is different from the subsequent 
state that people experience immediately after making sense of the 
stimulus. Next, I take the dynamics of sense-making to better 
understand curiosity. 
 
From Surprise to Curiosity 
Curiosity is triggered when people become aware of a gap in their 
knowledge, for instance when they have incomplete information or 
when they are confronted with something novel and complex that they 
do not understand completely right away (Kashdan & Silvia, 2009; 
Litman, 2005; Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009). Like 
surprise, curiosity can thus be the result of unexpectedness, but there 
are more causes. Just missing information can also make people 
curious, for instance, when people do not know what will happen or 
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when they do not have the answer to a question (Berlyne, 1960; 
Loewenstein, 1994; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015). Situations that induce 
curiosity are thus broader than situations that induce surprise. 
Curiosity instigates exploratory behavior, aimed at resolving the 
lack of information (Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia, 2012; Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2007). As such, curiosity is a state in which people have an 
information-gap but at the same time anticipate that they will resolve it. 
Surprise and curiosity thus share that there is something unknown that 
people want to resolve. Yet, while the key component of surprise is the 
interruption as a result of an unanticipated outcome, curiosity is better 
described as a state of lacking information with the anticipation that the 
resolution will follow. In other words, surprise is the “undecided” state 
in which people do not yet know whether to approach or avoid the 
event (Scherer, Zenter, & Stern, 2004), while curiosity refers to the 
motivation to explore the unknown (Silvia, 2005). 
It should be noted, however, that people do not mindlessly explore 
the unknown. An important precondition for exploration is that people 
estimate that they have the skills, knowledge, and resources to deal with 
the event (i.e., coping potential, Silvia, 2005). This means that people 
will only engage in exploratory behavior to resolve their information-
gap, when they feel able to cope with it (Silvia, 2005). Coping potential 
is particularly an issue when people are confronted with complex 
and/or novel events. Relative to more simple and familiar events, 
complex and/or novel events are more likely to interfere with people’s 
understanding of their environment. So, instead of exploring all that is 
unknown, people will be less inclined to do so when the information-
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gap is appraised to be too difficult to deal with. Note that this logic also 
implies that it is possible to shift from surprise to curiosity, but only 
when people feel they can cope with the unexpected event (see also 
sequential appraisals in Scherer, 2001, and Chapter 2). 
In Part 2 of this dissertation, I build on the notion that curiosity 
involves both not knowing something and the anticipation of resolving 
this, to investigate how it feels to be curious. Moreover, I relate feeling 
able to deal with the unknown to interest in complex novelty.  
 
Part 2: Curiosity 
Based on the notion that curiosity is a combination of not knowing 
and almost knowing, in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I 
investigate how time affects the subjective experience of curiosity. 
Specifically, I reason that the temporal proximity of the resolution of 
curiosity affects the relative impact of the not knowing (information-
gap) vs. almost knowing component (anticipation of resolution). When 
people do not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time to 
the resolution), the anticipation of the resolution is weaker and not 
knowing is predicted to affect the experiential content of curiosity more 
strongly than when they expect to close their information-gap quickly 
(short time to the resolution). Because not knowing feels more negative 
than almost knowing, curiosity is predicted to feel more unpleasant the 
further in time the resolution. 
Next, in the fifth chapter, I build on the fact that people need 
coping potential in order to be motivated to explore the unknown. 
Specifically, I investigate the relation between coping potential and 
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interest in complex novelty. Complex novelty, like new products or 
technologies, can be exciting in terms of promising possibilities, but 
also challenging because people do not exactly grasp its meaning or 
purpose. To become curious and interested in complex novelty it is 
therefore key that people have a sense that they can cope with it. I 
investigate this for both actual coping potential (product-specific 
understanding) and perceived coping potential (a general coping state 
that makes people able to tolerate the difficulty component of complex 
novelty). 
In the current framework, I focus on the similarities between 
curiosity and interest, based on their shared exploratory motivation (see 
also Kahsdan & Silvia, 2009). It should be noted, however, that some 
researchers differentiated between curiosity and interest by arguing, for 
instance, that curiosity is more unpleasant and short-lived than interest 
(e.g., Hidi & Berndorff, 1998; Loewenstein, 1994). Situational curiosity 
is often (but not exclusively) studied with relatively specific and clear 
information-gaps (e.g., a box containing something round; see Van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2007; or answers to knowledge questions, Litman, 
Hutchins, & Russon, 2005; see also Chapter 4). Interest, on the other 
hand, is typically studied in more complex and diffuse domains (e.g., art 
appreciation or learning, see Hidi & Berndorff, 1998; Silvia, 2005; 
Chapter 5) and even defined as such (i.e., novelty-complexity as one of 
the underlying appraisals of interest; cf. Silvia, 2005). In studies on 
curiosity it is therefore often clearer what piece of information is 
missing than in studies on interest. As such, curiosity can be resolved 
with finding this specific missing information, whereas with interest, 
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discovering one thing may motivate finding out more. This not only 
makes interest last longer, it is also likely to be more pleasant as there 
are many more possibilities for gaining knowledge than with the more 
specific information-gap of curiosity (see also the discussion on lack of 
informational end-point in Chapter 4). 
While there are thus reasons to differentiate between curiosity and 
interest, it also seems that the assumed differences are at least partly a 
byproduct of the domains in which curiosity and interest are studied. In 
addition, while perceptual curiosity (attention to novel visual, auditory, 
or tactile stimuli, see Berlyne, 1954; Collins, Litman, & Spielberger, 
2004) may fit the perspective of clear information-gaps, with epistemic 
curiosity this becomes more difficult. Epistemic curiosity is the desire 
for knowledge aroused by conceptual puzzles or (complex) ideas 
(Berlyne 1954; Litman & Spielberger, 2003). This thus also includes 
more complicated and diffuse topics making it hard to distinguish it 
from interest (see also the concept of diversive curiosity in Berlyne, 
1960). In general, there are thus many similarities between curiosity and 
interest and for the sake of parsimony, in this dissertation I focus on 
the features they share. 
Finally, a note about the chapters that will follow: The chapters are 
written as (empirical) journal articles and they can be read 
independently and there is some overlap. Moreover, due to changing 
times in social sciences (cf. Kline, 2013), the different chapters contain 
somewhat different statistical methods to test the hypotheses. This is a 
reflection of different requirements of journals moving away from only 
performing null hypothesis significance testing procedures (Cumming, 
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2015; Trafimow & Marks, 2015) and a general trend toward promoting 
















A revised version of this chapter can be found in: Noordewier, M. K., Topolinski, S., & 
Van Dijk, E. (2016). The temporal dynamics of surprise. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, in press. 
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The Temporal Dynamics of Surprise 
People are surprised when they are confronted with unexpected or 
schema-discrepant stimuli (Ekman, 2003; Horstmann, 2006; Meyer, 
Niepel, Rudolph, & Schützwohl, 1991; Meyer, Reisenzein, & 
Schützwohl, 1997; Smedslund, 1990). According to this view, surprise is 
a function of the difference between an expected and an actual 
outcome, like winning when one expected to lose (see also Teigen & 
Keren, 2003). This does not necessarily imply that people need explicit 
expectancies to be surprised. Surprise can also be evoked when people 
are confronted with something that does not fit their general schematic 
representation of the situation. When, for instance, a fluffy bunny hops 
into one’s office, this is not surprising in the sense that people explicitly 
expected something different. This bunny may come as a surprise 
because it is not prototypical of one’s representation of the situation, in 
this case, a business setting (see also misexpected vs. unexpected in 
Macedo, Cardoso, Reisenzein, Lorini, & Castelfranchi, 2009). Surprise 
thus reflects the difficulty in integrating or merely processing a disfluent 
or inconsistent event in a given representation (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Maguire, Maguire, & Keane, 2011; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015; 
Topolinski & Reber, 2010a) and it is the interrupted state in which 
people do not (yet) know what has happened (see also Meyer et al., 
1991, 1997). 
In the current review, we will integrate theories and empirical 
evidence on surprise guided by a temporal dynamics perspective on 
surprise and sense-making (see Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; Noordewier & 
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Breugelmans, 2013; Pezzo, 2003). We distinguish surprise as the initial 
state that represents a cognitive interruption as a result of inconsistency 
or disfluency from subsequent states after people cognitively master the 
presence of the stimulus. To understand the nature and consequences 
of surprise, it is thus key to take time into account. We will arrange 
surprise research onto this interruption-to-mastering timeline with the 
goal to distinguish surprise from its consequences and to explain 
(seemingly) contradicting findings. We do this by a) critically discussing 
methods used in surprise research and b) reviewing different models 
and findings on the cognitive and experiential content of surprise, 
where we also integrate conceptually similar research in which it is not 
typical to refer to surprise (e.g., cognitive consistency, processing 
fluency, and immediate cortical responses such as the P300). 
 
The Time Course of Surprise:  
From Interruption to Mastering 
The time course of surprise starts with the detection of something 
unexpected.  When people are surprised, ongoing thoughts and 
activities are interrupted, and attention is automatically directed to the 
surprising stimulus (Darwin, 1872/1998; Horstmann, 2006, 2015; 
Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; Plutchik, 1980; Reisenzein, 2000b; Scherer, 
2001). The stronger the unexpectedness (e.g., because of stronger 
expectancies/schema’s) the more intense the surprise (Schützwohl, 
1998). Once the surprising stimulus is cognitively mastered (Attardo, 
1997; Forabasco, 1992; Suls, 1972; Topolinski, 2013) surprise dissipates 
and other affective states follow depending on the valence of the 
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surprising event (Ekman, 2003; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; 
Tomkins, 1984). 
Thus, people first respond to the unexpectedness of an event, 
independent of its valence, and then responses unfold contingent on 
the valence of the event, such as joy for positive events and sadness or 
anger for negative events. As such, the temporal time course of surprise 
involves the unfolding of responses from initial interruption to 
cognitive mastering—similar to the sequential appraisal perspective on 
emotion (Scherer, 2001), where the appraisal of an event being sudden, 
unfamiliar, or unpredictable (i.e., novelty-check) precedes appraising the 
event in terms of pleasantness, goal conduciveness, or coping potential. 
Importantly, this means that surprise itself is different from the state 
that people experience immediately after making sense of the stimulus. 
The notion that time is important for surprise and its 
consequences originates from Meyer et al.’s (1991, 1997) cognitive-
evolutionary model of surprise (for reviews, see Macedo et al., 2009; 
Reisenzein, 2000b; Reisenzein, Meyer, & Niepel, 2012). This model 
identifies sequential processing steps and states that surprising events 
first elicit the appraisal of schema-discrepancy, followed by interruption 
of ongoing information processing and the reallocation of processing 
resources together with the feeling of surprise. The process ends with 
the analyses and evaluation of the event and, if necessary, the updating 
or revision of schemas. We build on this model and mainly focus on 
the interruption part where people feel surprise. This initial interruption 
and feeling of surprise is, in our view, the main experiential component 
of surprise (see also Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015), and experientially 
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different from the part that follows when people analyzed the event and 
master the outcome. So, where Meyer et al.’s model focuses on the 
sequence of processing steps to provide a complete overview of all 
consequences after being confronted with a schema-discrepant event 
(cf. Meyer et al., 1997), we follow their logic to differentiate surprise as 
the initial interrupted state from subsequent states that follow after people 
cognitively master the surprising stimulus. In the terminology of Meyer 
et al.’s model, this initial state thus represents the feeling of surprise, the 
interruption of processing and reallocation of processing resources and 
the very first part of the analysis of the event—as long as people do not 
yet master event. This follows the definition of Reisenzein et al. (2012), 
who stated that surprise is the “output signal of the unexpectedness 
detector”.  
By distinguishing surprise from its consequences, we aim to 
provide a clearer conceptualization of what surprise is and how it feels. 
Specifically, in what follows, we will take the time course of surprise to 
1) point out methodological implications, 2) review initial cognitive 
consequences that support the notion that surprise is initially 
interrupting and independent of the nature of the stimulus, and 3) 
integrate apparently contradictory findings concerning the experiential 
content of surprise. 
 
Implications of Temporal Dynamics for Methodology 
As methods differ in terms of timing, so do conclusions that can 
be drawn from them. Below we review various methods in terms of 
whether they primarily focus on the initial or later consequences of 
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surprise. Specifically, there are many methods that induce surprise in 
participants, which offer the possibility to focus on surprise while it 
happens. Importantly, however, not all dependent measures are equally 
suitable to tap into the initial interruption. Indeed, many measures that 
claim to assess surprise, merely assess the consequences of surprise at a 
later stage. Moreover, there are also methods that do not focus on 
surprise while it happens but rather focus on associations, 
interpretations, or memories. This limits the possibility to study the 
experience of surprise without confusing it with the state that follows it. 
Inducing Surprise 
Inducing surprise is typically done by presenting stimuli that are 
incongruent to representations brought to the empirical setting (cf. 
general knowledge structures, e.g., Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & 
Wölk, 1996), or by disconfirming an expectancy that has been created 
within the empirical setting itself. Surprise has, for instance, been 
induced by a change in the experimental setting like changing the voice 
of the experimenter (Scherer et al., 2004) or even by transforming a 
complete corridor into a new room (Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012). 
Explicitly violating expectancies is often done via repetition-change 
paradigms (i.e., a different target stimulus after repeated exposure to a 
stimulus), such as presenting big/green letters after a series of one 
small/grey letter (Schützwohl & Borgstedt, 2005), or by changing the 
location of the experimenter in a sequential peek-a-boo game with 
infants (Parrott & Gleitman, 1989). Other expectancy-based methods 
include expectancy/ stereotype-inconsistent person descriptions or 
interactions (e.g., a sporty elderly woman; Macrae, Bodenhausen, 
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Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & 
Jost, 2007; see also Gendolla & Koller, 2002), semantically 
unpredictable sentences (Whittlesea, 1993), good news after having read 
that bad news was more likely (Sheppard & McNulty, 2002), or success 
after predicting failure is more likely (McGraw, Mellers, & Ritov, 2004). 
Measuring (correlates of) Surprise 
While these diverse induction methods most likely all result in 
surprise, dependent measures differ in terms of whether they focus on 
the initial interruption or on the state after cognitive mastering. 
Measures that can capture the initial interruption include facial 
expressions (e.g., Reisenzein et al., 2006), coding the absence or 
presence of a surprised expression using for instance FACS (Ekman, 
Friesen, & Hager, 2002); facial electromyography (fEMG, e.g., 
Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 
2015) or expression coding software (e.g., FaceReader; see Chapter 3), 
sometimes including measures of pupil dilation and vocalizations 
(Reisenzein et al., 2006). Also, various physiological measures can 
measure initial correlates of surprise, including arousal (e.g., Niepel, 
2001), physiological threat responses (Mendes et al., 2007), and central 
nervous correlates obtained with EEG or fMRI (e.g., Alexander & 
Brown, 2011; Egner, 2011). 
Many dependent variables do, however, not tap into surprise while 
it happens, but instead focus on consequences of surprise after 
cognitive mastering. First of all, self-reported surprise (e.g., Maguire et 
al., 2011; Reisenzein, 2000a; Schützwohl & Borgstedt, 2005; Teigen & 
Keren, 2003) is often assessed when participants already made sense of 
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the surprising target. While people might be able to report how 
intensely they experienced surprise, this measure does not necessarily 
reflect the original experience of surprise while it happened because it is 
likely to be influenced by a retrospective evaluation of the event (see 
also Schützwohl, 1998). Also, when people report that they were not 
surprised, it is possible that they actually were surprised but meanwhile 
have re-interpreted the situation, such as in hindsight bias (Hawkins & 
Hastie, 1990). Similarly, self-ratings of related affective states or 
evaluative judgments most likely reflect consequences of surprise rather 
than experiential correlates of surprise itself (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997; 
Valenzuela et al., 2010). Concluding, self-reports of surprise and other 
affective states assessed after cognitive mastering are likely affected by 
various mechanisms different from surprise itself. 
Indirect Methods 
Besides inducing surprise in participants with inconsistent, 
disfluent, or unexpected outcomes, scientific knowledge about surprise 
has also benefitted from relatively indirect methods. Indirect methods 
do not focus on surprise while it happens but rather focus on 
associations, interpretations, or memories.  
For instance, in linguistic methods participants rated the extent to 
which emotions, including surprise, fit words related to arousal and 
valence (Russell, 1980) or affective states, appraisals, and actions 
(Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007). While these methods 
are suitable to study the dimensional structure of longer lasting 
emotions, they may not reflect the actual experiential properties of the 
short-lived experience of surprise. The associations people report are 
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potentially mixed and may not represent the initial short-lived surprise 
alone. The same holds for autobiographical recall of an unexpected/ 
surprising event. While recall supposedly regenerates feelings and 
participants appear able to differentiate between initial and later 
responses when asked to do so (Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013), it 
is still possible that recollections of especially the initial interruption are 
influenced by the fact that participants recalled the whole experience, 
including the part that they already made sense of (cf. the peak-and-end 
rule of retrospective assessments, Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & 
Redelmeier, 1993, where the end phase of an experience dominates the 
later assessment). 
Also, in some facial expression research, participants or actors are 
asked to express a certain emotion, based on an emotion label or a 
description of an emotional state (e.g., Du, Tao, & Martinez, 2014). 
This task requires actors to interpret the label or the description and 
come up with a fitting expression. These methods can be very suitable 
for perception and recognition studies (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971), 
but are unlikely to cover the time course of surprise and particularly, the 
initial interruption phase of surprise. Moreover, when descriptions 
include the meaning of the surprising situation (e.g., happily surprised, 
like “receiving wonderful, unexpected news” or angrily surprised, like 
“when a person does something unexpectedly wrong to you”, see Du et 
al., 2014; p. 7), the expressions probably include these interpretations 
rather the initial interruption, the state in which people experience 
difficulty integrating or processing an event. 
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Conclusion 
The implication of the current temporal dynamics perspective for 
methodology is that research questions related to surprise while it 
happens (i.e., initial interruption) are best answered by methods that 
induce surprise directly and measure correlates immediately, whereas 
research questions related to the later consequences of surprise (i.e., 
once cognitively mastered) are best answered by methods and measures 
that assess consequences once people understood what has happened. 
With this perspective in mind, we will now discuss cognitive and 
experiential consequences of surprise. 
 
Cognitive Correlates and 
 Consequences of Initial Interruption 
Several lines of research on neural mechanisms have addressed the 
immediate brain responses to schema-inconsistent or unexpected 
events. While in those approaches the term “surprise” is rarely 
mentioned, they examine the cortical responses to outcomes that 
conflict with predicted or anticipated outcomes (e.g., Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000; Donchin, 1981), which renders this research as highly 
pertinent to the present review. As we will see, these instant brain 
responses seem to aid increasing processing depth to prepare cognitive 
mastering. Importantly, these responses are initially independent of the 
nature of the surprising stimulus, supporting the view that surprise is 
similar for all kinds of stimuli. 
First of all, conflict detection (Bush et al., 2000) during conflict monitoring 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) can be conceived of 
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as a form of surprise. In conflict detection, the medial prefrontal cortex, 
and particularly the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) continuously 
monitor the contingencies of actions/decisions and their consequences 
and establishes expectancies of these contingencies from past to future 
actions and decisions (for reviews, see Alexander & Brown, 2010; 
Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007). If these contingency-
schemata are violated, that is, if unexpected outcomes are encountered 
(either positive, neutral, or negative, e.g., Hajcak, 2012; Hajcak, 
Holyroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005), the ACC shows an immediate 
increase in activity, as reflected by a negative deflection in the ongoing 
electroencephalogram (EEG), occurring less than 100 ms after the 
conflict arises, the so-called error-related negativity (ERN; for reviews, see 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). This ACC 
activity thus reflects a detection of violated expectancies within a very 
brief time frame and has recently been related to an aversive defense 
response (Hajcak, 2012; Hajcak & Foti, 2008). Functionally, ACC 
activity has been related to increased awareness (Lane et al., 1998) and 
the recruitment of control processes (Bush et al., 2000). 
Another immediate cortical response to unexpected stimuli is the 
family of P300 responses, or novelty P3 (Donchin, 1981; Ferrari, 2010; 
Goldstein, Spencer, & Donchin, 2002). In a typical paradigm on this, 
participants receive numerous (often neutral) stimuli, many of which 
are frequent or expected, but some are infrequent or unexpected (e.g., 
in an oddball-paradigm, Ferrari, 2010; Picton, 1992). During this, time-
locked signals in the EEG, event-related potentials (ERPs) are 
measured. This feature of expectedness as crucial manipulation in all 
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these paradigms again renders this research as conceptually important 
for the more general psychology of surprise. It should be noted, 
however, that surprising stimuli are not necessarily the same as 
infrequent stimuli (see also surprise vs. rarity in Horstmann, 2015). 
Infrequent stimuli are only occasionally, but typically more than once, 
presented in the context of frequent stimuli (e.g., in an oddball-
paradigm). As such, they can be expected or even awaited. Yet, because 
infrequent stimuli are also considered as interrupting, this research 
might help to understand surprise, as processes that are similar to 
surprise are involved.  
Taken together, a variety of studies show for surprising compared 
to common stimuli a positive deflection in voltage in parietal ERPs 
with a peak around 250 to 500 ms after stimulus-onset, the P300 (e.g., 
Escera, Alho, Winkler, & Näätänen, 1998; Ferrari, 2010; Goldstein et 
al., 2002). Crucially, the more unexpected or seemingly improbable an 
experimental event is, the larger the P300 is (Donchin, 1981). Similar to 
error-related ACC activity, functionally, the P300 has been related to 
the recruitment of executive functions (e.g., Näätänen, 1990). 
Finally, these immediate brain responses not only trigger more 
elaborate processing, they also elicit an involuntary attention allocation 
to the surprising stimulus (Escera et al., 1998; Horstmann, 2015). 
Attention Allocation. To identify the cause of the surprise, people 
attend to the surprising stimulus in order to makes sense of it (e.g., 
Escera et al., 1998; Horstmann, 2015; Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; for a 
discussion on surprise vs. the orienting response, see Reisenzein et al., 
2012). So, after the perception of a surprising stimulus, ongoing 
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processing is interrupted and processing resources are reallocated to 
attend to the surprise (for a review on the surprise-attention link, see 
Horstmann, 2015). Supporting the temporal dynamics perspective, 
attending to a surprising stimulus takes time: Because the perceptual 
system is not prepared for the surprising stimulus, people first have to 
detect the discrepancy and shift their attention, which takes more time 
than attending to expected stimuli (Horstmann, 2015). Once people 
attend to the surprising stimulus (measured by for instance reaction 
times, Horstmann, 2002, 2005; or eye-tracking, Horstmann & Herwig, 
2015) they subsequently gaze at it (presumably to make sense of it), 
which lowers attention to the non-surprising surroundings (i.e., 
surprise-induced blindness, cf. Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, & 
Marois, 2010). 
Attending to the surprising stimulus is a precondition for sense-
making. Processing is then aimed at establishing whether the stimulus 
has any relevance and whether people can or should act (Meyer et al., 
1991, 1997). This process delays responses. When participants are, for 
example, asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to the 
position of a series of circles in a repetition-change paradigm, they 
respond slower when a circle changes its color. Interestingly, this effect 
is most pronounced when the surprising stimulus is action-relevant (i.e., 
a circle) as compared to action-irrelevant (i.e., a diamond; Meyer et al., 
1997). So, surprise is interrupting (Meyer et al., 1991, 1997), and 
particularly so when it is part of goal directed behavior. Also, whereas 
initial responses to surprise are independent on the nature of the 
surprising stimulus, during the action-relevance check people start 
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showing differentiation in responses depending on the relevance of the 
target. 
In line with this relevance view, surprise also seems to facilitate 
threat detection (Schützwohl & Borgstedt, 2005). Based on the notion 
that threatening aspects of surprise might require immediate action, 
Schützwohl and Borgstedt (2005) tested whether reaction times differed 
depending on the valence of words. In one study, participants were 
asked to respond to the location of a dot above or below two animal or 
sports words. After a series of trials, people were shown an unpleasant 
(e.g., spider) or pleasant word (e.g., seal) that was either surprising or 
not (color was [un]expected). While in the surprise condition the 
pleasant and unpleasant words were evaluated to be equally surprising, 
participants in the surprise condition responded slower to unpleasant 
words (e.g., spider) than pleasant words (e.g., seal). This delay in 
response to the dot was assumed to reflect an increase of attentive 
resources to the picture and as such explained as support for threat 
detection. 
Conclusion 
Initial cognitive consequences occur very fast after a surprising 
event and increase depth of processing for this event. This enhanced 
encoding and elaboration together with the additionally recruited 
executive functioning all aid the process of cognitive mastering (Pezzo, 
2003; Topolinski & Reber, 2010b).2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 All this results in later increased memory for surprising stimuli (e.g., Sherman et al., 
2012). 
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Crucially, these initial consequences are independent of the nature 
of the surprising stimulus. For instance, the novelty P300 occurs for 
surprising abstract neutral stimuli (Goldstein et al., 2002), acoustic 
material (e.g., Escera et al., 1998), and pictures (e.g., Ferrari, 2010). 
Also, it occurs for positive, neutral, and negative stimuli (e.g., Cano, 
Class, & Polich, 2009; Conroy & Polich, 2007; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & 
Cacioppo, 1998), and it is generally described as being insensitive to 
stimulus valence (Hajcak et al., 2005; although some find a more 
pronounced P300 for negative stimuli; Ito et al., 1998, Experiment 1). 
Only after some cognitive integration, people show differences in 
attention depending on the nature of the stimulus. In sum, cognitive 
consequences and correlates of surprise are initially the same for all 
kinds of stimuli. Over time—along with cognitive mastering—
responses depend on the nature of the stimulus.  
 
Experiential Content and Valence 
The present temporal dynamics perspective of surprise is also 
informative for the ongoing debate on the experiential nature of 
surprise. Surprise “feels in a particular way” (Reisenzein, 2000b; p. 262), 
yet there is no clear answer to how it exactly feels to be surprised. 
Researchers seem to agree that surprise induces arousal, but at the same 
time, there are different perspectives on whether surprise feels good, 
bad, or neutral.  
In work on the dimensional structure of emotions, people have 
been found to associate surprise with arousal (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007; 
or astonishment in Russel, 1980) such as increased heartbeat and breath 
	   35 
frequency, being restless and warm (for the complete list, see Fontaine 
et al., 2007). Direct evidence has been obtained by studies on the 
orienting response, where, for instance, skin conductance levels 
increased in response to surprising change in stimuli (e.g., Siddle, 1991; 
see however Niepel, 2001, who suggested that it is change rather than 
unexpectedness that drives arousal responses). In addition, people also 
appeared to have increased levels of arousal when they were instructed 
to mimic and experience surprise shown on a target picture (Collet, 
Vernet-Maury, Delhomme, & Dittmar, 1997). 
It thus seems clear that surprise induces arousal, but there is less 
agreement on whether this is a pleasant or unpleasant state. Studies on 
surprise that included valence measures produced mixed results. 
According to some, surprise feels good (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007; 
Valenzuela et al., 2010), according to others, surprise feels bad (e.g., 
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; 
Topolinski & Reber, 2010a), and it has also been argued that surprise 
does not have any valence (e.g., Mellers et al., 2013; Reisenzein & 
Meyer, 2009; Reisenzein, Meyer, & Niepel, 2012; Russel, 1980). The 
current timing perspective can explain and integrate these seemingly 
opposing findings (for a similar reasoning, see Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013). 
When zooming in on surprise as initial interruption, there are several 
reasons to depict surprise as having a negative valence. Surprise signals 
that an event has not been anticipated, which feels bad because it is in 
conflict with people’s “need for prediction” (cf. Miceli & Castelfranchi, 
2002, 2015). Specifically, for cognitive functioning, people need to 
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anticipate events and validate these anticipations by facts; and if this 
does not happen, people experience distress (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 
2015). In line with this, a prediction-error signal (i.e., ERN) has been 
related to an aversive defense response (Hajcak, 2012; Hajcak & Foti, 
2008). Moreover, many studies in the domain of cognitive consistency 
(Gawronski & Strack, 2012), fluency (Topolinski, 2013; Topolinski & 
Strack, 2009a), and need for control (Kay et al., 2009; Rutjens et al., 
2013) show that inconsistencies, disruption, and lack of structure are 
experienced as threatening and unpleasant as they represent a conflict 
with people’s need for a predictable and comprehensible world (for 
overviews see Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Miceli & 
Castelfranchi, 2015). Surprise implies a prediction error and reflects 
difficulty in encoding and semantically integrating a stimulus 
(Topolinski, 2012). When being surprised, reality thus does not make 
sense for a while. This state can be seen as dissonant, unstructured, and 
meaningless; all aspects that have been related to discomfort and threat 
(Elliot & Devine, 1994; Mendes et al., 2007; Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Based on 
these longstanding research traditions, which developed relatively 
separately from literature on surprise, it thus seems plausible that the 
initial experiential disruption of surprise entails a phasic negative affect 
due to inconsistency or disfluency (cf. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & 
Eyre, 2007; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Topolinski et al., 2009; 
Topolinski & Deutsch, 2012, 2013). 
Support for this perspective can be found in a study by Mendes 
and colleagues (2007), who related expectancy violation to physiological 
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threat responses. A threat (vs. challenge) response is associated with 
evaluating the situation as exceeding personal resources, which can be 
measured with distinct patterns of cardiovascular reactivity (Blascovich 
& Mendes, 2000). Mendes and colleagues reasoned that expectancy 
violation is threatening because it triggers surprise and uncertainty. In 
their experiments, participants interacted with a confederate who was a 
typical or an atypical member of his/her social category (e.g., 
white/Latino with high/low socio-economic status). Results showed 
that stereotype-consistent interaction partners were preferred over 
inconsistent ones (see also Schubert, Topolinski, & Strack, 2014; 
Swann, 1990) and atypical members elicited physiological threat 
responses (Mendes et al., 2007). Although further research is necessary 
to generalize this evidence to other surprising events or stimuli, it 
suggests that surprise indeed has threatening properties. 
In addition, support for the reasoning that initial negativity unfolds 
to other affective states has been obtained by coding facial expressions 
over time from people who were positively surprised in TV-shows 
(Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013). Participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which a person in a picture felt negative or positive. The 
pictures were screenshots taken at one-second intervals after people 
were confronted with a positive surprise. Responses unfolded from 
relatively negative to positive, assuming to reflect the unfolding of 
initial responses to the unexpectedness to responses to the actual 
outcome. 
In line with the view that after cognitive mastering, people respond to 
the nature of the stimulus, surprise has been found to be neutral or 
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slightly positive when using linguistic methods (e.g., Fontaine et al., 
2008; Russel, 1980). As discussed above, these results may reflect a 
mixture of surprise and associations of what followed it. Similarly, 
studies that included valence-related measures often administer them at 
a point in time where people already made sense of the surprising 
event. So, in terms of our perspective, they ask people how they feel or 
how they evaluate a surprising target after cognitive mastering. Then, 
people report being happy with a surprise gift (Valenzuela et al., 2010), 
satisfied by a better-than-expected performance of a product (Oliver, 
1997), or delighted by an unexpected profit (Mellers et al., 1997).3 
Associations of the positive events with the word surprise might also 
explain why this word has more positive connotations than the word 
unexpected (for evidence suggesting this positive word-bias, see 
Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013). 
Conclusion 
While more direct evidence might be needed to draw definite 
conclusions, the reviewed findings suggest that surprise has a negative 
valence, while the experience after cognitive mastering can be 
rewarding and positive (similar to the positive feeling of insight and 
punch line comprehension, Topolinski, 2013; Topolinski & Reber, 
2010a). Thus, responses unfold from surprise to different states after 
people made sense of the stimulus. Only after cognitive mastering, 
people might feel good in the case of positive surprises. This dynamic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Surprise can also amplify these responses (e.g., Mellers et al., 1997; Oliver, 1997; 
Valenzuela et al. 2010), due to an intensifying effect of residual arousal (Schachter & 
Singer, 1962), or because of comparison between expectancy and outcome resulting in 
contrast effects (e.g., Biernat, 2005).  
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was shown by the unfolding of facial expressions in the reviewed TV-
show study (Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013). Facial expressions thus 
seem to be particularly suited to study the temporal dynamics of 
surprise. It should be noted, however, that coding in the TV-show 
study focused on overall valence ratings rather than the distinct surprise 
expression or other specific facial features. When looking more closely 
to the facial expression of surprise, results become less clear. 
 
The Face: Raised Eyebrows,  
Freezing, Frowning, or Nothing at All 
The surprise expression has classically been conceived as involving 
raised eyebrows, widened eyes, and an open mouth/jaw drop (Darwin, 
1872/1998; Ekman et al., 2002). Interestingly, the occurrence of this 
expression seems rare: Only a minority of surprised people actually 
shows this “typical” facial expression and those who do, show it only 
partly (i.e., one of the three components; e.g., Reisenzein et al., 2006).  
For instance, studies with infants could not provide support for a 
clear facial expression of surprise. Instead, in response to surprises, 
infants show facial and behavioral freezing (Camras et al., 2002; Scherer 
et al., 2004). In these studies, a repeatedly shown toy was hidden and a 
different toy was revealed (Camras et al., 2002) or the voice of the 
experimenter changed via a speaker (see Scherer et al., 2004). 
Compared to baseline, surprised infants looked longer at the 
“impossible event” and showed more freezing (i.e., behavioral/facial 
stilling; see Camras et al., 2002; Scherer et al., 2004 for culture and age 
effects). However, they did not show particular surprise expressions (full 
	   40 
or partial; but see Bennett, Bedersky, & Lewis, 2002; for a more infant 
expression studies, see Reisenzein et al., 2006).  
Also in adults, the surprise expression is rare. Reisenzein and 
colleagues (Reisenzein et al., 2006) systematically tested whether 
surprise resulted in a surprised facial expression. They varied extremity 
of surprise, sociality of the context, duration and complexity of 
surprise, the degree to which surprise conflicts with exploration 
tendencies, all in different surprising contexts (e.g., when confronting 
participants with unanticipated photographs of themselves, Reisenzein 
et al., 2006; or changing a complete corridor, Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 
2012). Participants reported being surprised and a majority of them also 
reported that they thought they had displayed a clear facial expression 
of surprise. Yet, only a minority of the participants actually showed a 
surprised face and often only partly (4-25%; Reisenzein et al., 2006; 
34% in Reisenzein, 2000a). 
Interestingly, in the studies reported here, the faces were mainly 
coded in terms of absence or presence of one or more of the three 
components of a surprised face (see above). It is, however, not 
completely clear whether participants who did not show a surprised 
face showed a neutral face, freezing, or signs of other facial expressions 
after a surprise. Sometimes, frowns were observed (Reisenzein et al., 
2006: 9%/13% in Studies 3 and 8; Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012: 
21%), as well as smiles (2-86% in Reisenzein et al., 2006; 26-71% in 
Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012; 8.6-12.1% in Scherer et al., 2004) and 
interest (on average 3.49 on a 5-point scale; Camras et al., 2002). In the 
other studies, no information about alternative expressions is available. 
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So, people do not seem to show the prototypical surprise expression, 
but they sometimes exhibit other facial signs like frowns (see also 
Topolinski et al., 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2015) or smiles.  
While these studies did not include time as a factor (except Study 7 
in Reisenzein et al., 2006; see below), the different expressions can be 
placed on the interruption-to-mastering timeline. That is, freezing, 
frowning, the (partial) surprise expression, or no expression4 most likely 
precede the smiles. Evidence for this unfolding can be found in the 
fEMG data in Reisenzein et al. (2006; Study 7). Participants were 
confronted with an unanticipated photograph of themselves in a facial 
judgment task. A slight increase of corrugator activity was observed 
after this surprising event and after 1-3 seconds this was followed by an 
increase in zygomaticus activity. So, a frown preceded a smile, which is 
in line with the current interruption-to-mastering logic (see also 
Noordewier & Van Dijk, 2015; Topolinksi & Strack, 2015). 
Yet, based on the reviewed studies, it is not completely clear what 
the expression after a surprise looks like, as freezing, frowning, (partial) 
surprise, and neutral expressions all have been observed. Future studies 
should take time into account when trying to differentiate between 
different expressions (Noordewier & Van Dijk, 2015). In addition, 
other factors, like individual differences in expressivity and/or emotion 
regulation (e.g., Gross & John, 1997) might also partly explain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is possible that a neutral expression actually reflects freezing. Especially in stills, this 
might be hard to differentiate. To test the possibility of freezing in adults, it seems 
necessary to analyze videos, maybe even including bodily codings (e.g., Roelofs, 
Hagenaars, & Stins, 2010). 
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variations in expression. Importantly though, what freezing, frowning, 
and the surprise expression seem to have in common is that they all fit 
the initial interruption phase of surprise (Meyer et al., 1997). That is, 
freezing can be seen as a response that allows people to wait for further 
information, like sometimes observed with fear (cf. Scherer et al., 2004). 
Frowning has been associated with mental effort (e.g., Van Boxtel & 
Jessurun, 1993) and seems to be related to sense-making. Finally, it has 
been argued that the surprise expression helps to increase the visual 
field, which facilitates perception to identify the cause of the surprise 
(Darwin 1872/1998, see also Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012). 
Conclusion 
The temporal dynamics of surprise thus seem visible in the face. 
Analyzing facial expressions seems a very promising and suitable 
method to capture the interruption-to-mastering time line. Yet, more 




Taking a temporal dynamics perspective on surprise (see also 
Meyer et al., 1991, 1997), we distinguished surprise as initial 
interruption from subsequent states that occur after people cognitively 
master the presence of the stimulus. Initially, consequences are the 
result of inconsistency or disfluency. Cognitive correlates (e.g., 
ACC/P300 activation, attention) are independent of the nature of the 
surprising stimulus and they all seem to increase processing depth to 
prepare cognitive mastering. Surprise is likely to be experienced as 
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negative, as people do not like inconsistency, disruption, and lack of 
structure. Only after people cognitively master the stimulus, affective 
responses become in line with the valence of the stimulus. The 
cognitive and experiential consequences of surprise thus seem to fit the 
interruption-to-mastering timeline. An important implication of this 
temporal dynamics perspective is that methods to study surprise should 
be chosen carefully. Research questions related to the initial 
interruption phase are best answered by methods that induce surprise 
directly and measure correlates immediately, whereas research questions 
related to the later consequences of surprise are best answered by 
methods and measures that assess consequences once people 
understood what has happened. In sum, the temporal dynamics 
perspective on surprise helps to understand and integrate the nature 















This chapter is based on: Noordewier, M. K., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2013). On the 
valence of surprise. Cognition and Emotion, 27, 1326-1334. 
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On the Valence of Surprise 
Common knowledge has it that it is nice to be surprised; many websites 
are devoted to how to throw the perfect surprise party or find the 
perfect gift to surprise your loved ones (e.g., www.ehow.com/topic 
_112_surpriseparty.html, www.surprise.com). However, psychological 
knowledge has it that people generally don’t like surprises; people 
prefer predictability, consistency, and structure (Abelson et al., 1968; 
Gawronski & Strack, 2012). So, the question is how people feel when 
they are surprised. Is surprising a loved one a tragic mistake or is our 
psychological knowledge of how people react to surprises incomplete?  
The relevance of this question clearly goes beyond decisions about 
whether or not to throw surprise parties. It touches upon a 
fundamental question in the psychology of emotions, namely to what 
extent emotions are characterized by a clear-cut valence. Whereas most 
other emotions have been associated with such a clear-cut valence—
they feel either good or bad—for surprise the case is not clear. Large-
scale emotion studies have not found a clear positive or negative 
valence (see Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007; Russell, 
1980) and many classical and contemporary ideas of surprise seem to 
portray it as a kind of emotional chameleon, feeling sometimes good 
and sometimes bad depending on whether the cause of the surprise was 
in itself positive (e.g., a gift) or negative (e.g., a tax assessment). 
The unclear valence of surprise has sometimes been explained by 
viewing it not as an emotion, but rather as a pre-emotional cognitive 
state. For example, Bain (1859/2006) already stated that: “… there are 
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surprises that delight us, and others that cause suffering; but many 
surprises do neither” (p. 13). He did not see surprise as a true emotion 
but rather as a cognitive phenomenon that affects behavior “…by 
detaining the attention, or by keeping a certain impression in the 
ascendant” (p. 13). These ideas resonate in some contemporary models 
of surprise, which position appraisals of unexpectedness and the 
ensuing interruption of ongoing processes before the analysis of the 
evaluation of an event (e.g., Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997). 
Thus, Reisenzein and Meyer (2009) concluded that: “in contrast to 
paradigmatic emotions such as joy or fear, surprise does not presuppose 
the appraisal of the eliciting event as positive (motive-congruent) or 
negative (motive-incongruent), and the feeling of surprise is per se 
hedonically neutral rather than pleasant or unpleasant” (p. 387). 
The cognitive view of surprise contrasts with views of surprise as 
one of the basic emotions (Ekman, 1982). In contrast to Bain, Charles 
Darwin (1872/1998) saw surprise clearly as an affective state, noting a 
relationship with fear: “Attention, if sudden and close, graduates into 
surprise; and this into astonishment; and this into stupefied amazement. 
The latter frame of mind is closely akin to terror” (p. 278). Darwin 
observed that many people mentioned seeing terror, horrified, painful, 
or even disgusted (all distinctly negative emotions) in Duchenne’s 
photographs of a surprised face. These observations were corroborated 
in later, more systematic studies of facial expressions (e.g., Ekman, 
1982). Surprise displays several other characteristics of “regular” 
emotions such as bodily arousal, a neurophysiological substrate, and an 
adaptive function (e.g., Breugelmans et al., 2005; Ekman, 1982). 
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Furthermore, surprise has been fruitfully studied as an emotion in 
various fields, such as cognitive sciences, economics, marketing, and 
psychology (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Schützwohl & 
Borgstedt, 2005; Valenzuela, Mellers, & Strebel, 2010).  
If surprise would indeed be a regular emotion, how should we 
account for the unclear findings regarding its valence? Many classical 
models of emotion seem to make the assumption that valence (also 
labeled evaluation, hedonic tone, or positivity) is a crucial element of 
what makes an emotion (Barrett, 2012; Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & 
Gross, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Russell, 2003). Mixed emotions do exist, but 
these are—as the term implies—co-occurrences of distinct emotions 
with a singular valence (e.g., Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001). 
Neutral emotions do not seem to fit these models, but it can of course 
be questioned whether a neutral valence would theoretically be 
problematic. If valence is seen as a dimensional property on which 
emotions take a certain position there is no logical reason why a neutral 
position would be problematic. The current paper cannot pretend to 
solve these issues, but rather takes a more pragmatic, explorative 
position. Given that most emotions that have been described in the 
literature are experientially characterized by a clear valence, how should 
we understand the current mixed findings on the valence of experiences 
of surprise? 
This paper explores the idea that experiences of surprise may 
actually have a negative valence. This idea is based on an integration of 
models of surprise as an interruption mechanism with a broad literature 
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on how people deal with unexpectedness and violations of 
predictability. 
Surprise can be seen as an interruption mechanism (Meyer et al., 
1997); it is elicited by unexpected events, interrupting ongoing thoughts 
and activities, and motivating people to pay attention to the unexpected 
stimulus. Such interruptions tend to be not merely cognitive events, but 
are rather unpleasant. Unexpectedness frustrates people’s need for 
predictability and structure (Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 
2012), which is experienced as threatening and uncomfortable (Elliot & 
Devine, 1994; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). For 
example, a classical study by Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) showed 
that people experience an uncomfortable dissonance when they are 
confronted with unexpected good performance. People even tend to 
prefer self-consistent over self-enhancing feedback in order to bolster 
their perceptions that reality is predictable and controllable (Swann, 
1990). Comparable findings have been found in studies of meaning 
violating experiences (see Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012, for 
an overview) and compensatory control processes that people employ 
to protect the belief that reality is orderly and nonrandom (see Kay, 
Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009, for an overview).  
The idea that surprise represents a negative interruption is 
congruent with findings from neuroscientific and psychophysiological 
studies. Recent models of the medial prefrontal cortex and especially 
the anterior cingulate cortex in learning and predicting outcomes of 
actions suggest that negative as well as positive surprises result in a 
prediction error signal (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Egner, 2011). For 
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instance, Error Related Negativity (ERN) has been observed in 
response to surprising outcomes (see Alexander & Brown, 2011). 
According to Hajcak and Foti (2008), the ERN can be related to 
emotional or motivational aspects of error detection and reflects an 
aversive defensive response. Furthermore, when interacting with an 
expectancy-violating partner people display physiological threat 
responses, even when this partner is positively surprising (Mendes et al., 
2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that at a neural and 
psychophysiological level, responses to surprise are similar for positive 
and negative events. In other words, responses to surprise seem to be 
independent of the valence of the stimulus. Moreover, these findings 
point to the possibility that surprise has a negative valence.  
In view of the long history on studies of surprise and 
unexpectedness/ inconsistency, it could be asked why a negative 
valence for surprise has not been suggested before. Part of the answer 
may be that the emotion literature and the literature on inconsistencies 
have remained largely separate until now. Another part of the answer 
may be that the most elaborate and sophisticated research programs on 
surprise have primarily focused on cognitive processes and 
consequences and less so on affective consequences (see Reisenzein & 
Meyer, 2009). However, we think there is a third answer that is of a 
methodological nature and that is particular to the way surprise has 
been studied in research that did include measures of emotional 
valence. Such studies typically employed retrospective and linguistic 
methods, meaning that participants rated how intensely or frequently 
they felt surprise (Russell, 1980) or what affective states could be 
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delineated from someone saying that he/she is surprised (Fontaine et 
al., 2007). Because surprise is a short-lived emotion (Ekman, 1982) it is 
plausible that episodic memories of surprising events involve a blend of 
the experience of surprise with that of the emotion that followed after 
sense-making, being either positive or negative depending on whether 
the event was goal-conducive or not. Thus, unexpected events initially 
result in surprise but once the event is understood other affective states 
follow depending on the nature of the event. The reliance on 
retrospective and linguistic methods probably resulted in a measure of 
both responses, producing mixed results. As Tomkins (1984) already 
noted about surprise: “Whatever its quality (…) it is frequently 
confused with the affect that immediately follows it” (p. 171). Similarly, 
the use of emotion words may have led to a particular blurring of the 
memories of surprise because everyday uses of surprise in phrases such 
as “throwing a surprise party” and “buying someone a surprise” may 
have caused the connotation of the word surprise to be biased towards 
a positive valence. 
So, in addition to exploring the idea that surprise may have a 
negative valence, we will also study a) linguistic biases and b) the 
temporal dynamics of surprise as possible explanations for why such a 
negative valence has not been found before. We present three 
experiments that use a diverse set of methods to explore the valence of 
surprise. Specifically, we studied autobiographical recall of experiences 
of unexpected and surprising events in Experiment 2.1, ratings of 
words and facial expressions in Experiment 2.2, and judgments of 
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naturalistic facial expressions unfolding after surprising events in 
Experiments 2.3a/2.3b.  
 
Experiment 2.1 
Experiment 2.1 studied temporal dynamics in people’s 
autobiographical recalls of surprise. In addition, we explored semantic 
biases in the emotion word surprise by asking some participants to 
report an unexpected event and others to report a surprising event. We 
expected participants to rate their initial experiences as more negative 
and more surprising than their subsequent experiences.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 446 people (278 females, 166 males, 2 not 
reported; Mage = 27.78 years, SDage = 14.59) were recruited through 
snowball sampling by assistants and completed a questionnaire about an 
unexpected event (n = 326) or a surprising event (n = 120).  
Procedure. Participants described a personal experience of an 
unexpected or a surprising event. They rated this experience for two 
separate moments: “Right at the moment that something 
unexpected/surprising happened” (t1); and “After a short while, when 
you understood what had happened” (t2). Experiences at both 
moments were rated on three items that loaded high on Fontaine et al.’s 
(2007) unexpectedness dimension (unpredictable, happened suddenly, was 
unexpected), three items that loaded high on the evaluation dimension 
(dangerous, pleasant, lost), eight items measuring general affect adapted 
from Elliot and Devine (1994: happy, energetic, uncomfortable, uneasy, 
calm, optimistic, annoyed, and dejected), and two items measuring 
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surprise (surprised and amazed; all ratings on 5-point scales, 1 = not at all 
to 5 = very strongly).  
Results 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the appraisals showed a 
two-dimensional structure within both conditions (i.e., unexpected and 
surprising). This was true for measures at t1 (Eigenvalues of the two 
components: 2.21 and 1.33; 59% variance explained for the unexpected 
condition and Eigenvalues 2.32 and 1.42; R2 = 62% for surprising) and 
at t2 (unexpected Eigenvalues 2.43 and 1.43, R2 = 64%; surprising 
Eigenvalues 2.18 and 1.65, R2 = 64%). On the first component loaded 
appraisals of suddenness, unpredictability, and unexpectedness. Items 
were averaged to form the unexpectedness index (Cronbach’s α at t1 = .67 
and at t2 α = .79 in the unexpected condition; t1 α = .78 and t2 α = .74 
in the surprising condition), with higher scores signifying more 
unexpectedness. On the second component loaded appraisals of 
pleasantness, danger, and loss of control. Items were recoded and 
averaged to form the evaluation index (unexpected t1 α = .59 and t2 α = 
.60; surprising t1 α = .68 and t2 α = .58), with higher scores indicating a 
more positive evaluation.  
PCA on the affect scale showed a unidimensional structure in both 
conditions at t1 (unexpected Eigenvalue 3.36 and R2 = 42%; surprising 
Eigenvalue 4.22 and R2 = 53%) and at t2 (unexpected Eigenvalue 3.56 
and R2 = 43%; surprising Eigenvalue 4.33 and R2 = 54%). Items were 
recoded and averaged to form the affect index (unexpected t1 α = .79 
and t2 α = .81; surprising t1 α = .85 and t2 α = .86), with higher scores 
indicating more positive affect. The emotion items surprised and 
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amazed were significantly correlated both at t1, unexpected r(326) = 
.49, p < .01, surprised, r(120) = .30, p < .01, and at t2, unexpected 
r(326) = .67, p < .01, surprised r(120) = .62, p < .01. Items were 
averaged to form the surprise index, with higher scores indicating more 
surprise. 
We performed repeated measures ANOVAs on each of the four 
dependent measures, with Condition as between-participants factor and 
Time as within- participants factor. Evaluation revealed significant 
effects of Condition, F(1, 444) = 141.84, p < .001, η2 = .24, and Time, 
F(1, 444) = 40.20, p < .001, η2 = .08. Affect revealed a significant effect 
of Condition, F(1, 444) = 162.49, p < .001, η2 = .27, of Time, F(1, 444) 
= 72.47, p < .001, η2 = .14, and a significant interaction, F(1, 444) = 
13.58, p < .001, η2 = .03. Unexpectedness revealed a significant effect of 
Time, F(1,444) = 87.77, p < .001, η2 = .17, and Surprise revealed 
significant effects of Condition F(1, 444) = 12.46, p < .001, η2 = .03, 
and of Time, F(1, 444) = 251.09, p < .001, η2 = .36.   
 
Table 2.1: Mean (and SD) evaluation, affect, unexpectedness, and 
surprise as a function of Time and Condition (Experiment 2.1). 
  unexpected event surprising event 
   time 1 time 2 time 1 time 2 
evaluation 2.80 (1.11) 2.96 (1.07) 4.00 (0.89) 4.25 (0.74) 
affect 2.75 (0.89) 3.11 (0.90) 3.96 (0.75) 4.10 (0.69) 
unexpectedness 4.04 (0.86) 3.71 (1.04) 4.00 (0.66) 3.57 (0.86) 
surprise 4.03 (0.93) 3.36 (1.12) 4.45 (0.58) 3.59 (0.98) 
Note: Ratings on a 5-point scale (1= not at all to 5 = very strongly). Higher ratings indicate 
more positive evaluation and affect.  
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, participants in both conditions 
evaluated their experiences as more negative and also as more 
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unexpected/surprising at t1 than at t2. In addition, participants 
evaluated their experience as more positive in the Surprise condition 
than in the Unexpected condition, suggesting a possible semantic bias 
in the emotion word. This idea was further tested in Experiment 2.2.  
 
Experiment 2.2 
Experiment 2.2 studied whether ratings of a surprised face are 
influenced by the word surprise (cf. Barrett, 2012). If the word surprise 
has a positive connotation, then adding this emotion word below a 
surprised face should make evaluation of the surprised face more 
positive as compared to not adding a word. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 81 students (42 females, 39 males; Mage = 
20.36 years, SDage = 2.39) were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: face-without-a-word or face-with-a-word.  
Procedure. Participants rated 24 faces taken from Ekman and 
Friesen (2003; six faces for surprise, fear, sadness, and happiness). 
Pictures of male and female faces were shown in random order on a 
computer screen. The face-without-a-word condition showed only the 
pictures; the face-with-a-word condition also showed the emotion word 
below the picture. Participants rated for each picture “How does this 
person feel?” on a 7-point scale from very negative (1) to very positive (7). 
Results 
Ratings of faces were collapsed across emotions. Independent 
samples t-tests on the ratings of each emotion revealed a significant 
difference for surprise. Participants rated the surprise face as 
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significantly more positive in the face-with-a-word-condition (M = 4.25, 
SD = 0.56) than in the face-without-a-word-condition (M = 3.72, SD = 
0.58), t(79) = -4.21, p < .001. No such differences were found for any 
other emotions: fear (Mwithout-word = 2.65, SD = 0.65 versus Mwith-word = 
2.45, SD = 0.46), t(79) = 1.56, p = .12; sadness (Mwithout-word = 2.36, SD = 
0.52 versus Mwith-word = 2.52, SD = 0.51), t(79) = -1.37, p = .18; and 
happiness (Mwithout-word = 5.94, SD = 0.55 versus Mwith-word = 5.91, SD = 
0.50), t(79) = 0.27, p = .79. These results suggest that the emotion word 
surprise conveys a positive bias to the perception of facial expressions 
of surprise, which was not found for fear, sadness, and happiness. 
These findings suggest this specific bias may be unique to or at least 
more pronounced for surprise (however, see Barrett, 2012). 
 
Experiment 2.3a 
Experiment 2.3 studied the unfolding of expressions to unexpected 
events in TV-shows where people were positively surprised. Following 
the idea that surprise has a negative valence that—in positive cases—is 
followed by a positive state, we expected spontaneous expressions to be 
rated more negatively in the first seconds after a surprise than those in 
later seconds. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 119 people (66 females, 53 males; Mage = 
30.50 years, SDage = 2.50) were recruited to participate in an online 
study through snowballing on a social network site (Hyves).  
Procedure. Participants rated stills of eleven faces (randomized 
order) on 7-point valence scales from very negative to very positive. Stills 
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were taken from a public website (uitzendinggemist.nl) from two Dutch 
TV-shows in which people were positively surprised: a garden program 
(Tuinruimers; Festen, 2009, 2010) where gardens are renovated as a 
surprise and Antiques Roadshow (Tussen Kunst en Kitsch; Drion, 2009) 
where people received high assessments of their antiques. Selection was 
based on the following criteria: (1) the situation is clearly a positive 
surprise; (2) people’s facial expression is clearly visible for at least four 
seconds; and (3) the expression is seen from the front. From each 
episode we took five stills; t0 was the moment at which the person was 
first confronted with the surprising event; t1-t4 were taken 
consecutively every second after t0. The resulting 55 stills were 
distributed over five groups (with t0-t4 randomly distributed) with the 
constraint that one participant never saw the same face more than once.  
Results 
Ratings were averaged across participants and episodes in a Still 
(11) x Time (5) matrix. A repeated measures ANOVA with Time as 
within-participants factor revealed a significant effect, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.15, F(4, 7) = 9.76, p < .01, ηp2 = .85 (see Table 2.2). Simple contrast 
analysis showed that faces at t0 and t2 were rated as significantly more 
negative compared to those at t4 (ps < .05). 
 
Experiment 2.3b 
These findings were replicated in a second experiment where an 
independent sample (N = 48; 35 females, Mage = 21.37 years, SDage = 
2.63) viewed the same faces to assess the situation that this person was 
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in. They rated the faces on the evaluation, affect, unexpectedness, and surprise 
scales from Experiment 2.1 (see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2: Mean (and SD) valence, evaluation, affect, unexpectedness, 
and surprise of facial expressions as a function of Time (Experiments 
2.3a/2.3b). 
   Time   
 0 1 2 3 4 




















































Note: Means with different superscripts in rows differ significantly at p < .05. 
1 Ratings on a 7-point scale (1 = very negative to 7 = very positive). 
2 Ratings on a 5-point scale (1= not at all to 5 = very strongly). Higher ratings indicate 
more positive evaluation and affect. 
 
Ratings were averaged across participants and episodes in a Still 
(11) x Time (5) matrix. A repeated measures ANOVA with Time as 
within-participant factor (see Table 2.2) revealed a significant effect of 
Time on unexpectedness, Wilks’ Lambda = .20, F(4, 7) = 6.98, p = 
.014, ηp2 = .80. Simple contrast analyses showed that participants rated 
the faces on t0-2 as more unexpected than on t4 (ps < .05). On 
evaluation, we also found a significant effect of Time, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.13, F(4,7) = 11.62, p = .003, ηp2 = .87. Simple contrast analyses 
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showed that the participants rated the faces on t0-3 as more unpleasant 
than on t4 (ps < .05). Next, on affect, we also found a significant effect 
of Time, Wilks’ Lambda = .15, F(4, 7) = 10.17, p = .005, ηp2 = .85. 
Simple contrast analyses showed that the participants rated the faces on 
t0-2 as showing more negative affect than on t4 (ps < .05) and t3 
marginally more negative than t4 (p < .08). Finally, on surprise, we 
found a significant effect of time, Wilks’ Lambda = .29, F(4, 7) = 4.21, 
p = .048, ηp2 = .71. Simple contrast analyses showed that the 
participants rated the faces on t0-1 as more surprised than on t4 (p < 
.05). 
Thus, in Experiments 2.3a/2.3b, faces were judged as more 
surprised and more negative in the first few seconds and as less 
surprised and more positively the more time elapsed.  
 
General Discussion 
This research explored the valence of surprise. More specifically, 
we explored the idea that surprise is experienced and perceived in 
others as a negative emotion, based on reasoning that surprise 
represents the interruption of ongoing thoughts and activities, which is 
unpleasant and in conflict with the desire for predictability and 
structure (Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 2012). A series of 
three experiments, using different research methods, provided some 
initial evidence that surprise may indeed be a (mildly) negative emotion.  
Our experiments also suggest why a negative valence for surprise 
has not been found before. Experiments 2.1 and 2.3a/2.3b suggest that 
surprise is a short-lived emotion (see also Ekman, 1982), which could 
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lead to experiences of surprise to be confused with emotions that 
follow it (see also Tomkins, 1984). Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 in addition 
suggest a positivity bias in the emotion word surprise, further adding to 
the confusion when using retrospective, linguistic methods. In order to 
identify the valence of surprise, it seems important to distinguish it 
from subsequent emotions that emerge when the situation is 
understood and appraised in terms of goal-conduciveness (i.e., after 
surprise has dissipated).  
While our data are suggestive of a negative valence, surprise was 
clearly not as strongly negative as for instance sadness or fear (see 
Experiment 2.2). Though this might have to do with the strength of the 
experimental manipulation, with more extreme surprises resulting in 
more negative responses, it seems also plausible that the negativity 
associated with uncertainty is less intense than that associated with 
clearly aversive situations (e.g., Proulx et al., 2012). An alternative 
possibility is that because of the short duration of surprise people are 
used to interpreting expressions of this emotion more in context than 
those of happiness, sadness, or fear (see Barrett, 2012). 
In addition, the negative valence of surprise does not imply that 
the experience of a surprising event can never be positive. Once the 
surprising event is understood people can feel good about it. 
Interestingly, this also opens the possibility that surprise may contribute 
to more intense positive experiences through what has been called an 
emotion-amplification effect. Given that surprise induces arousal (e.g., 
Fontaine et al., 2007; Russell, 1980), residual arousal may still be present 
when the surprising event is understood and the emotion surprise has 
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dissipated. Any subsequent emotion, such as joy, may thus arise in a 
situation where people already are in a state of heightened arousal, 
which may lead to more intense experiences of this emotion (see 
Schachter & Singer, 1962; see also Valenzuela et al., 2010). In other 
words, the residual arousal can become “attached” to the subsequent 
emotional state, which intensifies it. As such, a surprise visit of a friend 
may, for instance, result in increased joy as compared to a planned get 
together. This possibility would be an interesting avenue for further 
research on surprise.  
A final interesting question is how the desire for predictability and 
structure relates to the fact that people are also curious creatures that 
actively explore novel, unknown, and unfamiliar things. How do the 
apparently opposite desires for predictability on the one hand and for 
interest in discovering new things on the other relate, and what are the 
consequences for the experience of surprise? The answer may lie in the 
sequential nature of emotion processes. According to sequential 
appraisal perspectives (Scherer, 1999) people first respond to the 
novelty of a situation (i.e., novelty check) after which other appraisals 
follow. Silvia (2005) argues that because of this sequential nature, 
surprise comes first but can shift to interest as the situation unfolds: “... 
it seems likely that the novelty check precedes the coping potential 
check, because people must identify a disruption in processing before 
assessing their ability to comprehend the source of the disruption (p. 
99).” In other words, experiences of surprise, driven by the first 
appraisal of novelty, could shift following a subsequent appraisal of 
coping potential (see also Gendolla & Koller, 2001). Similarly, when 
	   63 
people actively search for novelty (rather than being confronted with it) 
they probably do this when they think they are able to cope with is. 
Interestingly, this probably involves an element of anticipating the 
unexpected and the unknown; the “expected unexpected” can be 
exciting and interesting but this is probably less surprising than events 
that were not anticipated at all.  
In conclusion, the finding that surprise has a negative valence may 
further our understanding of how people experience consistencies and 
inconsistencies in the world around them. With this, we can give a 
tentative answer to our opening question on whether surprising a loved 
one is a tragic mistake: it is probably not, but don’t expect a happy face 
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Surprise: Unfolding of Facial Expressions 
When people are confronted with unexpected, inconsistent, or disfluent 
stimuli, they experience surprise (e.g., Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph, & 
Schützwohl, 1991; Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; Noordewier 
& Breugelmans, 2013; Noordewier, Topolinski, & Van Dijk, 2015; 
Reisenzein, 2000b). When surprised, ongoing thoughts and activities are 
interrupted and attention is directed at the surprising stimulus to make 
sense of it (e.g., Camras et al., 2002; Horstmann, 2006; Meyer et al., 
1991, 1997; Reisenzein, 2000b; Scherer, 2001). After sense-making, 
surprise dissipates and other affective states follow depending on the 
nature of the surprising event (e.g., Ekman, 2003; Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013; Tomkins, 1984). 
Responses to a surprising stimulus are thus dynamic and unfold 
from initial interruption (i.e., responses to the unexpectedness of the 
event) to cognitive mastering (i.e., responses to the valence of the 
event; Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; 
Noordewier et al., 2015). Therefore, to study surprise rather than its 
consequences, it is key to take the temporal dynamics of sense-making 
into account (cf. Noordewier et al., 2015; see also Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013; Tomkins, 1984). We aimed to do exactly this and 
systematically tested the temporal unfolding of facial expressions in 
response to surprising stimuli, to distinguish surprise from the state that 
follows it. Moreover, we aimed to provide more insight into what 
surprise expression looks like and what this might mean in terms of the 
valence of surprise. 
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Facial expressions are particularly suited to reveal the unfolding of 
responses, because they can capture initial responses to a surprising 
stimulus as well as changes in responses over time (cf. Noordewier et 
al., 2015). In a first study on this, expressions of people who were 
positively surprised in TV-shows were analyzed (Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013). Screenshots taken right after the surprise and 
subsequently at one-second intervals were evaluated in terms of feelings 
and type of situation the person in the picture was in. Faces were more 
negative in the first moments as compared to later; a pattern that was 
assumed to reflect unfolding of responses, from interruption to 
mastering (Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013).  
In line with this, a facial electromyography study (fEMG; 
Reisenzein et al., 2006, Study 7) showed that participants who were 
surprised with an unanticipated photograph of themselves had a slight 
increase of corrugator activity (i.e., frown; also found in Topolinski & 
Stack, 2015; see also Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012), which was after 
1-3 seconds followed by an increase in zygomaticus activity (i.e., smile). 
While in this study Reisenzein et al. aimed to test the occurrence of the 
surprise expression (raised eyebrows, eye-widening, jaw drop; Darwin, 
1872/1998; Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) rather than its temporal 
dynamics per se, it supports the notion that initial responses to 
surprising stimuli differ from later responses. Interestingly, these studies 
also point to two other elements of the responses to surprise stimuli: 
The initial expression is more negative than the later expression and it 
may involve frowning.  
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First, regarding the valence of the expression, several lines of work 
indeed support the notion that surprise or interruption is relatively 
negative (see also Hajcak, 2012; Mendes et al., 2007; Miceli & 
Castelfranchi, 2015; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; Topolinski & 
Strack, 2015). In fact, from the point of view of cognitive consistency 
theories and personal control perspectives, surprise reflects 
inconsistency, disruption, and lacking of structure. Because this 
conflicts with people’s need for a predictable and coherent world, this 
may feel relatively negative (Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 
2012; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Miceli & 
Castelfranchi, 2015; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012; Rutjens, 
Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, Kreemers, & Noordewier, 2013).  
So, even if the surprising stimulus is positive, people first 
experience this brief phase of inconsistency and lack of meaning (i.e., 
surprise), before they can appreciate the outcome as is it (i.e., the state 
after surprise). Importantly, this means that to understand surprise, it 
should not be confused with its consequences and only by taking time 
into account, surprise can be distinguished as initial interruption from 
subsequent states that follow after sense-making. This temporal 
dynamics perspective also explains why other researchers suggested that 
surprise feels positive (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, 
& Ritov, 1997; Valenzuela, Strebel, & Mellers, 2010), as they measure 
retrospective evaluations or feelings after cognitive mastering (see 
Noordewier et al., 2015, for a similar reasoning). 
Second, the expression after a surprise might thus involve 
frowning (Topolinski & Strack, 2015; see also Reisenzein et al., 2006; 
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Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012). This seems inconsistent with the 
“typical” surprise expression (raised eyebrows, eye-widening, jaw drop). 
Previous research already showed, however, that this “typical” 
expression is in fact rarely and only partly observed in a minority of 
surprised people (mostly raising eyebrows only; 4-25% in Reisenzein et 
al., 2006; 34% in Reisenzein, 2000; 10-33% in Schützwohl & 
Reisenzein, 2012). Yet, it should be noted that in these studies it is not 
always clear whether participants who did not show a surprised face 
showed a neutral face or other facial action. Besides frowns, smiles 
were also observed (2-86% in Reisenzein et al., 2006; 26-71% in 
Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 2012; 8.6-12.1% in Scherer, Zenter, & Stern, 
2002); and in infant studies, freezing (Camras et al., 2002; Scherer et al., 
2002) and signs of interest were also found (Camras et al., 2002).  
There is thus some indication that the expression after a surprise 
involves frowning, yet other facial action has also been observed. 
Importantly, because most studies did not take time into account, the 
possibility that different facial actions follow each other remains 
untested. To better understand the expression after a surprise, it is 
therefore important to incorporate time when coding different facial 
actions. 
The Current Studies 
To clarify the temporal unfolding of facial expressions in response 
to a surprising stimulus, we developed two repetition-change studies—a 
standardized and well-validated procedure to induce surprise (e.g., 
Camras et al., 2002; Meyer et al., 1997; Reisenzein et al., 2006). We 
tested our predictions using positive surprises (Experiments 3.1 and 
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3.2) as well as a negative surprise (Experiment 3.2) and recorded facial 
expressions using webcams. Using computerized and manual coding, 
we measured the valence of facial expression over time as well as 
different facial action elements.  
We predict that if surprise is relatively negative and different from 
subsequent states after sense-making, 1) initial expressions to positive 
surprises are more negative than later expressions and 2) responses to 
positive and negative surprises are initially similar and only start to 
differentiate depending on the nature of the event after some time. We 
report all manipulations, all measures, and all data exclusions. Sample 
sizes are at least 50 per cell (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011, 
2013), yet, we collected more data to be able to account for data 
exclusion as a result of coding errors and participants not giving 
permission to use their material. 
 
Experiment 3.1: A Surprising Puppy 
In the first study, we tested our unfolding hypothesis by positively 
surprising participants with a puppy. 
Method 
A total of 71 participants (47 females, 24 males; Mage = 22.32 years, 
SDage = 4.87) were assigned to a within participants design in which we 
compared facial expressions in response to neutral stimuli (baseline) 
and to a positive surprising target.  
Procedure and Materials. The study started with a cover story to 
explain the use of the webcam and to induce a social context. 
Participants were told that they would participate in a study on eye-
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movement and attention to pictures and in order to analyze their eye-
movements, we would record them with a webcam. Then, we wanted 
to make the context somewhat more social than the more typical lab 
setting, where participants are in a lab cubicle on their own. A pilot test 
showed that participants were not very expressive in this setting and we 
reasoned that one explanation could be that it is not social enough (e.g., 
Friedlund, 1991). Therefore, we told participants that recent research 
suggested that there are reasons to believe that people perform better 
on attention tasks when they do this with other people and that we 
were interested to test whether it is necessary to see the other person or 
not. We told them that they would be connected to another participant 
via the webcam, like on Skype. This story was most likely extra credible 
to participants, as in the two preceding, but unrelated, experiments in 
the experimental session they were also connected to other participants 
(in one experiment for real, in the other also as part of a cover story). 
They were then presented with a pre-recorded video of a confederate 
with the request to look at the other person and to connect with this 
person by for instance waving. The confederate waved and on the 
footage, we saw many participants doing so too, which leads us to 
believe that we created a credible social context. A picture (i.e., a still 
frame) of the confederate remained in the top right corner of the screen 
throughout the neutral part of the experiment. 
After instructions, participants continued to the main part of the 
experiment in which they were surprised. Surprise was induced using a 
repetition-change procedure. On a computer screen participants were 
presented with a series of trials with sequential presentation of 
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affectively neutral stimuli: buildings. Each trial presented four pictures 
of buildings (i.e., building-building-building-building) at one-second 
intervals and ended with a question asking participants to indicate 
whether the last picture in the trial contained any green. On a keyboard, 
they could press either “a” or “l”, for yes and no, respectively. 
Participants were given one second to press the key. So, all elements in 
the trials took one second, which gave each trial a certain rhythm, 
which strengthens the expectancy of what will follow (buildings and a 
question).  
After four practice trials, fourteen experimental trials followed. 
The last trial was the critical surprise trial. In this trial, instead of 
presenting participants with the question, we showed them a gif-file of 
a puppy, in which the puppy moved its head and paw towards the 
camera (see imgfave.com/view/1494654). The gif repeated three times, 
which took 9 seconds in total. After the surprise trial, the experiment 
automatically continued to some background questions. Participants 
were asked to indicate (translated from the original Dutch) “To what 
extent were you surprised by the puppy?” (from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
extremely) and “What did you think of the puppy?” (from 1 = negative to 
7 = positive). Then we asked them to report their age and gender and 
whether they participated before in a comparable study before (yes/no; 
we ran a pilot study a couple of months before this study). Finally, 
participants were fully debriefed and they were asked for permission to 
use their recorded footage (yes/no). 
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Results and Discussion 
The analyses consisted of different steps. First, we selected 
participants. Then, we checked our manipulation. Finally, after editing 
the footage, we tested our unfolding predictions by analyzing the 
footage in two ways. First, the facial expressions were coded using 
Noldus’ FaceReader (version 5; see Noldus.com/FaceReader). Next, 
the facial expressions were also coded manually (see below). 
Participant Selection, Target Evaluation, Footage Editing. 
We excluded participants who did not give permission to use their 
footage (N = 8) and who participated before in a similar (pilot) study 
(N = 2). Next, we excluded participants who wore glasses (N = 8; 
glasses may hinder classification in FaceReader; Noldus, 2012, p. 16) 
and those who resulted in other coding errors (N = 1, extreme 
yawning). We analyzed the data of the remaining 52 participants (18 
males, 34 females; Mage = 21.83 years, SDage = 4.79). We first checked 
the ratings of the target. As expected, the target was rated as relatively 
surprising (M = 6.00, SD = 1.12) and as relatively positive (M = 5.85, 
SD = 1.36). 
Next, we edited the videos such that they started two seconds 
before display of the surprising stimulus (baseline) until eight second 
after the surprise. We did this based on event markers that were saved 
during the experiment: We saved the start and stop time of the 
experiment and we saved the time of critical trials. Based on the total 
duration of the video, we could then calculate for each participant 
separately when the surprising event took place. We then converted 
each video such that they were chronologically similar and as such, 
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comparable in the analyses. Then, we analyzed the footage in 
FaceReader and using manual coding.  
FaceReader. After uploading videos, FaceReader can analyse 
facial expressions in terms of basic emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, 
anger, surprise, fear, and disgust) and general valence (happiness minus 
negative emotions, excluding surprise). FaceReader first locates the face 
and then creates a face model based on 500 key points. The face is then 
compared to a database of 10,000 manually coded faces. The deviation 
of the face relative to database is made and intensity of expressions 
calculated. For each frame, FaceReader computes intensity scores for 
expressions of basic emotions (0 to 1) and valence (-1 to 1; for more 
information, see noldus.com/facereader; for validation see Den Uyl & 
Van Kuilenburg, 2005; Van Kuilenburg, Wiering, & Den Uyl, 2005; 
Lewinski, Den Uyl, & Butler, 2014; for studies using FaceReader see 
e.g., Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010; Garcia-Burgos & Zamora, 2013). 
The FaceReader data allowed us to compare the unfolding of 
responses within participants; comparing expressions before, during, 
and after the surprise. We focused on two output measures: valence and 
surprise. FaceReader was set to analyze 25 frames per second and to 
calibrate each participant individually, filtering out person-specific 
biases (e.g., looking angry or happy by nature). We reduced this large 
data set (i.e., 250 data points per participant for both valence and 
surprise) by computing an average intensity score on valence and 
surprise for each 0.5-second (mean of 12 or 13 frames) for each 
participant. After restructuring the data, the final data consisted of 21 
data points (resulting in the within participants factor Time) for each 
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participant for both valence and surprise on which we ran repeated 
measures ANOVAs. In all analyses (also Experiment 3.2), we 
performed Greenhouse-Geisser corrections where necessary (visible in 
adjusted degrees of freedom). Note that when we refer to seconds, the 
negative numbers refer to seconds before the surprising stimulus (i.e., 
baseline) and the positive numbers refer to seconds after the surprising 
stimulus. 
 
Figure 3.1: Valence of facial expression in response to a surprising 
puppy as a function of Time (Experiment 3.1). 
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Figure 3.2: Surprise expression in response to a surprising puppy as a 
function of Time (Experiment 3.1). 
 
Valence. The repeated measures ANOVA (N = 515) showed an 
effect of Time on valence of expressions, F(1.66, 83.15) = 4.14, p = 
.026, ηp2 = .08 (see Figure 3.1). When comparing the valence of 
expressions relative to baseline (second -2) with within subjects 
contrasts, we found that expressions were more positive at second 6 
until second 8, Fs(1, 50) = 5.16-5.94, ps = .018-.028, ηp2s = .09-.11. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The number of participants in the analyses is reported when, as a consequence of 
missing data, it deviates from the total number (i.e., a repeated measures ANOVA and 
Cochran’s Q analyses excludes participants when there are missing data).  
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Expressions were marginally more positive at second 5.5, F(1, 50) = 
3.03, p = .088, ηp2 = .06. 
Surprise. The repeated measures ANOVA (N = 51) showed a 
marginal effect of Time on the surprise expression, F(3.41, 170.72) = 
2.47, p = .056, ηp2 = .05 (see Figure 3.2). Comparing surprise 
expressions relative to baseline (second -2) with within subjects 
contrasts showed marginally more surprise at second 2.5 until 4, Fs(1, 
50) = 2.84-3.03, ps = .088-.098, ηp2s = .05-.06. 
In sum, the results show that it takes time to respond positively to 
a positive surprise and before that, people show some surprise 
expressions. While there thus seems to be some surprise expression, 
this is not very strong and the question remains what the facial 
expression after a surprising stimulus looks like. In Figure 3.1, there is a 
small decline visible in valence of expression just after the surprise. This 
decline is not statistically different compared to baseline. Yet, we 
considered the possibility that expressions are too subtle for 
FaceReader to detect. We therefore decided to also manually code 
different facial expressions elements. 
Manual Coding. Two independent coders who were blind to the 
research question and hypotheses of the study were trained using 
material of a pilot study to code different expression elements. Then, 
we created screenshots of the 52 videos of the current study at 0.5-
second intervals. Each screenshot was coded in terms of absence or 
presence of a frown, smile, eyebrow raise, jaw drop, and eye-widening. 
A screenshot was coded a “0” when an element was absent and it was 
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coded on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very strong) when an element 
was present.6 We also included the option “unclear”, which we treated 
as missing data (0.004% of a total of 12,480 codings). 
The interraterreliability of the data was calculated with correlations 
and because this was not consistently above r = .70 (particularly with 
brow raise, eye-widening), we recoded the data in terms of absence (0) 
and presence (1 = 1 to 5 intensity score) of the expressions after 
surprise (comparable absence/presence coding has also been used in 
Reisenzein et al., 2006). This recoding was done after one coder 
individually checked her ratings and corrected 0.05% of the brow raise 
and frown codings. To check reliability, we calculated percentage 
agreement between coders. Reliability for frown, smile, brow raise, and 
jaw drop was good, as it ranged between 70% and 100% (except for 
brow raise on seconds 0-1 and 2-3.5, where it was between 67-69%). 
The eye-widening agreement was too low (between 48-63%) and 
therefore excluded from further analyses. Finally, disagreement on all 
screenshots after the surprising stimulus was solved through discussion 
and we analyzed these 100% agreement data. Then, we tested whether 
Time affected the frequency of each expression element with Cochran’s 
Q tests (see Figure 3.3). When an effect was found, we subsequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Valence was also coded (“How does this person feel?” on a scale from -2 negative to 
+2 positive, with 0 representing neutral). Results replicated the FaceReader data pattern, 
such that a repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of Time, F(1.68, 85.83) = 
11.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Relative to baseline (second -2), expressions were coded 
more positive after second 4 until second 8, Fs(1, 51) = 4.04-17.68, ps = .000-.050, ηp2s 
= .07-.26. However, because the correlations between the ratings of the two coders 
were not consistently high (i.e., they ranged between .26 and .85, with 66% < .70), we 
excluded these results from the main analyses.  
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compared individual seconds with McNemar tests. Note that we now 
only focus on what happens after surprise (baseline is excluded). 
Frown. There was no effect of Time on the number of frowns, 
Q(16) = 18.84, p = .277 (N = 51). 
Smile. There was an effect Time on the number of smiles, Q(16) = 
134.28, p < .001. McNemar comparisons showed that, relative to 
second 0, there were more smiles from second 4.5 until second 8, ps 
between < .001 and .031, whereas before that, the number of smiles did 
not differ, ps > .124. 
Surprise elements. There was no effect of Time on number of 
brow raises, Q(16) = 11.65, p = .767 (N = 50). There was also no effect 
of Time on jaw drops, Q(16) = 12.00, p = .744, which were hardly 
observed (2 times or less; note that eye-widening was excluded from the 
analyses; see above).  
Taken together, these results show that it takes time to respond 
positively to a positive surprise. This positivity seems to be 
characterized by an increase in smiles. In addition, while FaceReader 
showed some indication of surprise expressions in the first couple of 
seconds, the manual coding of the separate facial actions did not 
confirm this result. The second study aimed to induce more intense 
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Figure 3.3: Number of frowns, smiles, and brow raises in response to a 
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Experiment 3.2: A Surprising Person 
Experiment 3.2 tests the unfolding logic by surprising people in a 
person-perception setting. We assumed that this setting is more social 
and self-relevant than the buildings and puppy in Experiment 3.1, 
which might intensify responses. We again used a repetition-change 
method and showed participants a series of neutral faces, followed by a 
face that deviated from the preceding faces and thus was unexpected. 
This was either a positive or a negative face and as such, we now also 
included negative surprise condition, which allows us to compare 
unfolding of responses to surprise to responses to a positive vs. a 
negative target.  
Method 
A total of 128 participants (69 females, 59 males; Mage = 21.20 
years, SDage = 2.25) were randomly assigned to a positive versus 
negative surprise condition. The study was presented as a test of factors 
driving first impressions of unknown others. To this end, they were 
asked to evaluate pictures 20 faces. Pictures were selected from de 
Radboud Faces Database (RAFD; Langner, Dotsch, Bijlstra, 
Wigboldus, Hawk, & Van Knippenberg, 2010). We selected equal 
numbers of males and females, all showing a neutral expression. Each 
neutral face was shown five seconds after which the question “What is 
your impression of this person?” appeared on the screen. Participants 
could answer “positive” or “negative” with respectively green and blue 
response buttons (i.e., the left and right ctrl buttons on a keyboard were 
covered with green and blue stickers). 
	   83 
After 20 trials the critical surprise trial showed either a positive or a 
negative target face for eight seconds. The positive target was a woman 
with a pig nose mask showing a funny face. The negative target was a 
man with wounds on his face. Both targets did not show any positive or 
a negative expression, to prevent that participants would mimic this 
expression. After the critical trial, the program automatically continued 
to background questions. Participants were asked to report to what 
extent they were surprised by the target (from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
extremely), to evaluate the target (from 1 = negative to 7 = positive), and to 
report their age and gender. Finally, they were fully debriefed and asked 
for permission to use their footage (yes/no). 
Results and Discussion 
The analyses were done following the same steps as in Experiment 
3.1. 
Participant Selection and Footage Editing. First, we excluded 
participants who did not give us permission to use the footage (N = 5), 
who wore glasses (N = 8) or because of other coding errors (i.e., N = 2; 
video could not open and N = 1; only half of the face was recorded). 
We report analyses of the remaining 112 participants (53 males, 59 
females, Mage = 21.14 years, SDage = 2.27). 
First, we checked the ratings of the target. As expected, the 
positive target was rated more positive (M = 5.70, SD = 1.69) than the 
negative target (M = 2.60, SD = 1.26), t(110) = 10.89, p < .001, d = 
2.08. Yet, the positive target was rated as equally surprising (M = 5.72, 
SD = 1.38) as the negative target (M = 6.02, SD = 1.18), t(110) = -1.24, 
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p = .22, d = -0.23. So, based on this we conclude that our stimuli 
represented a positive versus a negative surprise. 
Next, we edited the videos in the same way as in Experiment 3.1, 
such that they showed participant two seconds before the surprise 
(baseline) and eight seconds after the surprise. This footage was first 
coded with FaceReader. 
FaceReader. FaceReader was set to analyze 30 frames per second 
and to calibrate each participant individually, filtering out person-
specific biases. We again computed an average intensity score on valence 
and surprise for each 0.5-second. After restructuring, the final data had 
21 data points (Time) for each participant on valence and surprise on 
which we ran repeated measures ANOVAs (see Figure 3.4), followed 
by within subjects contrasts (Time) and between condition comparisons 
(Target). 
Valence. The repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of 
Time on valence of expressions, F(3.07, 337.43) = 2.59, p = .051, ηp2 = 
.02, and a Time x Target interaction, F(3.07, 337.43) = 4.76, p = .003, 
ηp2 = .04. To interpret the interaction, we compared the effect of Time 
within the positive and negative target condition separately. 
Within the positive target condition, there was a main effect of 
Time, F(2.84, 159.89) = 4.55, p = .005, ηp2 = .07. Simple contrasts 
showed that expressions were more positive relative to baseline from 
second 1.5 until second 7: Fs between 3.97 and 9.34, ps between .003 
and .051, ηp2s between .06 and .14, and marginally more positive at 
second 8, F(1,59) = 3.16, p = .081, ηp2 = .05. Within the negative target 
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condition, there was a marginal main effect of Time, F(2.63, 134.05) = 
2.18, p = .102, ηp2 = .04. Simple contrasts showed that expressions were 
more negative relative to baseline from second 4.5 until 7.5, Fs between 
3.89 and 5.38, ps between .024 and .054, ηp2s between .07 and 95.  
 
Figure 3.4: Valence of facial expression in response as a function of 
Target (positive vs. negative) and Time (Experiment 3.2). 
 
 
So, facial expressions were initially similar in the positive and 
negative target condition. Over time, they unfolded to more positive 
expressions in the positive target condition and to more negative 
expressions in the negative target condition. Interestingly, expressions 
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seemed to unfold slower in the negative as compared to the positive 
target condition. Moreover, overall, the unfolding seemed faster than in 
Experiment 3.1. We will discuss this in more detail in the General 
Discussion. 
Next, we compared the valence of expressions between the two 
target conditions. Two seconds after the surprise, facial expressions 
started to differentiate, such that at seconds 2-3.5, expressions in the 
positive target condition became (marginally) more positive than in the 
negative target condition, ts between 1.80 and 1.98 ps between .051 and 
.068, ds between 0.34 and 0.38. From second 4 until 7, conditions 
differed statistically, such that ts were between 2.08 and 2.69, and ps 
between .006 and .026, ds between 0.42 and 0.52. 
Surprise. No effects were observed on the surprise expression (all 
Fs < 1; all means ranged between 0.03 and 0.07).  
Manual Coding. We also coded the videos manually in the same 
way as in Experiment 3.1 (same coders, same method, including 
recoding in terms of 0 = absence and 1 = presence). We made 
screenshots at 0.5-second intervals of all 112 videos. These screenshots 
were coded in terms of frown, smile, brow raise, jaw drop, and eye-
widening. The “unclear” option was also included, which resulted in 
0.003% missing of a total of 26,880 codings.   
Agreement ranged between 70% and 100% (with the exception of 
frowning on seconds 0.5/1, where it was 65/69%; and eye-widening on 
seconds 1.5/3 where it was 69/68%, respectively) and disagreement 
was solved through discussion. Then, we compared the frequency of 
each expression element between conditions with Chi-square tests. 
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Next, we tested whether Time affected the frequency of each 
expression element (within each conditions, where relevant) with 
Cochran’s Q tests (see Figure 3.5). When an effect of Time was found, 
we subsequently compared individual seconds with McNemar tests7. 
Frown. Chi-square tests showed that there were (marginally) fewer 
frowns in positive target condition than the negative target condition 
from second 4 until second 8, χ2s(1, N = 107-111) between 2.83 and 
4.16, ps between .041 and .092, except second 5 and 5.5, χ2s(1) = 
2.69/0.66, ps = .101/.415. Before second 4, equal number of frowns 
were observed in the positive and negative target condition, χ2s < .68 
and ps > .40. Within the positive target condition, we found and effect 
of Time on the number of frowns, Q(16) = 35.38, p = .004 (N = 51). 
McNemar tests within the positive target condition showed that relative 
to second 0, the number of frowns did not differ, ps > .288, but there 
were (marginally) fewer frowns relative to second 0.5 at second 6 and 
6.5, ps = .031/.063 (other comparisons relative to second 0.5, ps > 
.124). Within the negative target condition, there was no effect of Time, 
Q(16) = 16.46, p = .421 (N = 49). So, initially, we observed the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Similar to Experiment 3.1, valence of expressions was coded as well and results 
replicated the FaceReader data pattern, even though interraterreliability was not 
consistently high (correlations ranged between .32 and .83 with 62% < .7). A repeated 
measures ANOVA (N = 110) on the averaged ratings of both coders showed a Time x 
Target interaction, F(2.12, 228.65) = 15.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .13, and a main effect of 
Time, F(2.12, 228,65) = 16.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Within the positive target condition, 
the expressions were more positive relative to baseline (second -2), after second 3 until 
second 8, Fs(1, 50) = 6.32-37.86, ps = .000-.015, ηp2s = .10-.40. Within the negative 
target condition, the expressions did not change over time, ps > .558. Comparing 
positive and negative target conditions, we see that the facial expressions start to differ 
from second 4 until second 8, ts(110) = 3.10-3.75, ps < .003, ds > 0.59. 
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amount of frowning in both conditions. Over time there was 
(marginally) less frowning in the positive target condition as compared 
to the negative target condition. 
 
Figure 3.5: Number of frowns, smiles, eye-widenings, and brow raises 
as a function of Target (positive vs. negative) and Time (Experiment 
3.2).  
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Smile. Chi-square tests showed that there were more smiles in the 
positive target condition than the negative target condition from second 
4 until second 8, χ2s(1, N = 111-112) between 8.86 and 14.15, ps 
between < .001 and .003, and marignally more on second 3.5, χ2(1, N = 
111) = 2.72, p = .099. Before second 3.5, equal number of smiles were 
observed in the positive and negative target condition, χ2s (1, N = 111-
112) < 1.17 and ps > .280. Within the positive target condition, we 
found an effect of Time on the number of smiles, Q(16) = 202.16, p < 
.001. McNemar tests within the positive target condition showed that, 
relative to second 0, there were more smiles from second 4 until second 
8, ps < .001, whereas before that, the number of smiles did not differ, 
ps > .249. Within the negative target condition, there was no effect of 
Time, Q(16) = 15.39, p = .496. So, initially, there were hardly any smiles 
in both conditions and over time this unfolded to more smiling in the 
positive target condition, but remained equally low in the negative 
target condition. 
Surprise elements. Chi-square tests showed that conditions did not 
differ in number of brow raises, χ2s (1, N = 108-111) < 1.69, ps > .192, 
or jaw drops (between 3 and 7 times observed), χ2s (1, N = 111-112) < 
1.01, ps > .316, or eye-widening, χ2s (1, N = 109-112) < 2.21, ps > .136. 
Next, we tested the overall effect of Time, which showed that Time did 
not affect the number of brow raises, Q(16) = 15.32, p = .501 (N = 
106), or jaw drops, Q(16) = 11.12, p = .802 (N = 109). There was, 
however, an effect of Time on eye-widening, Q(16) = 27.42, p = .037 
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(N = 107). Relative to second 0, there was more eye-widening from 
second 0.5 until second 8, ps between < .001 and .092, except on 
second 4 and 6.5, ps > .145. 
Taken together, these results support our unfolding logic. Initially, 
responses to a positive or a negative surprise did not differ. Over time, 
expressions to a positive target became more positive, whereas to a 
negative target they stayed the same. Moreover, initially, there were 
equal numbers of frowns in both conditions, whereas later, there were 




Responses to a surprising stimulus are dynamic and unfold from 
initial interruption to cognitive mastering of the event (Meyer et al., 
1991, 1997; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; Noordewier et al., 
2015). To study surprise and distinguish it from the state that follows it, 
we tested the temporal unfolding of facial expression in response to a 
surprising stimulus. Results of two repetition-change studies showed 
that initial expressions after positive surprises are more negative than 
later expressions. Moreover, expressions after a positive and negative 
surprise are initially similar and only after some time start to 
differentiate, depending on the valence of the event. Finally, 
irrespective of the valence of the surprise, participants showed initially 
equal number of frowns (Experiment 3.2), which only later turned to 
smiles when the outcome was positive (Experiments 3.1 and 3.2). 
Taken together, these results confirmed the notion that responses to 
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surprising stimuli unfold from responses to the unexpectedness of the 
event to the valence of the event (see also Meyer et al., 1997; 
Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; Noordewier et al., 2015). 
Interestingly, when we compare the two studies in terms of speed 
of unfolding, it becomes clear that expressions unfolded much faster in 
the study with the surprising faces than the study with the surprising 
puppy (see Figures 3.1 and 3.4). The relation between expectancy and 
surprise is a plausible explanation for this difference. The surprising 
puppy in Experiment 3.1 was categorically different from the preceding 
repetition trials (buildings), whereas the surprising positive/negative 
faces in Experiment 3.2 were categorically similar to the preceding 
repetition trials (neutral faces). Categorical similarity of surprise to the 
preceding context may make the surprise easier to categorize, which 
facilitates sense-making and thus, faster responses to the actual meaning 
of the target. Moreover, faces are probably more self-relevant to 
participants than a puppy, which could have contributed further to 
faster unfolding.  
Besides showing unfolding of responses after a surprising stimulus, 
we also aimed to get more insight into what the expression after a 
surprise looks like. Previous research already showed that the typical 
surprise expression with raised eyebrows, eye-widening, and jaw drop is 
rare (Reisenzein et al., 2006) and that people might initially frown 
(Topolinksi & Strack, 2015). We find some (marginal) evidence for 
initial frowning and later eye-widening (Experiment 3.2). Importantly, 
in line with our unfolding logic, frowns were initially equally strong for 
both the positive and negative surprises and also the eye-widening was 
	   92 
independent of the valence of the surprising target. In addition, in 
response to positive surprises, smiles were never observed right after 
the surprising stimuli and only occurred after some time passed 
(Experiments 3.1 and 3.2). So, also this more detailed expression-
coding supports the view that initially, people respond to the 
unexpectedness of the outcome and only later, after sense-making, 
respond to the valence of the outcome. Moreover, a tentative 
conclusion is that frowning may be part of the initial response to a 
surprising stimulus8.  
If frowning regularly occurs in response to surprising events, the 
question remains how this should be interpreted. Corrugator activity 
might just reflect orientation (Van Dillen, Harris, Van Dijk, & 
Rotteveel, 2015; Yartz & Hawk, 2002), but it has also been related to 
mental effort (e.g., Van Boxtel & Jessurun, 1993) and negative affect 
(Topolinski, Likowski, Wyers, & Strack, 2009; Topolinski & Strack 
2015). These latter connections would fit the notion that surprise 
reflects a negative state as a result of inconsistency and lack of meaning 
(Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Kay et al., 2009; Miceli 
& Castelfranchi, 2015; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; Proulx et al., 
2012; Rutjens et al., 2013). 
Finally, while we did not predict to find “typical” surprise 
expressions (based on Reisenzein et al., 2006; Reisenzein & 
Schützwohl, 2012), it is still intriguing that people think they show this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Note that we do not find this in Experiment 3.1, where expressions were overall less 
intense than in Experiment 3.2. As such, it remains possible that the frowns were too 
subtle to detect without fEMG. 
	   93 
expression (see Reisenzein et al., 2006) and recognize the expression as 
surprise in others (e.g., Ekman et al., 1987). One possibility that is still 
untested is that this expression occurs when intending to communicate 
surprise. So, rather than a direct consequence of an internal state, 
people would raise their eye-brows, widen their eyes and drop their jaw 
to inform someone else that they are surprised. This would mean that a 
social context alone is not enough to induce the “typical” surprise 
expression (as indeed found in Reisenzein et al., 2006; Schützwohl & 
Reisenzein, 2012), but instead people should directly interact with each 
other. Future research could test this possibility. 
Conclusion 
When people are surprised, they initially respond to the 
unexpectedness of the event and later to the valence of the event. Two 
repetition-change studies supported this unfolding notion and showed 
that 1) after positive surprises, initial expressions are more negative than 
later expressions and 2) expressions to positive and negative surprises 
are initially similar and only start to differentiate depending on the 
valence of the event after some time. Finally, initial frowning was 
independent of the valence of the surprising target and this only later 
turned to smiles in the case of positive surprises. Taken together, these 
studies show that to study surprise, it is key to take its temporal 
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Curiosity and Time:  
From Not Knowing to Almost Knowing 
Curiosity is the desire to know (Kashdan & Silvia, 2009; Litman, 2005; 
Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009), which is triggered when 
people become aware of a gap in their knowledge and it instigates 
exploratory motivation aimed at closing this gap (e.g., Loewenstein, 
1994; Silvia, 2012; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007). Curiosity thus reflects 
a state in which people lack information and are motivated to find out 
what it is.  
Curiosity becomes more intense when the information-gap 
becomes smaller (Litman, Hutchins, & Russon, 2005; Van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2007). So, people are more curious about the United States 
when they know 48 out of the 50 states than when they know only 14 
(Loewenstein, 1994) and people get more curious about the content of 
a box when they also hear that the box contains something round (Van 
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007). The explanation for this increase in intensity 
is that with more (but not all) information available, the information-
gap is perceived to be smaller and people focus more on what they do 
not know, which intensifies the desire to know (Loewenstein, 1994; see 
also Litman et al., 2005). Moreover, with more information available, 
people feel closer to finding out what the curiosity-inducing target is 
and closer to fulfilling their desire to know (Loewenstein, 1994). 
Information-gap theory can be conceived as a cognitive theory that 
focuses on what information people miss and on what information 
people need to close the gap. We will build on this approach, but add a 
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new element: Time. In doing so, we not only focus on what information 
is needed to close the gap, but also on when the gap will be closed; a 
feature we refer to as the “time to resolution.” By varying the time to 
resolution, while keeping the amount of information constant, we 
tested how time affects how it feels to be curious. We predict that when 
people do not expect to close their information-gap soon, they are 
more likely to focus on the information-gap and the fact that they do 
not know something than when they can close their information-gap 
relatively quickly and almost know something. In this view, there are 
two sides to curiosity: the information-gap (not knowing) and the 
anticipation of the resolution (almost knowing). We predict that time 
affects how it feels to be curious, because it changes the relative impact 
of these two components: The longer the time to resolution, the weaker 
the anticipation of the resolution and the stronger the impact of the 
information-gap. 
So, what does it mean to focus on the information-gap itself or its 
resolution? There is hardly any empirical work on how it feels to be 
curious, but there are different theoretical perspectives on both sides of 
curiosity. On the not knowing side, curiosity has been conceptualized as 
a state of knowledge deprivation (e.g., Loewenstein, 1994). In this view, 
curiosity is aversive because it frustrates people’s desire to understand 
their environment and to have a sense of predictability, certainty, and 
structure (e.g., Berlyne, 1960, 1971; Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Kay, 
Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Litman, 2005; Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). In line 
with this, a recent imaging (fMRI) study showed that inducing curiosity 
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activated brain areas related to conflict and arousal, while resolving it 
activated areas related to reward (Jepma, Verdonschot, Van 
Steenbergen, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012; for related work see 
Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Han, Li, Warren, Feng, Litman, 
& Li, 2013; Kang et al., 2009; Maril, Simons, Weaver, & Schacter, 
2005). In addition, knowledge-seeking studies show that people feel 
discomfort when they do not know something and even prefer 
knowing negative outcomes to staying ignorant (Kruger & Evans, 2009; 
Shani, Tykocinski, & Zeelenberg, 2008). 
Contrary, and in our view more on the “almost knowing” side, 
curiosity has been related to positive emotions and to being interested 
in the unknown. In this view, curiosity is part of people’s exploratory 
nature and it reflects the anticipation of discovering something new 
(e.g., Berlyne, 1960, 1971; Kashdan & Silvia, 2009; Litman, 2005; 
Noordewier & Van Dijk, 2015; Silvia, 2012; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009). 
This anticipation may be pleasurable in itself (e.g., Silvia, 2012) or it 
may be driven by the expected pleasure of closing the information-gap 
rather than the experience of curiosity itself (Loewenstein, 1994). 
While it is difficult to unravel the exact nature of the desire to 
know, it seems plausible that a focus on not knowing (i.e., the 
information-gap) is more negative than a focus on almost knowing (i.e., 
anticipation of discovering something new; Kashdan & Silvia, 2009; 
Litman, 2005). That the subjective experience of curiosity might depend 
on whether people focus on missing information or the possibility of 
discovering something new can also be found in Litman’s I/D model 
of curiosity that differentiates between curiosity as deprivation and 
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curiosity as interest. Curiosity as deprivation refers to an uncomfortable 
wanting of information; curiosity as interest refers to a pleasurable 
anticipation of liking information (Litman 2005, 2008, 2010; for more 
information on wanting vs. liking systems and its neural processes, see 
Berridge 1999, 2003). Litman developed scales that reliably measure 
individual differences in deprivation- vs. interest-type curiosity (Litman, 
2008; Litman & Jimerson, 2004; Litman & Spielberger, 2003). Studies 
show that dispositional deprivation-type curiosity is associated with 
uncertainty reduction, discomfort, tip of tongue experience, and low 
tolerance of ambiguity, whereas dispositional interest-type curiosity is 
associated with openness, anticipated fun of discovering something 
completely new, positive affect, and high tolerance of ambiguity 
(Collins, Litman, & Spielberger, 2004; Litman, 2008, 2010; Litman et al., 
2005; Litman & Jimerson, 2004; Litman & Mussel, 2013). 
When we combine this not knowing vs. almost knowing logic with 
our time-to-resolution perspective, this results in the prediction that 
curiosity is less pleasant when the resolution takes long as compared to 
short. Specifically, when the time to close the information-gap is long, 
the anticipation of the resolution is relatively weak and the aversiveness 
of not knowing something is more likely to become part of feeling 
curious. Contrary, when the time to close the information-gap is short, 
the anticipation of the resolution is stronger and the aversiveness of not 
knowing something is less likely to become part of feeling curious. 
Time thus may change whether people primarily want or like 
information (Berridge, 1999; Litman, 2005), as over time, people are 
predicted to move from feeling deprived to feeling interested. In line 
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with this, the recent pleasure-interest model on aesthetic liking predicts 
a comparable effect of time (Graf & Landwehr, 2015), such that when 
processing goes more difficult or slower than expected it likely results 
in confusion, whereas when processing goes easier or faster than 
expected it likely results in interest.  
So, clear predictions can be made regarding how the temporal 
proximity of the resolution affects how it feels to be curious. It is, 
however, less clear how time affects the intensity of curiosity. It could be 
that to the closer in time to the resolution, the stronger the curiosity—
similar to increased motivation when people are closer in fulfilling their 
goal (i.e., goal-gradient hypothesis, cf. Hull, 1932; see e.g., Kivetz, 
Urminsky, & Zheng, 2006; see also Kruger & Evans, 2009; or 
approach-gradient principle of motivation, see Miller, 1959; 
Loewenstein, 1994). Yet, it seems also plausible that intensity will not 
be affected by temporal proximity, because the size of the information-
gap stays the same. So, while the subjective experience of curiosity may 
differ, its intensity may not. 
Finally, note that we do not argue that time-to-resolution affects 
curiosity in the same way as information-gaps. Rather, we propose that 
the time-to-resolution affects the impact of the information-gap. Like 
others (Litman et al., 2005; Loewenstein, 1994) we argue that when an 
information-gap is relatively small, people are more likely to focus on 
what they do not know, whereas when an information gap is relatively 
big, people are more likely to focus on what they know. In line with the 
reasoning outlined before, this focus on not knowing is associated with 
irritation, annoyance, and uncertainty, whereas bigger information gaps 
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are more likely to be associated with enjoyment and the fun of 
discovery (Litman et al., 2005; Litman, 2008, 2010). This effect is 
modulated, however, by the time-to-resolution. The focus on not 
knowing is most strongly evoked in the case of a small information-gap 
with a long time-to-resolution. Based on this logic, the most aversive 
curiosity would thus be the result of a relatively small information-gap 
that takes a long time to resolve. 
The Current Studies 
To test our predictions, we compared the subjective experience 
and intensity of curiosity in a long vs. short time-to-resolution 
condition and measured how this develops over time. With a long 
compared to short time-to-resolution, not knowing something was 
predicted to influence curiosity more strongly, resulting in more 
discomfort and less positive affect. In addition, over time (i.e., going 
from a long to a short time-to-resolution, within participants), 
discomfort was predicted to decrease while positive affect increases, 
because people get closer to fulfilling their desire to know. 
Specifically, Experiment 4.1 tested the effect of a long vs. short 
time-to-resolution on discomfort and positive affect. Experiment 4.2 
extends this by also measuring the strength of the anticipation of the 
resolution and the extent to which people were bothered by not 
knowing. Moreover, we studied how the subjective experience of 
curiosity develops over time when participants go from a long to a 
short time-to-resolution. Finally, Experiment 4.3 aimed to replicate 
Experiment 4.2 and also tests potential moderating effects of individual 
differences in curiosity. We report all manipulations, all measures, and 
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all data exclusions (if any). Based on recommendations by Simmons, 
Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011, 2013), sample sizes are at least 40 per 
cell. In our lab studies (Experiments 4.2 and 4.3) sample sizes are 
bigger, because we continued to collect data until the end of our lab 
time, which was one week. 
 
Experiment 4.1 
The first experiment aimed to provide a first test for the prediction 
that a long vs. short time-to-resolution results in more discomfort and 
less positive affect.  
Method 
Participants (N = 83) were recruited through MTurk (USA 
participants only, hit approval rate higher or equal to 96%) and 
randomly assigned to the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution condition. 
Participants were informed that we studied website content effects. 
While in reality the study took equally long for all participants, we told 
participants that depending on condition, the study would take either 
35 or 5 minutes (instructions/measures adds some time to the 30 vs. 1 
minute[s] to resolution) and that they would be paid according to the 
time they would need to complete the study. So, participants in the 30-
minutes to resolution condition expected to receive more money than 
those in the 1-minute to resolution condition. We explained that for the 
study, they would visit a website containing a video. To make 
participants curious about the video, they read partial information 
about it (based on Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007):  
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Right now, we cannot say what the video is about. You 
will see this once you access the website. We can say, 
however, that the video will show something with 
different shades of brown. The video covers 
approximately half of the web page. The rest of the 
page is text. 
 
Then, they continued to the next page where we manipulated the 
30- vs. 1-minute(s) to the resolution:  
Before we give you the link, however, we would like to 
ask you to do some other unrelated tasks. These tasks 
take approximately 30 minutes [1 minute] and are 
generally experienced as interesting to do. After these 
30 minutes [this minute], you can access the website 
with the video. So, there is half an hour [are only 60 
seconds] between you and the website. After this half 
an hour [these 60 seconds] you can watch the video. 
The following pages will show a timer that counts 
down the 1800 [60 seconds] before you can access the 
website and watch the video. Please take a moment to 
think about the website and what the video might 
show. You will be able to continue shortly. 
 
Next, we measured “To what extent are you eager to find out what 
is on the website?” and then “How do you feel right now?” on the item 
“curious”, followed by a measure of discomfort (uncomfortable, uneasy, 
bothered; α = .82) and positive affect (good, happy, energetic; α = .90; 
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Elliot & Devine, 1994; all from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely) and in this 
and the subsequent studies, we repeated the time-to-resolution 
information before asking the questions. Finally, for exploratory 
purposes, we asked participants to guess what the video would show. 
We reasoned that different feelings may results in different ideas about 
what the video could show (based on feelings-as-information, e.g., 
Schwarz, 1990). Then, the experiment ended and participants were 
debriefed. 
Results 
An independent samples t-test (Table 4.1) showed, as predicted, 
that participants in the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution condition 
experienced more discomfort, t(70.460) = 3.01, p = .004, d = 0.67. 
Conditions did not differ in eagerness, curiosity, or positive affect, ps > 
.32, ds = -0.08 to -0.21.  
 
Table 4.1: Mean (and SD) eagerness, curiosity, positive affect, and 
discomfort as a function of Time (1 vs. 30 minute[s] to resolution; 
Experiment 4.1). 
 1 min 30 min 
eager 4.32a (1.80) 4.18a (1.92) 
curious 4.57a (1.90) 4.41a (1.96) 
positive affect 3.99a (1.45) 3.66a (1.64) 
discomfort 2.13a  (1.20) 3.07b (1.59) 
Note: Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p = .004 in an independent 
sample t-test. 
 
In this and the other studies reported, we coded the ideas about 
the content of the video. Two independent coders were instructed to 
code the valence of the answer (-2 = negative, -1 = slightly negative, 0 = 
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neutral, 1 = slightly positive, 2 = positive). The answers were very diverse 
and ranged from chocolate and poop to dirt, cats, and UPS drivers. We 
excluded seven participants who indicated to have no idea what to 
expect. When more than one answer was given, the valence of each 
answer was coded and an average was used in the analysis. The 
interraterreliability was good (r = .79) and codings were averaged. A t-
test showed that conditions did not differ in valence of ideas (M30min = 
0.21, SD30min = 1.14, vs. M1min = 0.54, SD1min = 0.85), t(74) = -1.40, p = 
.17, d = -0.33. Participants in the 30-minutes to resolution condition did 
give marginally fewer answers (M = 1.06, SD = 0.16) than participants 
in the 1-minute to resolution condition (M = 1.22, SD = 0.52), 
t(48.647) = -1.88, p  = .07, d = -0.42.  
Discussion 
We found preliminary support for our prediction that people 
experience more discomfort when they expect it takes relatively long to 
close their information-gap than when they expect this can be done 
quickly. It did not result in differences in curiosity, positive affect, or 
valence of ideas about the content of the video.  
One might argue that the discomfort in the 30-minutes to 
resolution condition is due to participants expecting to do unrelated 
tasks which they may not feel like doing, even though participants in 
this condition expected to receive more money than the 1-minute to 
resolution condition and we stressed that the tasks were generally 
experienced as interesting. To address this possibility, Experiment 4.2 
tests the same predictions in a lab session that was equally long for all 
participants: Participants were recruited to participate in different 
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studies that together took one hour. They were informed about the 
different studies through an informed consent, so every participant 
knew a) what type of studies were coming, and b) that the session 
would take an hour. As such, any effect of time on discomfort cannot 
be explained by different ideas about tasks ahead or the time it would 
take to finish the session. 
 
Experiment 4.2 
In Experiment 4.2, we again tested the effect of time on 
discomfort and positive affect. In addition, we tested whether a long vs. 
short time-to-resolution weakens the anticipation of the outcome while 
increasing annoyance with lack of information. Moreover, besides 
testing the differences between the long vs. short time-to-resolution 
conditions, we also investigated how the subjective experience 
developed over time within the long time-to-resolution condition, by 
measuring the dependent measures in the long time-to-resolution 
situation (time 1) as well as when time passed and they were as close to 
the resolution as the short time-to-resolution participants (time 2). 
Finally, we now also actually showed participants a video and asked 
them to evaluate it to see whether a long vs. short time-to-resolution 
affects its appreciation.  
Method 
Participants (N = 141; 108 females, 33 males; Mage = 20.01 years, 
SDage 1.95) visited the Leiden University lab and they were randomly 
assigned the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution condition. Participants 
were told that we investigated factors predicting the (un)pleasantness of 
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online videos and that they would evaluate a video. We said that 
(translated from the original Dutch):  
At this point, we cannot say what the video is about. 
You will see this once you access the page. We can say 
that the video takes approximately a minute and it 
shows something with different shades of brown.  
 
Next, they were asked to think about what the video might show 
for a couple of seconds. Then we manipulated time. Similar to 
Experiment 4.1, before watching the video, they were requested do 
some other unrelated task, which would take either approximately 30 or 
1 minute(s). To strengthen the manipulation, we additionally said: 
So there is half an hour [only 60 seconds] between you 
and the video. After this half an hour [60 seconds] you 
can watch the video. Thus, it takes some time before 
the video is shown. [Thus, the video will be shown 
shortly.] 
 
Then, the study continued to the dependent variables. With the 
same items as in Experiment 4.1 (translated to Dutch), we measured 
curiosity, discomfort (α = .70), and positive affect (α = .85). Next, we 
measured lack of information annoyance with, “I think it is bothersome 
that I do not know what the video is about”, and “I think it is annoying 
that I lack information about the content of the video” (α = .87). 
Finally, we checked the temporal proximity of the resolution with, “I 
am about to discover what the video is about” and “The content of the 
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video is almost tangible” (α = .81; all from 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). 
Finally, we asked participants to guess what the video would show 
(open question).  
For the participants in the 1-minute to resolution condition, these 
were all the dependent measures and they could continue to watch the 
video (showing Siberian Grizzly bears) and evaluate it on the items 
“interesting” and “boring” (reversed scored; α = .89). For participants 
in the 30-minutes to resolution condition, this was the time 1 measure. 
All measures were asked again after they did another experiment testing 
possible gender biases in hiring decisions. After this unrelated study, 
they returned to the current study and before watching the video, they 
answered the same items as before (time 2), measuring curiosity, 
discomfort (α = .89), positive affect (α = .80), lack of information 
annoyance (α = .93), and outcome anticipation (α = .61). Then, they 
watched the video and evaluated it on the interesting/boring scales (α 
= .89). At the end of the session, all participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
Results 
We compared the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution condition with 
independent samples t-tests (Table 4.2a). Replicating Experiment 4.1, 
we found that conditions did not differ in reported curiosity, t(139) = -
1.47, p = .14, d = -0.24. As predicted, participants in the 30- vs. 1-
minute(s) to resolution condition experienced more discomfort, t(139) 
= 3.02, p = .003, d = 0.50, and less positive affect, t(139) = -2.87, p = 
.005, d = -0.48. In addition, in the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution 
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condition, they had weaker outcome anticipation, t(139) = -7.58, p < 
.001, d = -1.28. No differences were found on lack of information 
annoyance, t(139) = 0.97, p = .34, d = 0.16. Finally, we compared video 
evaluations (note that this is measured at time 2 in the 30-minutes to 
resolution condition). Participants in the 30-minutes to resolution 
condition evaluated the video more negatively than participants in the 
1-minute to resolution condition, t(139) = -3.13, p = .002, d = -0.53. 
 
Table 4.2a: Mean (and SD) curiosity, positive affect, discomfort, lack 
of information annoyance, outcome anticipation, and video evaluation 
as a function of Time (1 vs. 30 minute[s] to resolution) and within the 
30-minutes to resolution condition (time 1 vs. time 2; Experiment 4.2). 


































video evaluation 4.48a 
(1.63) 
 3.65b  
(1.52) 
Note: Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .01 in an independent 
sample t-test comparing the 1-minute vs. 30-minutes condition or a paired-sample t-test 
comparing 30-minutes to resolution at time 1 vs. time-2. 
 
Next, within the 30-minutes to resolution condition we compared 
t1 and t2 with paired-sample t-tests (Table 4.2a). We found that after 30 
minutes, participants did not become less or more curious, t(69) = -
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1.14, p = .26, d = -0.13 (for information on d-values in repeated 
measures, see Dunlop, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996), but they did 
experience more positive affect, t(69) = -4.76, p < .001, d = -0.44, less 
discomfort, t(69) = 2.93, p = .005, d = 0.25, less lack of information 
annoyance, t(69) = 2.80, p = .007, d = 0.28, and stronger outcome 
anticipation, t(69) = -9.14, p < .001, d = -1.27.  
Then, if our prediction that time to the resolution affects the 
subjective experience of curiosity is correct, there should be no 
difference between t2 in the 30-minutes to resolution condition and the 
1-minute to resolution condition, as the resolution is now equally close. 
T-tests indeed showed no differences on any of the dependent 
measures, all ts(139) between -0.74 and 1.24, ps > .21.  
Finally, we coded the valence of the ideas about the content of the 
video in the same way as in Experiment 4.1. The interraterreliability was 
sufficient (r = .77). Conditions did not differ on valence of ideas (M30min 
= 0.32, SD30min = 0.91 vs. M1min = 0.47, SD1min = 0.79), t(137) = -1.07, p  
= .29, d = -0.18, or the number of answers given (M30min = 2.27, SD30min 
= 1.42 vs. M1min = 2.22, SD1min = 1.27), t(137) = 0.24, p = .81, d = 0.04. 
Discussion 
A long vs. short time-to-resolution resulted in more discomfort, 
less positive affect, and weaker outcome anticipation. Also, while it did 
not change the valence of the ideas about the content of video, a long 
vs. short time-to-resolution did lower video evaluation. Finally, over 
time, participants in the long time-to-resolution condition experienced 
less discomfort, more positive affect, less lack of information 
annoyance and a stronger anticipation of the resolution. 
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We assume that the effects of time are due to the relative impact of 
not knowing vs. almost knowing and we reasoned that the current set-
up ruled out potential effects of expectancies about the task or time to 
finish. Yet, even though participants in the 1-minute to resolution 
condition did the same tasks for the same amount of time as 
participants in the 30-minutes to resolution condition, perhaps the 
duration of the lab session was more on top of participants’ mind in the 
30- than the 1-minute(s) to resolution condition. To rule out the 
possibility that this could explain the discomfort findings, we repeated 
Experiment 4.2 with an extra condition emphasizing the duration of the 
lab session (Experiment 4.2b; N = 194; 140 females, 54 males; Mage = 
21.88 years, SDage = 4.91). Specifically, we compared the 30-minutes 
(like Experiment 1, only time 1) vs. 1-minute to resolution condition to 
a 1-minute to resolution condition where we additionally emphasized 
the remaining time in the lab session. After the 1-minute instructions, 
participants in this condition read: “After viewing the video, the other 
studies you read about in the informed consent will follow. The studies 
in the rest of the session take 30 minutes”. We repeated that “the rest 
of the sessions takes half an hour” before the dependent measures.  
Results again showed that the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution 
condition resulted in more discomfort, less positive affect, weaker 
outcome anticipation, and marginally more lack of information 
annoyance, while the 1-minute to resolution condition did not differ 
from the 1-minute to resolution including session-time reminder 
condition (see Table 4.2b for means and post hoc LSD tests). This 
further corroborates the notion that time to the resolution affects the 
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subjective experience of curiosity.  
 
Table 4.2b: Mean (and SD) curiosity, positive affect, discomfort, lack 
of information annoyance, and outcome anticipation as a function of 
Time (1 minute vs. 1 minute + session time vs. 30 minutes to 
resolution; Experiment 4.2b). 


































Note: Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p < .05 and with * differ at p 
<= .10, LSD post hoc tests. 
 
Experiment 4.3 
In Experiment 4.3, we aimed to replicate Experiment 4.2 and for 
exploratory purposes, we tested potential effects of individual 
differences in curiosity, measured with the Curiosity Exploration 
Inventory (CEI-II; Kashdan et al., 2009). CEI-II measures the extent to 
which people are motivated to look for new knowledge and experiences 
(stretching subscale) and embrace the uncertainty and unpredictability 
of everyday situations (embracing subscale). We reasoned that low 
curious people may be more bothered by not knowing than high 
curious people, who might not experience unpleasantness at all. We did 
not have specific predictions for the different subscales. 
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Method 
A total of 115 participants (95 females, 20 males; Mage = 22.05 
years, SDage = 4.52) visited the Leiden University lab. First, the CEI-II 
was administered. To avoid that participants would associate the pre-
measure with the main study, they then did an unrelated study about 
gender stereotypes in advertising. After this, they were randomly 
assigned to one of two time conditions: 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to 
resolution—similar to Experiment 4.2, except that the study between 
the t1-t2 measures within the 30-minutes to resolution condition was 
now on value conflicts. Also, we checked whether participants had 
participated in the previous study: 15 participants who indicated they 
did were excluded from the analyses. We analyzed the data of the 
remaining 100 participants (Mage = 22.04 years, SDage = 4.78; 83 
females). 
Results 
We compared curiosity, discomfort, positive affect, lack of 
information annoyance, outcome anticipation, and video evaluation in 
the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution condition with independent 
samples t-tests (Table 4.3). Replicating Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, we 
found no differences in reported curiosity, t(98) = 0.79, p = .43, d = 
0.16, while participants in the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution 
condition experienced more discomfort, t(98) = 1.96, p = .05, d = 0.39, 
less positive affect, t(98) = -2.45, p = .02, d = -0.50, more lack of 
information annoyance, t(98) = 3.52, p = .001, d = 0.70, and weaker 
outcome anticipation, t(98) = -2.43, p = .02, d = -0.49. Contrary to 
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Experiment 4.2, no video evaluation differences were found, t(98) = -
1.18, p = .24, d = -0.24. 
Next, we compared t1 and t2 within the 30-minutes to resolution 
condition with paired-sample t-tests (Table 4.3). Replicating 
Experiment 4.2, we found no differences on reported curiosity, t(49) = 
0.91, p = .37, d = 0.12, but at t2 participants did experience less 
discomfort, t(49) = 2.34, p = .02, d = 0.32, less lack of information 
annoyance, t(49) = 2.42, p = .02, d = 0.25, and stronger outcome 
anticipation, t(49) = -5.09, p < .001, d = -0.81. No positive affect 
differences were found, t(49) = -1.53, p < .13, d = -0.19.  
 
Table 4.3: Mean (and SD) curiosity, positive affect, discomfort, lack of 
information annoyance, and outcome anticipation as a function of 
Time (1 vs. 30 minute[s] to resolution) within the 30 minutes to 
resolution condition (time 1 vs. time 2; Experiment 4.3). 






































Note: Means with different superscripts in rows differ at p <= .05 in an independent 
sample t-test comparing the 1-minute vs. 30-minutes to resolution condition and at p < 
.03 in a paired-sample t-test comparing 30-minutes to resolution at time 1 vs. time 2. 
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Then we again compared 30-minutes to resolution condition at t2 
with the 1-minute to resolution condition. As before, we found no 
differences, ts(98) between -1.46 and 1.55, ps > .12, except on lack of 
information annoyance, t(98) = -1.97, p = .05. So, participants in the 
30-minutes to resolution condition at t2, being equally close to the 
resolution as participants in the 1-minute to resolution condition, 
responded similar to those in 1-minute to resolution condition. 
Next, we coded the valence of the ideas about the content of the 
video in the same way as in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. The 
interraterreliability was sufficient (r = .74). Conditions did not differ on 
valence of ideas (M30min = -0.03, SD30min = 0.87 vs. M1min = 0.19, SD1min 
= 0.92), t(110) = -1.32, p  = .19, d = -0.25, or the number of answers 
given (M30min = 1.75, SD30min = 1.21 vs. M1min = 1.76, SD1min = 0.95), 
t(110) = -0.09, p  = .93, d = -0.01. 
Finally, we checked for effects of the Curiosity and Exploration 
Inventory. After computing CEI-stretching (α = .71) and CEI-
embracing (α = .73) subscales (Kashdan et al., 2009), we ran 
ANCOVA’s with each standardized subscale, Time and their 
interaction on all dependent measures. The Time/CEI-stretching 
ANCOVA showed a marginal CEI-stretching main effect on 
anticipation, F(1, 96) = 3.18, p = .08. The effects of Time remained the 
same as before (all ps < .05, except discomfort, p = .08, curiosity ns). 
No other effects were found (ps > .12). The Time/CEI-embracing 
ANCOVA showed a CEI-embracing main effect on anticipation, F(1, 
96) = 4.92, p = .03, and Time x Embracing interaction on lack of 
information annoyance, F(1,96) = 4.84, p = .03. The effects of Time 
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remained the same as before (ps <= .06, curiosity ns). No other 
differences were found (ps > .10).  
To interpret the Time x Embracing interaction, we ran a regression 
with low and high embracing (standard deviation below/above the 
mean, following Aiken and West, 1991) on lack of information 
annoyance. This showed the Time x Embracing interaction, B = 0.69, 
t(96) = 2.23, p = .03, and a low/high embracing main effect, B = -0.50, 
t(96) = -2.32, p = .02. For high embracers, there was no difference 
between the 30- and 1-minute(s) condition, B = -0.32, t(96) = -.73, p = 
.47 (M1min = 2.72 vs. M30min = 3.08), whereas for low embracers it 
remained, B = -1.69, t(96) = -3.88, p < .001 (M1min = 2.38 vs. M30min = 
4.07). So, low embracers were more bothered by lack of information in 
the 30- vs. 1-minute(s) to resolution condition, but there was no 
difference for high embracers.9  
Discussion 
Experiment 4.3 replicated the main results of Experiment 4.2 by 
showing that a long vs. short time-to-resolution resulted in more 
discomfort, less positive affect, more lack of information annoyance, 
and weaker outcome anticipation. The time-to-resolution did not affect 
the valence of the ideas about the content of the video and in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 We also included Consideration for Future Consequences (CFC-14; Joireman, Shaffer, 
Balliet, & Strathman, 2012). People with a strong future-focus may realize that the 
information-gap will be closed, lowering the effect of time. Analyzing both 
future/immediate-focus subscales, only a Time x Future-Focus interaction on positive 
affect was found, B = 0.42, t(96) = 2.11, p = .04: The long vs. short time-to-resolution 
condition did not differ for high future-focused people (M = 4.58 vs. M = 4.51); low 
future-focus people were more positive in the short vs. long time-to-resolution 
condition (M = 4.92 vs. M = 4.02). No other effects were found. For ease of 
presentation, we excluded this from the method/results. 
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study, it also did not affect video evaluation. In addition, when 
participants in the long time-to-resolution condition came closer to the 
resolution, they responded similar to those in the short time-to-
resolution condition. Finally, for people who strongly embrace the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of everyday situations, time did not 
affect lack of information annoyance. So, even though we did not find 
this effect on discomfort, it is plausible that for these people, the not 
knowing component of curiosity is not as aversive as for people who 
rather have certainty and predictability. It should be noted, however, 
that a general willingness to embrace uncertainty is not necessarily the 
opposite of discomfort as the result of such uncertainty. Future 
research could incorporate scales that directly measure the extent to 
which people feel uncertain when lacking information, such as 
Litmans’s (2008) scale measuring deprivation- and interest-type 
curiosity (see also Litman & Jimerson, 2004; Litman & Spielberger, 
2003; for correlations between I/D curiosity and the first version of the 
CEI, see Litman & Mussel, 2003).  
 
General Discussion 
This research focused on how it feels to be curious. We reasoned 
that there are two sides to curiosity: An information-gap, which is an 
unpleasant deprived state of not knowing something (e.g., Jepma et al., 
2012; Kruger & Evans, 2009; Loewenstein, 1994; Shani et al., 2008), 
and an anticipation of resolving this lack of information, which is an 
exciting state of almost knowing something (e.g., Silvia & Kashdan, 
2009). We showed that the time to the resolution of curiosity affects the 
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relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect 
to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution), the 
anticipation of the resolution was weaker and not knowing something 
affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when 
they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-
resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more 
discomfort, and they were more bothered by the lack of information in 
a long vs. a short time-to-resolution. In addition, when time in the long 
time-to-resolution passed, people more strongly anticipated the 
resolution, they experienced more positive affect, less discomfort, and 
they were less bothered by the lack of information. 
While the results generally confirm our predictions, there are some 
elements that warrant further discussion. First, it should be noted that 
the reported discomfort and lack of information annoyance were 
relatively low (i.e., below the midpoint of the scale). This may (at least 
partly) be driven by the fact that we tested our predictions in the 
context of online videos, which are probably perceived as interesting 
and a source of entertainment. When the curiosity-inducing target is 
less positive or its valence is unclear, it seems plausible that the not 
knowing discomfort levels are higher.  
Also, while temporal proximity of the resolution resulted in 
different feelings, it did not affect the intensity of curiosity in any of the 
studies. The most straightforward explanation for this finding is that 
the size of the information-gap affects intensity (Litman et al., 2005; 
Loewenstein, 1994; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007), but since this was 
held constant we found similar intensity levels. The fact that the time-
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to-resolution did not affect intensity may be taken to imply that not 
knowing and almost knowing are equally related to curiosity, supporting 
the view that there are indeed two sides to curiosity that affect the 
experience of curiosity differently depending on the temporal proximity 
of the resolution (for more on the importance of temporal dynamics in 
sense-making, see Noordewier, Topolinski, & Van Dijk, 2015).10 
Finally, while we did not find consistent effects on our exploratory 
measures (i.e., video evaluation, ideas of video content, individual 
differences in curiosity), they might still provide a base for future 
research. First, it could be more systematically tested whether a long vs. 
a short time-to-resolution lowers the evaluation of the target, as found 
in Experiment 4.2 but not in Experiment 4.3. This finding may, for 
instance, be more robust when people experience higher levels of 
curiosity. In addition, we did not find any evidence for the notion that 
time (and thus feelings) affects the valence of ideas of the content of 
the target. Yet, it remains possible that with more intense discomfort 
levels, people also expect more negative targets. All in all, the current 
studies constitute one of the first systematic empirical assessments of 
the subjective experience of curiosity and future research could try to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Participants in Kruger and Evans (2009; Study 3) more often chose ignorance about a 
negative outcome when they expected to gain this knowledge after 10 months 
compared to immediately. This effect was mediated by the extent to which participants 
thought the information would satisfy their curiosity. While satisfying curiosity is 
different from feeling curious, it remains possible that curiosity intensity decreases 
when time-to-resolution is extremely long. Then, the outcome may seem relatively 
unreachable, lowering the motivation resolve it. 
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replicate and extend the findings in a different, preferably a more 
intense, context. 
Next, it should be noted that the task in our studies is rather 
perceptual and it could be argued that our findings fit a perceptual 
curiosity framework (Collins et al., 2004; Litman & Spielberger, 2003). 
Perceptual curiosity is the result of complex, new, or ambiguous 
sensory stimuli and it motivates visual, auditory, or tactile inspection 
(Berlyne, 1954; Collins et al., 2004). This is different from epistemic 
curiosity, which is the result of by conceptual puzzles or complex ideas 
and motivates asking questions or testing hypothesis to gain knowledge 
(Berlyne, 1954; Litman & Spielberger, 2003). We do not expect that the 
time to the resolution of curiosity would work markedly different for 
perceptual or epistemic situations, as long as people lack information 
about something specific.  
There is, however, also diversive curiosity (Day, 1971), which refers 
to people looking for new and interesting things for the sake of 
stimulation, rather than for any specific outcome. With diversive 
curiosity, it is less likely that people focus on something they do not 
know and time is predicted to affect people differently. That is, 
diversive curiosity relates to exploratory behavior in situations that lack 
clear temporal or informational end-points, like wandering around in an 
unknown town or exploring nature without a particular destination. In 
situations like this, there is an information-gap in the sense that the 
situation is unknown and people are likely to experience curiosity 
regarding what they might discover. Yet, there is not necessarily one 
piece of information that could close this information-gap (i.e., the 
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information-gap itself is unknown), nor does spending a lot of time 
seem unpleasant. There are thus numerous possibilities for gaining 
knowledge and any information could fulfil this type of desire to know. 
This potential may make these situations enjoyable. In other words, this 
type of not knowing may not be that aversive but is likely to be 
experienced as positive (as the time spent and as also the items in the 
Curiosity and Exploration Inventory suggest; Kashdan et al., 2009). It 
should be noted, however, that people may not want to approach the 
unknown without the feeling that they are able to cope with it. For 
instance, people only experience interest when they also have coping 
potential (Silvia, 2005) and complex novelty is more interesting when 
people feel they can deal with it (Noordewier & Van Dijk, 2015). So, it 
seems that people only tolerate or enjoy the uncertainty of the 
unknown when they appraise the situation as manageable. 
Finally, it could be argued that a long time-to-resolution resembles 
delay of gratification of resolving the information-gap (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999; Mischel, 1974). This introduces possible connections 
between the time-to-the-resolution of curiosity and self-control. In 
typical delay of gratification settings, the gratifying outcome is present 
and people have to engage in self-control to inhibit their impulse to go 
for it (e.g., a marshmallow; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972). For 
curiosity, this could match situations where the resolving outcome is 
already present and people have self-imposed time-to-resolution—for 
instance, when having to wait to open a gift or resisting the temptation 
to go to the last page of a book to find out the end of a story. In many 
curiosity situations, however, the resolving outcome is not yet present 
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and the time to the resolution involves information-search or simply 
awaiting what will follow. Especially when people feel deprived of 
information (i.e., in a long time-to-resolution situation), self-control 
could benefit persistence or patience. In line with this, people who are 
high in dispositional deprivation-type curiosity also report higher 
impulse control (Litman & Mussel, 2013; Piotrowski, Litman, & 
Valkenburg, 2014) as well as increased scores on other self-regulatory 
dimensions such as emotional restraint and thoughtful evaluation 
(Lauriola, Litman, Mussel, De Santis, Crowson, & Hoffmann, 2015).  
Conclusion  
Time is a key factor in the experience of curiosity. It is less pleasant 
when people do not expect to close their information-gap soon than 
when they can close their information-gap quickly. Given that there is 
hardly any empirical work on how it feels to be curious, the current 
studies contribute to the different theoretical accounts on curiosity and 
also offer a starting point to integrate seemingly opposing views. 
Knowledge deprivation (e.g., Loewenstein, 1994) and interest in the 
unknown (e.g., Kashdan & Silvia, 2009) are both part of curiosity as 
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Interest in Complex Novelty 
In the future, people may control devices with their brainwaves, 
influence the weather with cloud making machines, and clean their 
house using robotic cleaning flies. This is just a snapshot of the 
numerous new products and technologies that are currently being 
developed11 and that may find their way into people’s daily lives. 
Innovation may provide people with many new and useful things and 
people most likely first hear about it via news coverage or through 
websites that focus specifically on technological innovation. Journalists, 
bloggers, or developers communicate about what is new and the 
widespread attention for, for instance, products introduced at the yearly 
Consumer Electronics Show (CES; see cesweb.org) suggests that the 
assumption is that many people are interested in new and innovative 
things. 
Interestingly, though, many new products fail (the estimated failure 
rate ranges from 40% in Castellion and Markham, 2012, to 75% in 
Schneider and Hall, 2011; see also Cierpicki, Wright, and Sharp, 2000)12. 
So, even though new products and technologies may be exciting, useful, 
and often enthusiastically communicated about, success is sometimes 
hindered. The question is how to introduce novel products to increase 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For brainwaves tattoo see: ideaconnection.com/new-inventions/temporary-tattoos-
could-make-telekinesis-possible-06794.html; for cloud making machine see: 
ideaconnection.com/new-inventions/cloud-making-machine-could-help-offset-climate-
change-06674.html; for robotic cleaning flies see: electroluxdesignlab.com/ 
en/submission/mab/links 
12 Failure rates differ somewhat between industries (e.g., in 2004 there were more 
failures in consumer goods/services [45%] than health care [36%], cf. Castellion & 
Markham, 2012). See also Best Practices study by the Product Development & 
Management Association’s (PDMA). 
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the chance that people will become interested in it. One issue that may 
play a role is that novelty can be challenging because it may come with 
unfamiliarity and a difficulty understanding it (e.g., Mukherjee & Hoyer, 
2000; Rindova & Petkova, 2007; see also Oreg, 2003; Oreg & 
Goldenberg, 2015). This does not concern “simple” novelty like new 
flavors or modernized package design, but is rather an issue of complex 
novelty like technological change. Complex novelty is the combination 
of atypicality/unfamiliarity (novelty) and difficulty of understanding this 
at first sight (complexity: see also Berlyne, 1960, 1971; Silvia, 2005). 
People might resist complex novelty because they experience 
uncertainty regarding its purpose and meaning (see also Antioco & 
Kleijnen, 2010; Carbon & Schoormans, 2012; Castaño, Sujan, Kacker, 
& Sujan, 2008; Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009; Hoeffler, 2003; Oreg & 
Goldenberg, 2015). So, to become interested in complex novelty, it is 
key that people have a sense that they can cope with it. This has 
concrete implications for how complex novelty should be introduced to 
people. 
Complex Novelty 
Complex novelty can be exciting in terms of promising 
possibilities, but people might also feel that they do not exactly grasp 
what it is or what it is for (see also Berlyne, 1971; Hoeffler, 2003; 
Mukherjee & Hoyer, 2000). For example, robotic cleaning flies may 
offer the prospect of saving a lot of time cleaning, but at the same time 
it is not really clear how these little robots find dirt or what it means 
that they fly around in one’s house. This lack of understanding might 
confront people with an information-gap, which can make them 
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curious and motivated to find out more about it (e.g., Loewenstein, 
1994; Noordewier & Van Dijk, 2015; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009). At the 
same time, it can challenge people’s preference to understand their 
environment and their need for certainty, predictability, and structure 
(e.g., Abelson et al., 1968; Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Kay, Whitson, 
Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; Proulx, 
Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Not understanding complex novelty 
may actually lower interest rather than promote interest, as people may 
find it difficult to deal with. 
Research on the appraisal structure of interest also points to the 
importance of feeling able to deal with complex novelty. In particular, it 
has been argued that feeling interested is driven by a combination of a 
novelty-complexity appraisal and a coping potential appraisal (Silvia 
2005; see also Kashdan & Silvia, 2009; Silvia, 2008). The novelty-
complexity appraisal refers to the evaluation of an event as new, 
unexpected, complex, hard to process, surprising, mysterious, or 
obscure. The coping potential appraisal is the estimation of having the 
skills, knowledge, and resources to deal with an event (cf. Silvia, 2005). 
Complex novelty obviously meets the first appraisal, but the question is 
whether people experience sufficient levels of coping potential to 
experience interest, as the complexity component may actually interfere 
with this. So, the more complex and novel a product is, the less likely it 
becomes that people experience coping potential. This is also in line 
with Berlyne’s notion (e.g., Berlyne, 1960, 1971) that people want to 
avoid things that become too novel because they are too arousing (see 
also Noseworthy, Di Muro, & Murray, 2014) and findings that show 
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that “most advanced, yet acceptable” (MAYA) works best in industrial 
design (cf. Blijlevens, Carbon, Mugge, & Schoormans, 2012; Hekkert, 
Snelders, & Van Wieringen, 2003).   
Coping with Complex Novelty  
Importantly, this logic also provides clear directions on how to 
increase interest in complex novelty. By increasing people’s coping 
potential with complex novelty, interest in it should increase as well. 
Supporting this, interest in art appears to be positively related to 
understanding the meaning of the artwork (e.g., provided via titles of 
abstract art or extra information about a poem; Millis, 2001; Silvia, 
2005), given that people have sufficient time to process the meaning of 
the information (Leder, Carbon, & Ripsas, 2006). Also, research has 
shown that interest in an unclear task was highest when people 
experience moderate levels of self-efficacy, whereas low and high self-
efficacy resulted in lower interest because the task was respectively too 
difficult or too easy (Silvia, 2003). In addition, in a theoretical analysis 
of technological change and product design, Rindova and Petkova 
(2007) argued that people might be better able to cope with novel 
technologies when they are presented in a familiar product design, 
because the familiarity makes it easier to comprehend.13 Finally, Carbon 
and Leder (2005) showed that innovative product design becomes more 
attractive when people are repeatedly exposed to it (see also Carbon & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A nice illustration of this logic is Horsey Horseless (cf. Rindova & Petkova, 2007), a 
car that was presumably invented in 1899 with a head of a horse (i.e., more familiar as 
means for transportation) attached to the front to make people feel more at ease with 
the strange new vehicle. For an image, see content.time.com/time/specials/ 
2007/article/0,28804,1658545_1657686,00.html and to read about the idea to make the 
horse head hollow to be able to put fuel in it. 
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Leder, 2007), presumably because the extra elaboration increases their 
understanding of the product. Taken together, these insights suggest 
that when introducing complex novelty, interest might be increased by 
making it easier to understand rather than only highlighting the 
innovative elements.  
Yet, in addition to increasing actual coping potential (i.e., product-
specific understanding), it is also plausible that a more general 
subjective feeling of coping potential increases interest in complex 
novelty. In this view, people are predicted to become more interested in 
complex novelty when they perceive they can deal with complex novelty, 
such that they can tolerate or even enjoy the unfamiliarity and difficult 
to understand component of complex novelty. Perceived coping 
potential thus refers to general psychological state in which people 
evaluate complex novelty, which is independent of features of the 
complex novelty itself.  
Indirect evidence indeed points to such a relation between 
perceived coping potential and people’s preference for predictability 
and familiarity. For instance, when people experience high as opposed 
to low personal control, they are more likely to accept disorder and 
randomness (e.g., Rutjens, Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, Kreemers, & 
Noordewier, 2013; see also Kay et al., 2009) and thus possibly also 
novelty. In addition, people who feel certain are more likely to go for 
novel products whereas people who feel uncertain are more likely to 
prefer familiarity (Oishi et al., 2012; see also Van Horen & Pieters, 
2013). Finally, people who focus on fascination or growth appreciate 
novelty more than people who focus on danger or maintaining or 
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attaining security (Carbon, Faerber, Gerger, Forster, & Leder, 2013; 
promotion vs. prevention focus, Gillebaart, Fo ̈rster, & Rotteveel, 2012). 
Although rather diverse and not always focusing on complex 
novelty, these findings suggest that contextual factors related to coping 
potential predict preferences for novel or disorderly targets. Translating 
this to interest in complex novelty, this suggests that when people are in 
a state of high coping potential, they feel they can deal with the 
unfamiliarity and difficulty component of complex novelty, whereas 
when they are in a state of low coping potential, this same unfamiliarity 
and difficulty component can be experienced as challenging or even 
stressful (e.g., Oishi et al., 2012). As such, people are predicted to be 
more interested in complex novelty when they feel they have high vs. 
low coping potential. When introducing complex novelty, it is therefore 
important to do this in settings where people feel they can cope.  
Importantly, this may provide innovators with alternative means to 
increase interest in complex novelty. Rather than concentrating only on 
increasing product-specific understanding (actual coping potential) they 
may benefit from increasing the idea that people can cope (perceived 
coping potential). Moreover, this logic suggests that coping potential 
can affect interest without changing novelty-complexity evaluations. 
This may be of importance to innovators, who might worry that 
increasing coping potential lowers the perceived innovativeness of their 
products. In addition, this implies that the two appraisals underlying 
interest (novelty-complexity and coping potential; Silvia, 2005) can 
independently produce interest.  
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In sum, it seems that people need to have a sense that they can 
understand complex novelty to become interested in it. This can either 
be through actual coping potential (i.e., product-specific understanding) 
or through perceived coping potential (i.e., feeling able to deal with 
difficulty understanding). We predict that people who experience 
relatively high actual or perceived coping potential are more interested 
in complex novelty than people who experience relatively low actual or 
perceived coping potential. To test this hypothesis, we measure interest 
in complex new products (Experiments 5.1 and 5.2) and recent 
inventions (Experiment 5.3), after increasing actual coping potential by 
communicating similarity with familiar products (Experiments 5.1 and 
5.2) or after increasing perceived coping potential in an 
autobiographical recall task (Experiment 5.3). In all studies, we included 
novelty and complexity measures, to test the (in)dependence of the 
novelty-complexity and coping potential appraisals. 
 
Pretest 
To select complex novel stimuli for Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, we 
conducted a pretest. We selected 12 complex novel products based on 
an internet search. An Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) sample (N 
= 30; US participants only and at least 96% of previous studies 
completed [i.e., hit rate]; age/gender information unavailable) viewed 
pictures of the products in random order, including the product name: 
robot vacuum cleaner, Mercator personal manager bracelet, Sci-Fi LED 
watch, iTaste 134 E-Cigarette, Orbit dry ice washing machine, flexible 
6-inch organic light emitting diode (the picture made it clear that this 
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was a phone), vibrating ring alarm, bio polymer refrigerator, MAB 
computerized cleaning flies, smart stop smoking wearable device, 
flexible wrist computer, headbones conduction headphones.  
 
Table 5.1: Mean (and SD) interest, coping potential, novelty, and 
complexity of the four products selected for the main study (Pretest). 













interest 6.35 (0.84) 6.62 (0.78) 6.05 (1.12) 5.93 (1.09) 
coping potential 3.51 (1.60) 4.18 (1.71) 2.77 (1.36) 4.37 (1.59) 
novelty 6.25 (0.97) 6.35 (0.77) 6.07 (1.04) 5.55 (0.95) 
complexity 5.90 (1.28) 6.15 (1.07) 6.02 (1.07) 5.33 (1.20) 
Note. Other products in the pretest were not selected because they were rated as 
relatively familiar (means equal or smaller than 4; vacuum cleaner, e-cigarette), relatively 
simple (means equal or smaller than 4; e-cigarette), relatively high coping potential 
(means equal or higher than 4.5; LED watch, e-cigarette, phone, ring, flexible arm 
computer, headphones), or relatively low interest (means lower than 5.5; vacuum 
cleaner, e-cigarette, stop smoking device). 
 
Each product was evaluated in terms of interest (interesting, boring 
[reverse coded]; overall α = .8814), novelty (novel, familiar [reverse 
coded]; overall α = .90), complexity (complex, simple [reverse coded]; 
overall α = .92) and coping potential (“I feel able to understand the 
product”, “I have a sense of what this product can be used for”, “I am 
unsure how to try this product” [reverse coded], reliably adapted from 
Silvia, 2005; overall α = .93). The four products chosen for the main 
study were rated as interesting, but not extremely so (to avoid ceiling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 All alphas reported in this pretest and subsequent studies are Cronbach’s alphas on all 
relevant items. 
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effects), relatively low in terms of coping potential and high on novelty 
and complexity (see Table 5.1). The products were: Orbit dry ice 
washing machine, Bio polymer refrigerator, MAB computerized 
cleaning flies, Mercator personal manager bracelet.15 In the next two 
studies, we tested whether increasing the actual coping potential of 
these products would also increase interest in it. 
 
Experiment 5.1: Similarity to a Familiar Product 
In Experiment 5.1, we tested whether communicating similarity of 
a complex novel product to a comparable familiar product would 
increase interest in it. Previous research showed that communicating 
analogies of a new product to something known increases product 
comprehension (Feiereisen, Wong, & Broderick, 2008; Gregan-Paxton, 
Hibbard, Brunel, & Azar, 2002). Based on this, we predicted that 
communicating similarity of a complex novel product with a 
comparable familiar product would increase actual coping potential and 
interest in the product.  
In addition, for exploratory purposes we included a measure of 
individual differences in innovativeness and curiosity (Curiosity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a picture and more information about the products, see: 
-   Orbit dry ice washing machine: see http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-
02/17/dry-ice-washing-machine 
-   MAB computerized cleaning flies: see 
http://electroluxdesignlab.com/en/submission/mab/ 
-   Bio polymer refrigerator: see http://inhabitat.com/zero-energy-bio-refrigerator-
cools-your-food-with-future-gel/ 
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Exploration Inventory [CEI-II]; Kashdan et al., 2009). The Curiosity 
and Exploration Inventory measures the extent to which people are 
motivated to look for new knowledge and experiences and embrace the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of everyday situations. The 
Innovativeness scale (Goldsmith & Hofacker, 1991) measures the 
extent to which people are early vs. late adopters of novel products 
(Rogers, 2003). We predicted that high curious people and people who 
are often the first in knowing or owning novel products might be less 
affected by communicating similarity than low curious people or people 
who are late in knowing or owning novel product. These people are 
more likely to be interested in the products independent of our 
manipulation because the complexity is not necessarily challenging (and 
maybe even exciting, see Kashdan et al., 2009) and interest in novelty is 
part of being an innovative person (see Goldsmith & Hofacker, 1991).  
Method 
A total of 100 participants were recruited on MTurk (US 
participants only, hit rate 96%, age/gender information unavailable). 
First, they filled out the Curiosity and Exploration Inventory (CEI-II, 
Kashdan et al., 2009; e.g., “I am at my best when doing something that 
is complex or challenging”, α = .91), followed by the Innovativeness 
scale (Goldsmith & Hofacker, 1991; e.g., “In general, I am among the 
first in my circle of friend to buy new products or technologies”, where 
we specified each item such that it referred to novel products or 
technologies; α = .83). Then, they were randomly assigned to one of 
the two conditions: the similarity vs. control condition. 
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Participants viewed pictures from the four complex new products 
selected in the pretest and evaluated each product before viewing the 
next one. In the control condition, they saw the pictures with the product 
title: Orbit dry ice washing machine, Bio polymer refrigerator, MAB 
computerized cleaning flies, Mercator personal manager bracelet. In the 
similarity condition, they saw the pictures with the product title as well as 
similarity information: The Orbit dry ice washing machine works just 
like a regular washing machine, but without water and soap. / The Bio 
polymer refrigerator works just like a regular refrigerator, but with a 
special gel to keep your products cool. / The MAB computerized 
cleaning flies works like a regular vacuum cleaner, but with multiple 
small cleaning objects that move independently and automatically find 
dirt. / The Mercator personal manager bracelet works like your 
personal assistant, which you can wear as a bracelet. 
Participants evaluated the products sequentially and in the same 
order. Below the product information, participants could complete the 
dependent measures. First, we measured interest in the product by 
asking to what extent they agreed with the following four statements 
about the product (reliably adapted from Silvia, 2005; α = .89): “I think 
this product is interesting”, “I think this product is boring” (reverse 
coded), “This product makes me feel curious”, “I would like to try this 
product”. Then, we measured coping potential (α = .83), novelty (α = 
.71), and complexity (α = .80) using the same items as in the pretest. All 
questions could be answered on scales ranging from 1 = not at all, to 4 
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= moderately, to 7 = extremely. After evaluating all four products the study 
ended and participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
In this and subsequent studies, we did not conduct null hypothesis 
significance tests but instead, we calculated effect sizes to measure the 
magnitude of effects (Trafimow & Marks, 2015; see also Lakens, 2013). 
Specifically, we report Glass’s Δ when we compare means relative to a 
control condition (with the SD of the control condition; Experiments 
5.1 and 5.2) and Cohen’s d (with pooled SD) when we compare 
experimental groups without a control condition (Experiment 5.3). In 
addition, when referring to main effects or interactions, we also report 
eta squared (η2) or standardized Betas (βs) where relevant. 
 
Table 5.2: Mean (and SD/SE) interest, coping potential, novelty, and 
complexity as a function of condition (similarity vs. control; 
Experiment 5.1). 
 similarity control Glass’s Δ 
interest 5.80 (0.90/0.13) 5.43 (0.97/0.14) 0.38 
coping potential 4.59 (1.08/0.15) 4.14 (1.02/0.15) 0.44 
novelty 5.48 (0.93/0.13) 5.30 (0.87/0.12) 0.21 
complexity 4.94 (1.20/0.17) 4.87 (0.88/0.13) 0.07 
 
Results showed that (see Table 5.2) participants in the similarity 
condition reported more interest in the products (M = 5.80, SD  = 
0.90) than participants in the control condition (M = 5.43, SD  = 0.97; 
Glass’s Δ = 0.38). In addition, participants in the similarity condition 
reported more coping potential with the product (M = 4.59, SD  = 
1.08) than participants in the control condition (M = 4.14, SD  = 1.02; 
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Glass’s Δ = 0.44). Finally, participants in the similarity vs. control 
condition rated the products fairly similar in terms of novelty (M = 5.48 
SD  = 0.93 vs. M = 5.30, SD  = 0.87; Glass’s Δ = 0.21) and complexity 
(M = 4.94, SD  = 1.20 vs. M = 4.87, SD  = 0.88; Glass’s Δ = 0.07). 
Next, we checked the effects of individual differences in curiosity 
and innovativeness, using standardized means for the curiosity (CEI)16 
and innovativeness scale. 
Curiosity. The effect size of the interaction between 
similarity/control condition and curiosity on complexity was η2 = .03, 
and on coping potential η2 = .03 (other interaction effect sizes, η2 = 
.01). In addition, the effect size of the main effect of curiosity on 
interest was η2 = .09, and on coping potential η2 = .05 (other curiosity 
main effect sizes, η2 = .00). The effect size of the main effect of 
similarity/control condition on interest was η2 = .04, and on coping 
potential η2 = .04 (other similarity/control effect sizes, η2 = .00). 
To interpret the curiosity x similarity/control condition 
interactions, we ran a regression with similarity/control condition, 
low/high curiosity (standard deviation below/above the mean, 
following Aiken & West, 1991; for all estimated means and βs, see 
Table 5.3), and the interactions on coping potential and complexity. For 
complexity, there was a similarity/control condition x low/high 
curiosity interaction with β = .32 (other effects: βs between -.17 and 
.21). For coping potential, there was a similarity/control condition x 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For ease of presentation, we report results with the whole CEI-scale rather than with 
the embracing and stretching subscales. Results using the subscales are comparable. 
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low/high curiosity interaction with β = -.30, and a low/high curiosity 
main effect with β = .40. High curious people reported almost equal 
levels of coping potential in the similarity and control condition 
(Msimilarity = 4.64 vs. Mcontrol = 4.58, β = .03), whereas low curious people 
reported higher coping potential in the similarity condition than the 
control condition (Msimilarity = 4.55 vs. Mcontrol = 3.72; β = .39). So, for 
high curious people the similarity did not change their coping potential, 
whereas for low curious people it increased. 
 
Table 5.3. Estimated interest, coping potential, novelty, and complexity 
as a function of low vs. high curiosity in the similarity vs. control 
condition (Experiment 5.1). 
 low curiosity  high curiosity  
 similarity control  β similarity control β 
interest 5.46 5.19 .14 6.13 5.67 .24 
coping potential 4.55 3.72 .39 4.64 4.58 .03 
novelty 5.40 5.42 -.01 5.56 5.17 .22 
complexity 4.73 5.05 -.16 5.15 4.69 .22 
Note: βs in the table represent the comparison of the control vs. similarity condition in 
the regression. βs for the main effects for low/high curiosity: interest = .25 / coping 
potential = .40 / novelty = -.14 / complexity = -.17. βs for the similarity/control 
condition x low/high curiosity interaction: interest = .09 / coping potential = .30 / 
novelty = .19 / complexity = .32. 
 
Innovativeness. The effect size of the main effect of 
innovativeness on interest was η2 = .04. In addition, the effect size of 
the main effect of similarity/control condition on interest was η2 = .03, 
and on coping potential η2 = .04. The effect sizes of the interactions 
between similarity/control condition and innovativeness were 
negligible, η2 = .00, and so were other effect sizes, η2 <= .01. The 
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effect of similarity on interest was thus independent of individual 
differences in innovativeness.  
In line with our predictions we found that communicating 
similarity of a complex novel product to a comparable familiar product 
increased interest in it. Communicating similarity also increased coping 
potential with the complex novel product and based on the appraisal 
structure of interest (Silvia, 2005), we assume that the increased interest 
is explained by this increased coping potential. Importantly, 
communicating similarity did not affect ratings of novelty or complexity 
of the products. Therefore, the increased coping potential cannot be 
explained by the product seeming more familiar or simple. This finding 
also suggests that the two appraisals underlying interest (novelty-
complexity and coping potential) can be influenced separately and 
jointly but independently predict interest. 
It should be noted, however, that besides communicating similarity 
(e.g., “works like a regular vacuum cleaner”), we also gave participants 
some extra information about how the complex novel products work 
(e.g., “works with multiple small cleaning objects that move 
independently and automatically find dirt”). Consequently, we cannot 
be certain that it is the similarity, the information, or a combination of 
both that drives our effect. In the next study, we therefore manipulated 
similarity and information separately. 
 
Experiment 5.2: Similarity or Information 
 In Experiment 5.2, we presented participants with the same 
complex novel products as in Experiment 5.1. Next to a control 
 
	   144 
condition that only gave the product title, we either communicated 
similarity, gave information about how it works, or both. Because all 
this would increase people’s understanding of the product, we predicted 
that relative to the control condition, communicating similarity, 
information, and similarity + information would all increase actual 
coping potential and interest in the complex novel product.  
We improved our manipulation in three ways. First, to more clearly 
communicate similarity in the similarity condition and to distinguish it 
from the information on how the products work, we now explicitly 
state “similar to” (rather than “works just like” in Experiment 5.1). In 
addition, we improved the information on the Orbit dry ice washing 
machine, such that it now explained what is new about it, like the 
information about the other products (i.e., “works with dry ice to clean 
clothes”, rather than “works without water and soap”, which could be 
interpreted as an advantage and focuses less on the innovative part). 
Finally, in this study, products were now presented in random order 
rather than in the same order. 
Method 
Similar to Experiment 5.1, participants (N = 200; 80 females, 120 
males; Mage = 32.93 years, SDage = 10.24; all American; education 
distribution was 0.5% none, 18.5% high school/GED, 35% some 
college, 39% bachelor’s degree, 5.5% master’s degree, 1.5% doctoral 
degree/PhD) were randomly assigned to conditions and viewed 
pictures of the products with a product title. In the control condition, this 
was all they saw and read. In the similarity condition, participants read: 
Orbit dry ice washing machine: similar to a regular washing machine. / 
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Bio polymer refrigerator: similar to a regular refrigerator. / MAB 
computerized cleaning flies: similar to a regular vacuum cleaner. / 
Mercator personal manager bracelet: similar to a personal assistant. In 
the information condition, participants read: Orbit dry ice washing 
machine: works with dry ice to clean your clothes. / Bio polymer 
refrigerator: works with a special gel to keep your products cool. / 
MAB computerized cleaning flies: works with multiple small cleaning 
objects that move independently and automatically find dirt. / Mercator 
personal manager bracelet: works with software in a bracelet to keep 
you organized. In the similarity + information condition, participants read 
both the similarity and information (i.e., combination of sentences 
described above). Interest (α = .90), coping potential (α = .80), novelty 
(α = .69), and complexity (α = .75) were measured in the same way as 
in Experiment 5.1.  
Next, we asked some background questions. To be able to check 
for potential mood differences, we asked, “How do you feel right 
now?” on a scale 1 = negative to 7 = positive. Then, as previous 
experience with the products could affect coping potential independent 
of our manipulations, we asked, “Please indicate below whether you 
have seen the products you evaluated before you participated in this 
study?” (yes/no) for each product separately (2.5% saw the Orbit dry 
ice washing machine before, 7.5% the Bio polymer refrigerator, 2% the 
MAB computerized cleaning flies, and 5% the Mercator personal 
manager bracelet; excluding these participants did not affect the pattern 
of results so they were included in the analyses). Finally, participants 
reported their gender, age, nationality (American, other; open question), 
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educational level (none, high school/GED, some college, bachelor's 
degree, master's degree, doctoral degree/PhD, not sure) and whether 
they had participated before in a similar study, in which we asked 
participants to evaluate the same four products (i.e., Experiment 5.1; 
yes/no—two participant indicated to have participated before, which 
did not affect the pattern of results so they were included in the 
analyses). After completing the background questions, participants were 
thanked and fully debriefed. 
Results 
Inspection of the mean novelty of the separate products showed 
that the bracelet was overall evaluated as less novel (M = 4.48) than the 
other products (means ranged between 5.82 and 5.83). Also, the 
bracelet was evaluated as less complex (M = 4.34) than the other 
products (means ranged between 5.18 and 5.65). In the time between 
the data collection of Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, several smart watches 
have been introduced to the market and it seems reasonable to assume 
that the bracelet became less novel and less complex to participants. 
Therefore, the bracelet is not a suitable product to test our reasoning 
and we excluded the ratings of this product from the main analyses. 
Including the bracelet in the analyses resulted in a similar, but weaker 
pattern of results. 
Results showed that (see Table 5.4) compared to participants in the 
control condition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.12), participants reported more 
interest in the products in the similarity condition (M = 5.74, SD = 
0.91; Glass’s Δ = 0.43), and somewhat more in the information 
condition (M = 5.59, SD = 1.23; Glass’s Δ = 0.29), and the similarity + 
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information condition (M = 5.59, SD = 1.22; Glass’s Δ = 0.29). In 
addition, compared to participants in the control condition (M = 3.57, 
SD = 1.12), participants reported to have more coping potential in the 
similarity condition (M = 4.12, SD = 0.96; Glass’s Δ = 0.49), the 
information condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.20; Glass’s Δ = 0.66), and the 
similarity + information condition (M = 4.15, SD = 0.83; Glass’s Δ = 
0.52). 
 
Table 5.4: Mean (and SD/SE) interest, coping potential, novelty, and 
complexity as a function of condition (similarity vs. information vs. 
similarity + information vs. control; Experiment 5.2). 








Δ = 0.43 
5.59 
(1.23/0.17) 
Δ = 0.29 
5.59 
(1.22/0.17) 







Δ = 0.49 
4.31 
(1.20/0.17) 
Δ = 0.66 
4.15 
(0.83/0.12) 







Δ = 0.71 
5.98 
(0.97/0.14) 
Δ = 0.58 
5.68 
(1.14/0.16) 







Δ = 0.26 
5.38 
(1.09/0.15) 
Δ = 0.16 
5.46 
(1.02/0.14) 
Δ = 0.23 
5.22 
(1.03/0.15) 
Note: Δ = Glass’s delta relative to control condition. 
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Interestingly, and different from Experiment 5.1, compared to 
participants in the control condition (M = 5.53, SD = 0.78), participants 
rated the products as more novel in the similarity condition (M = 6.08, 
SD = 0.86; Glass’s Δ = 0.71) and the information condition (M = 5.98, 
SD = 0.97; Glass’s Δ = 0.58). Novelty ratings in the similarity + 
information condition (M = 5.68, SD = 1.14; Glass’s Δ = 0.19) were 
fairly similar to those in the control condition. Finally, compared to 
participants in the control condition (M = 5.22, SD = 1.03), participants 
rated the products as somewhat more complex in the similarity 
condition (M = 5.49, SD = 0.98, Glass’s Δ = 0.26) and the similarity + 
information condition (M = 5.46, SD = 1.02, Glass’s Δ = 0.23), while 
complexity ratings were fairly similar in the information condition (M = 
5.38, SD = 1.09, Glass’s Δ = 0.16). 
Finally, compared to the control condition (M = 5.59, SD = 1.22), 
participants’ mood was fairy similar in the similarity condition (M = 
5.52, SD = 1.20, Glass’s Δ = -0.06), the information condition (M = 
5.63, SD = 1.18, Glass’s Δ = 0.03), and the information + similarity 
condition (M = 5.78, SD = 1.33, Glass’s Δ = 0.16). 
Discussion 
Taken together, the findings of Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 show that 
people are more interested in complex novelty when similarity to a 
comparable familiar option is communicated and/or information is 
given on how the product works. We assume that interest increased 
because the similarity and/or information increased actual coping 
potential (i.e., product-specific understanding; see also Silvia, 2005). It 
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should be noted, however, that our manipulations could have increased 
perceived coping potential as well. The fact that people understand 
complex novelty might make them feel competent, which could also 
induce a readiness for complex novelty in general. Moreover, the 
connection to something familiar in the similarity condition could, 
besides product-specific understanding, also provide people with a 
more general safe feeling that could serve as a base for interest in 
complex novelty (see also Carbon et al., 2013; Gillebaart et al., 2012; 
Oishi et al., 2012). We will come back to this in the General Discussion. 
Next, it is interesting that the strongest effects were obtained by 
communicating similarity. This finding is important for product 
developers who want to introduce their complex new product. Rather 
than only focusing on the innovative components of their product, they 
need to address the feeling that people can cope with the innovation. 
That this works best by explaining how the product is similar to an 
already known option is probably not the first thing that comes to mind 
when wanting to introduce a complex novel product.  
In fact, when we asked an MTurk sample to imagine that they were 
product developers and predict what would be effective 
communication, they did not make choices that matched these findings. 
Specifically, participants (N = 50; 22 females, 28 males; Mage = 32.76 
years, SDage = 9.25; all American; Education distribution was 24% high 
school/GED, 32% some college, 38% bachelor’s degree, 4% master’s 
degree, 2% Doctoral degree/PhD; 4 participants participated in one of 
the previous studies, which did not affect the pattern of results so they 
were included in the analyses) were asked to evaluate the stimulus 
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materials used in Experiment 5.2, to predict the most effective way to 
create interest in the product. We stated:  
Imagine you are a product developer. After an 
extensive development process, you created a new 
technological product. You are very excited about the 
innovativeness of the product and you can’t wait to 
communicate to the world about it. Together with your 
marketing team, your aim is to create “a buzz” about 
your product: get attention, make people talk about 
your product and get them interested to find out more 
about it. There are of course many other new products 
that are being introduced. What would be an effective 
communication method to stand out and to be 
evaluated as innovative and interesting? 
 
Then, they saw the picture of the products and saw all four text 
options (product title only, similarity to a familiar product, information 
about how it works, similarity and information together; see 
Experiment 5.2). They evaluated each of these four options on “People 
would be curious to find out more about it”, “The product would 
attract attention”, “People would be interested in the product” and 
“The product would be evaluated as innovative”, on 7-point scales (1 = 
not at all to 7 = extremely). Then, they were asked to rank order the 
options from 1 = most effective to 4 = least effective.  
We aggregated the items for the product title only (α = .96), 
similarity (α = .95), information (α = .93), and similarity + information 
(α = .96) and compared the means. Results showed that relative to only 
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the product title (M = 4.08, SD = 1.42), the similarity text was expected 
to be less effective (M = 3.62, SD = 1.27, Glass’s Δ =  = -0.32), 
whereas the information text (M = 5.47, SD = 0.83, Glass’s Δ = 0.98) 
as well as the similarity + information text (M = 5.36, SD = 0.93, 
Glass’s Δ = 0.90) was expected to be more effective. In line with this, in 
the rank ordering, only 5.5% chose the similarity text as most effective, 
whereas 14.5% chose the product title only, 45% the information, and 
25.25% the similarity and information. So, while our results showed 
that communicating similarity is the most effective strategy to increase 
interest in complex novelty, participants in this study actually think this 
is the least effective option. 
The next study tests whether solely inducing perceived coping 
potential (i.e., a state in which people can tolerate complex novelty) also 
increases interest in complex novelty. 
 
Experiment 5.3: Recall Coping Potential 
In Experiment 5.3, we asked people to recall a situation in which 
they experienced high vs. low coping potential before they evaluated 
different recent inventions. Based on previous autobiographical recall 
procedures (e.g., De Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 
2011; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013) we reasoned that when 
people recall such an event, this would temporarily affect feelings of 
coping potential. Specifically, the recall was assumed to make memories 
accessible (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones 1977) through the spreading 
of activation of related constructs via an associative network (e.g., 
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Berger & Fitzsimons, 2008; Collins & Loftus 1975; Neely, 1977). This 
temporarily actives feelings and associations related to high vs. low 
coping potential. Prior to evaluating the inventions, this manipulation 
aimed to induce a general psychological state in which people are less or 
more able to tolerate the unfamiliar and difficulty component of 
complex novelty (see also Smith & Semin, 2007). It thus constitutes a 
contextual manipulation of coping potential rather than a product-
specific manipulation. We predicted that people who were in a state of 
high coping potential would be more interested in complex novel 
inventions than people who were in a state of low coping potential.  
Method 
We recruited a total of 103 participants (44 females, 59 males; Mage 
= 36.93 years, SDage = 11.37) on MTurk. Settings were the same as in 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 (96% hit rate, US only). Nationality was 
distributed as: 101 Americans, 1 Italian, and 1 Asian. Educational level 
was distributed as: 11 high school/GED, 33 some college, 41 
bachelor’s degree, 12 master’s degree, and 6 doctoral degree/PhD. 
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and were asked to 
recall an event in which they had high vs. low coping potential. After 
general instructions, we explained what we meant with high [low] 
coping potential: 
Coping potential is the extent to which one is able to 
deal with an event. In some situations, people have low 
coping potential and in other situations, people have 
high coping potential. In this study, we are interested in 
high [low] coping potential situations. Having high 
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[low] coping potential means that you have [lack] the 
skills, knowledge, or resources to deal with an event. 
So, even if [when] things are complicated, unfamiliar, 
or unclear, someone with high [low] coping potential is 
able to [cannot] deal with it. Please take a moment to 
think about high [low] coping potential and what this 
means to you. 
 
Then, we asked participants:  
Please describe an event in your life that was complex 
or unfamiliar you had high [low] coping potential; you 
had [lacked] the skills, knowledge, or resources to deal 
with it; so, you could [could not] understand the 
situation and you were able/unable to deal with it.  
 
Note that both in the low and the high coping potential condition, 
participants were asked to recall a complex or unfamiliar event. We did 
this to avoid that the content of the recall would be different in terms 
of complexity. We asked participants in the high [low] coping potential 
condition to recall the situation by responding to the questions: “What 
was complex or unfamiliar about the event?”, “How did you realize that 
you understood [did not understand] the event?”, “How did you realize 
that you could deal [were unable to deal] with the event?”, “Which 
skills, knowledge, or resources did you have that enabled you [were you 
lacking that prevented you] to deal with the event?” Stories were 
diverse. Participants, for example, recalled events related to work 
challenges, moving house, death, illness, addiction, money issues, or 
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accidents. Some reported examples of coping are staying calm, relying 
on social support, using experience (high coping potential) vs. feeling 
overwhelmed, not knowing what to do, and lacking experience (low 
coping potential).  
To get a better understanding of the content of the stories and 
similarities or differences between conditions, two independent coders 
who were blind to condition, rated the material. They rated, “To what 
extent is the situation complex?” (r = .61; N = 9717), “To what extent 
could the person deal with the situation?” (r = .86; N = 92), “To what 
extent could the person influence the situation (i.e., control)?” (r = .60; 
N = 94) on 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. Finally, they rated “What was 
the valence of the situation?” on 1 = negative to 7 = positive (r = .64; N = 
94) and the type of situation (e.g., work, illness, death, relations).  
After aggregating the ratings of both coders, we compared the 
means between high vs. low coping potential conditions. This showed 
that the high coping potential stories reflected a higher ability to deal 
with the situation (M = 5.48, SD = 0.88) than the low coping potential 
stories (M = 2.16, SD = 0.91; d = 3.71). In addition, the high coping 
potential stories reflected more controllability (M = 4.06, SD = 1.76) 
than the low coping potential stories (M = 2.91, SD = 1.37, d = 0.73). 
Also, the high coping potential stories were somewhat more positive 
(M = 2.81, SD = 1.04) than the low coping potential stories (M = 2.26, 
SD = 0.81, d = 0.59) and somewhat less complex (M = 5.45, SD = 
0.92) than low coping potential stories (M = 5.66 SD = 0.85, d = -0.24). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Note that there are sometimes missing data, as dimensions were only coded when 
information was available to accurately code it. 
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Finally, the distribution of the type of situations was: 26.5% work, 
12.7% death, 9.8% illness, 7.8% relations, 5.9% money, 4.9% computer 
or technical issues, 4.9% accidents or mechanical failure, 3.9% 
education, 2.9% moving house, 15.7% other (e.g., addiction, low self-
esteem), 4.9% missing (e.g., no clear information).  
High as compared to low coping potential stories thus reflected 
higher ability to deal with the situation and higher controllability, which 
confirms that people indeed recalled situations in which they had 
relatively high vs. low coping potential. The differences in valence and 
particularly complexity were unanticipated, but compared to the other 
findings relatively weak. 
After the recall task, we asked people to report their level of coping 
potential (“How would you rate your current coping potential?” from 1 
= low coping potential to 7 = high coping potential). Then, the study 
continued to the evaluation of three recent inventions. Participants 
read, in random order, approximately 100-word descriptions of three 
inventions: 1) A temporary electronic tattoo, able to read brain wave 
activity, that could allow people to control machines with their mind; 2) 
Nano sensors for health monitoring, implants that can monitor 
molecules and health of cells; and 3) A cloud machine, a weather 
modification device that can influence the climate. For each invention, 
we measured interest (i.e., “This invention is interesting, this invention 
is boring” [reverse coded], “This invention makes me feel curious”, “I 
would be interested in more information about this invention”, α = 88; 
reliably adapted from Silvia, 2005) and coping potential (i.e., “This 
inventions is hard to understand” [reverse coded], “I have a sense of 
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what the invention can be used for”, α = .68; sufficiently reliably 
adapted from Silvia, 2005). All items could be answered on 7-point 
scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. 
Finally, participants were asked various background questions. 
First, to be able to check for potential mood differences, we asked, 
“How do you feel right now?” on a scale 1 = negative to 7 = positive. 
Then, to be able to check whether recalling a high vs. low coping 
potential event was equally difficult, we stated, “We asked you to 
describe a recent event in your life that was complex, unfamiliar, or 
ambiguous with a certain level of coping potential. How difficult was it 
to come up with this event?”. The scale ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 
= extremely.  
Then, as previous knowledge about the inventions could affect 
coping potential independent of our manipulation, we asked, “Please 
indicate to what extent you knew about the existence of the inventions 
before you participated in this study?” for each invention separately 
(i.e., “Did you know about...”) from 1 = not at all to 7 = in great detail. 
For the tattoo (M = 1.18, SD = 0.68), the cloud machine (M = 1.83, SD 
= 1.45) and the nano sensors (M = 1.64, SD = 1.30) ratings were very 
low, which shows that the inventions were indeed novel to participants. 
Finally, we asked participants to report their gender, age, 
nationality (American, other; open question), educational level (none; 
high school/GED; some college; bachelor's degree; master's degree; 
doctoral degree/PhD; not sure) and whether they had participated 
before in a study on coping potential and inventions (i.e., we ran a pilot 
a couple of month before this study; yes/no—nobody indicated to have 
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participated before). After completing the background questions, 
participants were thanked and fully debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
A comparison of the general coping potential measure in the high 
vs. low coping potential recall condition (see Table 5.5), showed that, as 
predicted, participants who recalled a high coping potential situation 
reported higher levels of coping potential M = 5.78, SD = 0.85) than 
people who recalled a low coping potential situation (M = 4.69, SD = 
1.67; d = 0.82). In addition, participants in the high coping potential 
condition were more interested in the invention (M = 5.91, SD = 0.77) 
than participants in the low coping potential condition (M = 5.40, SD = 
0.90; d = 0.61). Finally, participants in the high coping potential 
condition reported somewhat more coping potential with the invention 
(M = 5.15, SD = 0.86) than in the low coping potential condition (M = 
4.85, SD = 1.07; d = 0.31). 
Next, we checked whether controlling for differences in knowing 
about the invention and participants’ mood changed the pattern of 
results. First, an ANCOVA with high vs. low coping potential 
condition on interest and coping potential with knowing about the 
inventions as covariate (mean of the three measures) showed that 
knowing before had an effect on coping potential with the inventions, 
η2  = .06, and only weakly on interest, η2 = .02. With knowing before 
in the analyses, the effect of high vs. low coping potential on interest 
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Table 5.5: Mean (and SD/SE) coping potential (general and with the 
invention) and interest as a function of recall condition (high vs. low 



























Next, while coping potential condition affected mood somewhat, 
η2 = .03, there was still an effect of high vs. low coping potential on 
interest when mood was added as a covariate to the analyses, η2 = .06, 
and the effect on coping potential was weak, η2 = .02, as before. 
Interestingly, besides coping potential condition, mood also had an 
effect on interest, η2 = .07 (other effects, η2 = .00). 
In sum, in line with our predictions we found that people who 
experienced more coping potential were more interested in complex 
novelty. While effects on specific coping potential with the invention 
were weaker, it seems likely that the interest was higher in the high vs. 
low coping potential condition because people felt more able to deal 
with the unfamiliar and complex component of novelty.  
 
General Discussion 
Complex novelty like new technologies can be exciting in terms of 
promising possibilities. At the same time, people might feel that they do 
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not exactly grasp what the product or invention is or what it can be 
used for (see also Berlyne, 1971; Hoeffler, 2003; Mukherjee & Hoyer, 
2000). This lack of understanding might hinder the success of complex 
novel products and inventions. That is, feeling interested is driven by a 
combination of a novelty-complexity appraisal and a coping potential 
appraisal (i.e., having the skills, knowledge, and resources to deal with 
an event; Silvia, 2005). Yet, the more complex and novel a product is, 
the more it interferes with people’s preference to understand their 
environment (e.g., Aronson et al., 1968; Berlyne, 1971; Gawronski & 
Strack, 2012; Kay et al., 2009; Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; 
Proulx et al., 2012) and the less likely it becomes that people experience 
coping potential.  
In agreement with this, we showed that people with relatively high 
coping potential are more interested in complex novelty than people 
with relatively low coping potential. We show this in two different 
ways. First, by increasing product-specific understanding of the product 
through communication similarity and/or providing information on 
how the product works, we increased actual coping potential 
(Experiments 5.1 and 5.2). Second, using an autobiographical recall 
procedure, we induced feelings and association related to high vs. low 
coping potential to affect perceived coping potential (Experiment 5.3).  
As said, by increasing actual coping potential, we may have 
increased perceived coping potential as well, by making people, for 
instance, feel competent dealing with complex novelty in general or 
providing them with a familiar base to become interested in other 
complex novel things (see also Carbon et al., 2013; Gillebaart et al., 
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2012; Oishi et al., 2012). The manipulations of Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 
may actually result in a mixture of actual and perceived coping 
potential. Future research could disentangle this by, for instance, 
investigating whether actual coping potential with one series of 
complex novel products can produce interest in another set of complex 
novel products. In addition, it could be investigated whether similarity 
or familiarity that does not directly affect product-specific 
understanding can increase coping potential and interest (e.g., product 
design that reminds people of something familiar, see also Carbon & 
Leder, 2005; Rindova & Petkova, 2007).  
Low coping potential might be one of the reasons why many 
complex novel products fail (Castellion & Markham, 2012; Cierpicki et 
al., 2000; Schneider & Hall, 2011) as the uncertainty about its meaning 
or purpose might result in resistance rather than acceptance (see also 
Antioco & Kleijnen, 2010; Castaño et al., 2008; Hoeffler, 2003; Kleijnen 
et al., 2009; Oreg & Goldenberg, 2015). The finding that increasing 
coping potential increases interest in complex novelty fits a more 
general perspective on knowing states (cf. Keltner & Shiota, 2003; 
Silvia, 2008), that suggests that people first need to master a situation 
before they can appreciate it (e.g., Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013; 
Noordewier, Topolinski, & Van Dijk, 2015). According to this 
perspective people will only approach an unknown, unpredictable, or 
unstructured situation when they feel they are able to cope with it.  
In addition, our findings have implications for how to introduce 
complex novelty. Complex new products and technologies are more 
likely to become successful when they are introduced in settings where 
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people have high coping potential. People are more likely to be 
interested in complex novelty when they are, for instance, in control or 
certain as compared to lacking control or feeling uncertain (Oishi et al., 
2012; Rutjens et al., 2013; Van Horen & Pieters, 2013). It is also 
conceivable that there are situations of extreme levels of coping 
potential that might result in actively approaching complex novelty. For 
instance, when people experience boredom (Bench & Lench, 2013) or 
extreme levels of structure (Rutjens, Van Harreveld, & Cunningham, 
2015), the unfamiliar or puzzling nature of complex novelty might be 
pleasant mind activation.  
In addition, rather than only highlighting the innovative elements 
of complex new products or technologies—which is a likely and maybe 
even the default strategy when wanting to introduce a new product (see 
also the study in the discussion of Experiment 5.2)—acceptance of 
complex novelty might be increased by making it easier to understand. 
This could be accomplished by communicating similarity to a familiar 
product, as done in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, but probably also via 
familiarity in product design (Rindova & Petkova, 2007). At the same 
time, it should be noted that interest does not necessarily always 
translate to acceptance. While interest in complex novelty is a necessary 
pre-condition of the adoption of complex novelty, the relation between 
interest and acceptance is undeniably more complex than that. Practical 
issues (e.g., people cannot afford it or do not need it) might lower the 
interest-acceptance relationship and also after people find out more 
about the complex novel product, they could conclude not to like it 
(see also Muth et al., 2015 for a connection between interest, insight, 
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and liking). Yet, while not everybody necessarily may want to own 
complex novel products like a dry ice washing machine or 
computerized cleaning flies, for the development of these products, 
interest could contribute to support, (crowd) funding, and ultimately, 
success. 
Finally, while product developers might worry that increasing 
actual or perceived coping potential might make their product seem 
more like other products, and thus more ordinary, this is not what we 
found. Our manipulations increased coping potential in Experiments 
5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, but evaluations of novelty and complexity of the 
products and inventions remained unaffected (Experiments 5.1 and 5.3) 
or increased (Experiment 5.2). This suggests that the novelty-
complexity and coping potential appraisals work independently (Silvia, 
2005) and that it is indeed the ability to deal with complex novelty that 
predicts interest rather than decreased levels of novelty or complexity. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that people first need to feel able 
to cope, before they can become interested in cleaning their house 
using robotic cleaning flies, creating rainfall on a hot summer day with a 
weather modification device, or turning on their television with a 
brainwave tattoo. 
 




The dynamics of surprise and curiosity 
 
“The mind is an anticipatory device”  
Miceli and Castelfranchi (2015; p. 3) 
 
People constantly monitor whether reality fits their schematic 
representations and expectancies (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001, Miceli & 
Castelfranchi, 2015). When an unexpected event is detected or when 
information appears to be missing, people experience surprise or 
curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994; Meyer et al., 1997; Silvia & Kashdan, 
2009). At this point, reality does not yet make sense, which is 
unpleasant because it is in conflict with people’s need for a predictable 
and coherent world (Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 
2015; Proulx et al., 2012). This unpleasantness is, however, only 
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temporary, as people will try to make sense of the unknown and 
anticipate that they can resolve their lack of understanding. Following 
these dynamics of sense-making, I argued and showed that the 
subjective experience of surprise and curiosity depends on where 
people are in their process of dealing with the unknown. 
 
Part 1: Surprise 
The first part of this dissertation focused on surprise. Based on the 
temporal dynamics of sense-making, I theorized in Chapter 1 that 
responses to surprising events are dynamic and unfold from initial 
interruption (i.e., responses to the unexpectedness of an event) to 
cognitive mastering (i.e., responses to the valence of the event). I 
showed that theories and empirical evidence on surprise could be 
arranged onto this interruption-to-mastering timeline: Initially, surprise 
increases processing depth to prepare cognitive mastering. The 
interruption is likely to be experienced as negative and over time, 
responses unfold to other states depending on the nature of the 
stimulus. Time is thus a key factor to understand the nature of surprise 
and to distinguish it from its consequences. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I presented empirical support for this 
unfolding logic of surprise. In Chapter 2, I used autobiographical recall 
procedures and analyses of facial expressions over time and found that 
the response to a surprising event and the perception of surprise in 
others is initially more negative than later. This is replicated in Chapter 
3, where I showed that initial facial expressions to positive surprises are 
more negative than later expressions. Moreover, expressions to positive 
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and negative surprises were initially similar, but after time differentiated 
depending on the valence of the event. Finally, people may frown after 
a surprise and importantly, initial frowns were independent of the 
valence of the surprising target and only later turned to smiles in the 
case of positive surprises.  
Taken together, Part 1 of this dissertation showed that to study 
surprise it is key to take the temporal dynamics of sense-making into 
account and to distinguish surprise from the state that follows it. Facial 
expressions are particularly suitable to reveal this unfolding, because 
they can capture these temporal changes.  
 
Part 2: Curiosity 
In Part 2, I focused on the dynamics of curiosity. Curiosity is the 
desire to know (Litman, 2005; Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia & Kashdan, 
2009) and contrary to the “undecided” nature of surprise where people 
await further information before taking action (Scherer et al., 2004), 
curiosity involves exploratory motivation aimed at resolving the 
information-gap. In this context, time is also a key factor. Like surprise, 
curiosity also involves unfolding from not knowing something to 
knowing something. Yet, while with surprise time allows people to 
make sense of what has happened, with curiosity, the outcome that 
resolves the state is not present yet and the anticipation of finding it or 
being able to deal with it is the key factor. I showed that the 
anticipation of discovering the outcome weakens the negativity of being 
deprived of information. In addition, I showed that the anticipation of 
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being able to deal with something that is not completely understood 
intensifies interest. 
Specifically, in Chapter 4, I showed that time to the resolution of 
curiosity affects the subjective experience of curiosity because it 
determines the relative impact of not knowing vs. almost knowing what 
an outcome will be. When people did not expect to close their 
information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution), the anticipation of the 
resolution was weaker and not knowing affected the subjective 
experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close 
their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, 
people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more 
annoyance with lack of information when the time-to-the-resolution 
was long as compared to short. Moreover, when time in the long time-
to-resolution situation passed, the anticipation of the resolution became 
stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with 
lack of information decreased. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I focused on interest in complex novelty. I 
argued that people will only be motivated to explore the unknown 
when they think they can manage. People become more interested in 
complex novelty when they have a sense that they can cope with the 
unfamiliarity and difficulty component of complex novelty. Following 
this, I showed that people who had relatively high coping potential were 
more interested in complex novelty than people who experienced 
relatively low coping potential. So, products like computerized cleaning 
flies or Nano-technology for health monitoring were especially 
interesting to people who felt they understood what it is or what it is 
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for (actual coping potential). In addition to this effect of product-
specific understanding, interest in complex novelty also increased when 
people were in a state where they felt able to deal with the unfamiliarity 
and difficulty component of complex novelty (perceived coping 
potential). 
Taken together, Part 2 of this dissertation showed that anticipation 
is a key factor for the subjective experience of curiosity. The closer 
people are to the resolution, the more they anticipate discovering new 
information, the more the negative feeling of deprivation is reduced. 
Moreover, the more people anticipate that they can deal with complex 
novel things, the more curious they will become. 
 
What Happens Next? 
A question that was only peripherally part of the current 
dissertation is what happens after surprise and curiosity are resolved. In 
this last section, I would like to point out some consequences of 
surprise and curiosity for subsequent feelings and evaluations, including 
what may happen when sense-making fails. 
When things make sense again 
When sense-making is successful, surprise and curiosity dissipate, 
but there may be downstream consequences for subsequent feelings 
and evaluations. As outlined in Part 1 of this dissertation, surprise is 
known to amplify the state that follows it. Based on contrast effects or 
transfer of arousal (Biernat, 2005; Schachter & Singer, 1962) people are, 
for instance, happier with unexpected than expected positive outcomes, 
such as when they unexpectedly gain money or receive a surprise gift 
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(Mellers et al., 1997; Valenzuela et al., 2009). A practical implication of 
this amplification potential is that people might be delighted with 
better-than-expected service (Oliver, 1997) and via affect-as-
information (Schwarz, 1990), people might evaluate products more 
positive when they are introduced using surprises (e.g., in advertising, 
Derbaix & Vanhamme, 2003). Based on the research in the current 
dissertation, however, such a strategy will only be effective when people 
have time to make sense of it. If not, the negativity of not 
understanding might be used as base for judgment. 
While consequences of surprise seem pretty clear, for curiosity it is 
more difficult to predict what will happen after the resolution. 
Loewenstein (1994) predicts that resolving curiosity will generally be 
disappointing, as the outcome cannot match the anticipation and 
intensity of curiosity that precedes the resolution. Yet, there may be 
situations that result in more positive states. First, an outcome can 
simply match or exceed expectancies (e.g., reading a funny end of a 
story or learning something really interesting), which could make it 
enjoyable. In addition, the positive feeling associated with resolving an 
information-gap might transfer to the evaluation of the target and when 
people predict outcomes, they might be right, which could contribute 
to enjoying the outcome (e.g., correctly predicting the killer in a murder 
mystery). Finally, when there is no clear expectation about what there is 
to discover (as with diversive curiosity, information search for the sake 
of stimulation rather than a specific answer, Berlyne, 1960), it is unlikely 
that outcomes are generally disappointing as people may simply enjoy 
what they come across. Clearly, there is more research needed to 
 
	   169 
understand what determines the consequences of curiosity. This could 
also benefit the effectiveness of everyday use of curiosity, such as teaser 
advertising, cliffhangers, or movie trailers (e.g., Menon, & Soman, 
2002), where it is probably not the intention that the anticipation is 
more exciting than the actual content. 
When sense-making fails 
Up until now, I have generally focused on situations where, at 
some point, reality makes sense again. Yet, unexpected outcomes are 
not always understood and information-gaps not always resolved. What 
happens when sense-making fails? 
The failure to make sense of a surprising or unknown event will 
most likely result in confusion. Confusion refers to feeling unsure how 
to proceed in the face of an ongoing mismatch as a result of 
inconsistency or incoherence (D’Mello & Graesser, 2014; D’Mello, 
Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014). It motivates effortful cognitive 
activities to resolve it (e.g., careful deliberation; D’Mello et al., 2014). 
Yet, when confusion persists (D’Mello et al., 2014) and people 
experience low or no coping potential (Silvia, 2010) it can also result in 
avoidance, disengagement, or moving to something different. So, an 
unexpected or unknown outcome results in sense-making. If this does 
not happen, however, people might get frustrated and, if possible, give 
up and disengage from the situation (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; 
D’Mello et al., 2014). 
It should be noted that confusion is less likely to occur with 
relatively simple knowledge gaps like not knowing some states in 
America or the contents of a box (Loewenstein, 1994; Van Dijk & 
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Zeelenberg, 2007). Unsuccessful sense-making in these situations may 
result in frustration as the not knowing state is continuously 
unresolved, but not in confusion as there is not really anything to be 
confused about (i.e., it is very clear what is missing and therefore, there 
is no mismatch or incoherence; see also the specific vs. diffuse 
information-gap in the Prologue). When people realize that the missing 
information will not be found, the anticipation of the resolution of 
curiosity will also disappear. Without this anticipation, people will most 
likely give up and curiosity will dissipate. As such, dealing with an 
unexpected or unknown outcome (e.g., Chapter 1 or 5) does not 
necessarily imply that people make sense of it, as they can also accept 
the presence of the unknown and move on. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapters in this dissertation show that people first need to 
master a situation of not knowing before they can appreciate it. This 
can occur through increased understanding, by feeling close to a 
resolution, or by feeling able to deal with the unknown. Surprise and 
curiosity are thus dynamic states that can only be fully understood by 
disentangling the not knowing from the (almost) knowing component. 
The findings in this dissertation speak to the importance of knowing 
and understanding the environment. Knowledge states signal a 
discrepancy and as long as people do not (almost) resolve this, it feels 
unpleasant. Only after some sense-making, it can feel good. In other 
words, it can be nice to be positively surprised, interesting to think 
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about complex novelty, and enjoyable to explore the unknown—but 
only when it starts to make sense. 
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De dynamiek van verrassing en 
nieuwsgierigheid 
 
Mensen houden constant in de gaten of de realiteit waar ze zich in 
bevinden overeenkomt met de verwachtingen en schematische 
representaties die ze hebben van de wereld (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015). Wanneer iets onverwachts wordt 
gedetecteerd of wanneer informatie blijkt te missen, ervaren mensen 
verrassing of nieuwsgierigheid (Loewenstein, 1994; Meyer et al., 1997; 
Silvia & Kashdan, 2009). Op het moment van dit soort discrepanties 
worden waargenomen is de realiteit even niet te begrijpen. Dit wordt 
ervaren als onplezierig omdat het de behoefte aan een voorspelbare en 
coherente wereld frustreert (Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Miceli & 
Castelfranchi, 2015; Proulx et al., 2012). Deze onplezierigheid van het 
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“niet-weten” is echter tijdelijk. Mensen zullen de situatie proberen te 
begrijpen en anticiperen dat het gebrek aan informatie of begrip zal 
worden opgelost. In tegenstelling tot het niet-weten kan (de anticipatie 
van) de oplossing ervan als plezierig worden ervaren omdat het leuk 
kan zijn om iets nieuws te ontdekken (Berlyne, 1971; Kashdan & Silvia, 
2009; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009).  
Het betekenis geven aan iets dat niet begrepen wordt is dus een 
dynamisch proces dat zich ontvouwt van iets niet weten (onplezierig) naar 
iets (bijna) weten (mogelijk plezierig). In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat de 
subjectieve ervaring van verrassing en nieuwsgierigheid afhankelijk is 
van waar mensen zich in dit proces bevinden. Door de dynamiek van 
betekenis geven mee te nemen in het onderzoek naar verrassing en 
nieuwsgierigheid blijkt het mogelijk om de niet-weten component te 
onderscheiden van de (bijna) weten component. Op deze manier is het 
mogelijk om verrassing en nieuwsgierigheid beter te begrijpen. In Deel 
1 van dit proefschrift richt ik me op verrassing en het effect van de tijd 
die het kost om verrassende uitkomsten te begrijpen. In Deel 2 van dit 
proefschrift richt ik me op nieuwsgierigheid en het effect van de 
nabijheid van de oplossing in termen van tijd en de mate waarin 
mensen zich in staat voelen om te gaan met het onbekende. 
 
Deel 1: Verrassing 
 Hoofdstuk 1 is een theoretische analyse op basis van de idee dat 
reacties op onverwachte stimuli zich temporeel ontvouwen. Wanneer 
mensen worden geconfronteerd met iets dat onverwacht is, ervaren ze 
allereerst interruptie en pas in tweede instantie begrip. Mensen reageren 
 
	   193 
dus eerst op het onverwachte element van de verrassende stimulus 
(interruptie) en daarna pas op de valentie van deze stimulus (begrip). 
Theorieën en empirisch bewijs over verrassing blijken goed te passen 
op deze interruptie-tot-begrip tijdslijn: In eerste instantie verdiept 
verrassing de informatieverwerking, wat nodig is voor het latere begrip. 
De interruptie die in eerste instantie wordt ervaren lijkt onplezierig te 
zijn en pas naar mate de tijd verstrijkt, en mensen meer betekenis 
hebben kunnen geven aan de situatie, reageren mensen meer in lijn met 
de kenmerken van de stimulus (bijvoorbeeld blij wanneer de 
verrassende uitkomst positief is). Tijd is dus een essentiële factor om 
verrassing te begrijpen omdat het alleen dan kan worden onderscheiden 
van de gevolgen. 
 In Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 wordt empirisch bewijs voor het 
temporele ontvouwen van reacties na een verrassing gepresenteerd. In 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik studies waarin autobiografische herinneringen 
en gezichtsexpressies worden geanalyseerd. Het blijkt dat de reactie op 
een verrassing en de perceptie van verrassing in anderen in eerste 
instantie negatiever is dan later. Dit wordt gerepliceerd in Hoofdstuk 3, 
waar initiële gezichtsexpressies na een positieve verrassing negatiever 
zijn dan latere gezichtsexpressies. Daarnaast blijkt dat gezichts-
expressies na een positieve en een negatieve verrassing in het begin 
hetzelfde zijn en pas na enige tijd differentiëren afhankelijk van de 
valentie van de uitkomst. Tot slot blijkt dat de gezichtsexpressie na een 
verrassing mogelijk een frons bevat. Belangrijk hierbij is dat het fronzen 
in eerste instantie onafhankelijk is van de valentie van de verrassende 
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uitkomst en pas later verandert in een lach in het geval van positieve 
verrassingen. 
De hoofdstukken in Deel 1 van dit proefschrift laten zien dat het 
tijd kost om een verrassende uitkomst te begrijpen. Alleen als deze tijd 
wordt meegenomen in onderzoek naar verassing is het mogelijk om 
verrassing te onderscheiden van de staat die erop volgt. Het analyseren 
van gezichtsexpressies is uitermate geschikt om het ontvouwen van 
reacties te laten zien omdat het gezicht de temporele veranderingen 
toont. 
 
Deel 2: Nieuwsgierigheid 
In Deel 2 van dit proefschrift richt ik me op de dynamiek van 
nieuwsgierigheid. Nieuwsgierigheid wordt veroorzaakt door missende 
informatie en wordt omschreven als de behoefte om iets te weten 
(Litman, 2005; Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009). In 
tegenstelling tot de “onbesliste” aard van verrassing waar mensen 
wachten op meer informatie voordat eventueel actie wordt 
ondernomen (Scherer et al., 2004), bevat nieuwsgierigheid exploratieve 
motivatie gericht op het vinden van de missende informatie. Hierin 
blijkt tijd ook een belangrijke factor. Net als bij verrassing ontvouwt 
nieuwsgierigheid zich van iets niet weten naar iets (bijna) weten. Echter, 
waar tijd bij verrassing mensen in staat stelt om te begrijpen wat er is 
gebeurd, is tijd bij nieuwsgierigheid meer een kwestie van de nabijheid 
van de oplossing en de anticipatie van het ontdekken van iets nieuws. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat de tijd tot het oplossen van 
nieuwsgierigheid effect heeft op de subjectieve ervaring van 
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nieuwsgierigheid. Dit komt omdat de nabijheid van de oplossing de 
relatieve impact van niet-weten versus bijna-weten beïnvloedt. Ik laat 
zien dat wanneer mensen verwachten dat het gebrek aan informatie niet 
snel wordt opgelost (lange tijd tot resolutie), ze een zwakkere anticipatie 
van de oplossing hebben en meer worden beïnvloed door het niet-
weten dan wanneer mensen verwachten dat het gebrek aan informatie 
snel wordt opgelost (korte tijd tot de resolutie). Mensen ervaren daarom 
minder positieve gevoelens en meer irritatie door gebrek aan informatie 
wanneer de oplossing relatief lang duurt dan wanneer deze nabij is. 
Daarnaast blijkt dat wanneer de lange tijd tot de oplossing verstrijkt, de 
anticipatie van de oplossing en positieve gevoelens worden versterkt en 
de irritatie door gebrek aan informatie vermindert. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 richt in me, tot slot, op nieuwsgierigheid en 
interesse in complexe nieuwe dingen. Het startpunt is dat mensen alleen 
het onbekende zullen exploreren wanneer ze denken dat ze dit 
aankunnen. Mensen zijn daarom meer geïnteresseerd in complexe 
nieuwe dingen wanneer ze het gevoel hebben dat ze kunnen omgaan 
met de onbekende of ingewikkelde component hiervan. In 
overeenstemming hiermee laat ik zien dat mensen die denken dat ze 
complexe nieuwheid aankunnen (een begrip dat in het Engels wordt 
aangeduid met coping potential) meer interesse hebben in complexe 
nieuwe dingen dan mensen die dit in mindere mate denken aan te 
kunnen. Producten of technologieën zoals bijvoorbeeld 
schoonmaakrobots of Nano-sensoren die processen in het lichaam 
kunnen meten zijn daarom vooral interessant wanneer mensen het 
gevoel hebben dat ze begrijpen wat het is of waar het voor bedoeld is 
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(i.e., daadwerkelijke coping potential). Naast dit product-specifieke begrip 
blijkt interesse in complexe nieuwheid ook toe te nemen wanneer 
mensen een meer algemeen gevoel hebben om te kunnen gaan met 
onbekendheid of complexiteit (i.e., perceptie van coping potential). Dit 
hoofdstuk laat dus zien dat de introductie van nieuwe complexe 
producten of technologieën niet alleen gericht moet zijn op dat wat er 
nieuw aan is, maar ook op het bevorderen van coping potential. 
De hoofdstukken in Deel 2 van dit proefschrift laten zien dat 
anticipatie een essentiële factor is in de ervaring van nieuwsgierigheid: 
Hoe nabijer de oplossing, hoe meer mensen anticiperen dat ze iets 
nieuws zullen ontdekken en hoe minder negatieve gevoelens van 
deprivatie een rol spelen. Daarnaast blijkt dat wanneer mensen 
anticiperen dat ze kunnen omgaan met complexe nieuwe dingen, ze hier 
nieuwsgieriger naar worden. 
 
Conclusie 
De hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift tonen aan dat mensen een 
situatie waarin ze iets niet weten eerst moeten begrijpen voordat ze 
deze kunnen waarderen. Dit kan gebeuren door middel van betekenis 
geven, de nabijheid van de oplossing of een gevoel om te kunnen gaan 
met het onbekende. Verrassing en nieuwsgierigheid zijn dus 
dynamische gevoelens, die alleen volledig kunnen worden begrepen 
door de niet-weten component te onderscheiden van de (bijna) weten 
component. De bevindingen in dit proefschrift tonen aan hoe 
belangrijk het is dat mensen de wereld om hen heen kennen en 
begrijpen. Verrassing en nieuwsgierigheid signaleren een discrepantie en 
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zolang mensen dit niet (bijna) kunnen oplossen is dit vervelend. Alleen 
wanneer mensen in staat zijn enige betekenis te geven aan dit onbegrip 
bestaat de mogelijkheid dat het goed voelt. Met andere woorden, het is 
leuk om positief te worden verrast, interessant om na te denken over 
complexe nieuwe dingen en plezierig om het onbekende te 
exploreren—maar alleen nadat mensen het beginnen te begrijpen.

 






Dit proefschrift gaat op vele manieren over tijd. Tijd als factor om 
verrassing en nieuwsgierigheid beter te begrijpen maar ook tijd om zelf 
betekenis te geven aan een onverwachte situatie. Tijd waarin ik af en toe 
dacht in een “rerun” te zitten (cf. Vonnegut’s Timequake, 1997) en 
vooral tijd om opnieuw te kunnen ontdekken hoe leuk het is om 
onderzoek te doen. Ik ben veel mensen dankbaar voor het mogelijk 
maken van dit project en het in mij gestelde vertrouwen. In het 
bijzonder wil ik graag de volgende mensen noemen: 
 
Bedankt Eric, dat je mijn promotor wilde zijn. Bedankt voor je scherpe 
geest, je relativeringsvermogen, en voor de deur die altijd open staat. 
Bedankt Naomi, voor je steun en het letterlijk en figuurlijk achter me 
staan. Bedankt Wilco, voor het altijd willen meedenken en dat je mijn 
co-promotor wilde zijn. Bedankt, Philip Spinhoven en Hanna Swaab, 
voor jullie initiatief en bereidheid om deze bijzondere promotie 
 
	   200 
mogelijk te maken. Bedankt, Daniel Mandel, voor het delen van je 
kennis. 
 
Bedankt/thanks, Marijke en Yana, wat fijn dat jullie er zijn; it meant a 
lot to me to be in the craziness together. Bedankt, Marijn, voor het fijne 
samenwerken; je enthousiasme is aanstekelijk en motiverend. Bedankt, 
Leidse collega’s, voor jullie ideeën en gezelligheid. Bedankt, alle andere 
mensen om me heen, voor de positiviteit. Bedankt, Johan en Petra, 




	   201 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Marret Noordewier (Leeuwarden, 1981) completed her secondary 
education (VWO) in 2000 at CSG Comenius in Leeuwarden and 
graduated in (social) psychology at the University of Groningen in 
2005. After working as a researcher at the Emmen Zoo, she went to 
Tilburg University and received a PhD in psychology in 2009. Then she 
continued working at Tilburg University as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the 
department of Social Psychology and as an Assistant Professor at the 
Communication and Information Sciences department. Since 2011, she 
works at Leiden University as an Assistant Professor (tenured in 2015).  
 
 
